Beyond the ballot-box
Although democracy is the buzzword in Iraq, merely holding elections is not enough, Hala Mustafa* argues
Since the fall of the Ba'thist regime in Baghdad, the United States has come under close scrutiny. Will the Americans pull out of Baghdad soon or stay for years? Will they unite Iraqis or will they succeed in administering a country divided along ethnic, sectarian, and tribal lines? More to the point, will the US fulfil its promise to bring democracy to Iraq and turn it into a model for the region, or fail in doing so?
Democracy, some have argued, is incompatible with the Arab world. Would it be possible to implant it in Iraq these days, following such a long absence? Or will an autocratic Shi'ite regime -- one that is just as tyrannical as the Ba'thists -- emerge, with clerics calling the shots for the entire nation?
Those are just a few of the disconcerting questions with which politicians and scholars -- Americans included -- are grappling. Contemporary Iraq poses a challenge to US policy in the region. Anything the United States does -- or doesn't do -- will affect the future of the Gulf country and the region as a whole.
Much has been written in the Arab world about this state of affairs, but fresh insight is still scarce. Clichés have been regurgitated, but the Arabs have assumed the role of spectators. Those who support the United States have cast the country as a saviour, while those who detest it are hoping it will fail so they might vent their anger against it more freely. These two reactions are based more on sentiment than reality. The Iraqi predicament is just as much an Arab one as it is American.
US policy is clearly at a crossroads, but so is the Arab world. The repercussions of the Iraqi saga will reverberate far and wide. Even the departure of foreign forces will not be enough to end it. The central dilemma in Iraq revolves around its internal composition.
As Arab countries go, Iraq is not in a unique situation. Many Arab countries have similar characteristics and shortcomings. The fall of Saddam's regime laid bare numerous political and societal problems. After years of independence, one still has to wonder about the extent of domestic cohesion achieved there.
Iraq, then, is a case of stunted development, a country where confessional and tribal groups have not developed the sense of cohesion required for the smooth functioning of a nation state. Citizenship, not loyalty to clan or sect, remains a vague concept, both in form and content. National integration in Iraq had been enforced by a repressive regime. Once the regime disappeared, a whole array of problems surfaced in a manner reminiscent of the situation following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Iraq is a rich country, and yet it has failed to live up to its promise in terms of cultural, societal, political, and economic development.
This sorry state of affairs applies to many other Arab countries, where societies are in a state of flux, neither totally conventional nor fully modern, but something in between. Arab countries have not yet mastered the ways of modernity and science. Full civil rights remain an alien concept. Religion and the state coexist in an uncomfortable symbiosis. Added to this, standards of living are far below the level required for effective political participation. The Arab middle classes are still unable to provide the mainstay of professional, intellectual, and political life.
All of the above pose serious problems for democratisation. It would be wrong to assume that democracy does not befit the Arab world, but one must admit that societal and cultural environment compatible with democracy is still lacking.
So, can the United States bring democracy to Iraq? The answer depends on two things: the type of democracy and the time needed to create it.
Defined as casting votes, democracy can be accomplished within days or weeks. Yet, what forces would the ballot box bring to power? Under the circumstances, where the Shi'ites account for about 60 per cent of the population and have the capacity to mobilise the masses by appealing to religious sentiments, the outcome would seem fairly predictable. The US State Department and intelligence services, for their part, might not be averse to such an outcome.
Ballot-box democracy of the sort mentioned above may, however, offer an example that "inspires" others, to use a word favoured by US politicians. Islamist forces can be single-minded on matters of power and truth, and are willing to sacrifice pluralism in favour of their point of view. A one- vote-one-time scenario would not be in the interests of Iraqi democracy.
The world is full of electoral democracies that provide a measure of political rights but fail to sustain a pluralistic system with a credible rotation of power. Such systems generally do not guarantee full civil liberties, they may be intolerant of ideological opposition and xenophobic when it comes to the rest of the world.
With respect to the matter of a time frame, if current circumstances are not conducive to establishing an enduring democracy, wouldn't it be advisable to wait until the state is rebuilt and society is given a chance to mature in the manner alluded to earlier? The task of change is clearly difficult, but it is not impossible.
It may take Iraq years before it is able to launch an enduring form of democracy, but there are alternatives. For example, efforts can be made to forge a consensus among the various sectarian, tribal, and political forces in the country. Each of those forces should be enticed to abandon some of their political ambitions, particularly those ambitions that could endanger the future of democracy. The Iraqis could strive for a power-sharing formula that would safeguard basic individual and collective civil rights (freedom of belief, expression, movement, lifestyle, and so on). No political force should be allowed to impinge on or revoke basic human rights.
Such a general consensus would have to be enshrined in a written democratic constitution; one that safeguards basic civil rights against future reversal by any social or political group in the country. Such steps could pave the way for a true democracy. They could be taken within weeks or months -- not years.
The durability of democracy matters more than the speed of its creation. Societal and cultural conditions must be taken into account. The Arab world has characteristics that set it apart from, say, Latin America and East Europe, where countries have pursued democratisation with varying degrees of success. Both Latin America and East Europe are closer to Western culture than the Arab world. It would be easier to overthrow regimes than to create credible democracies. To further democracy in the Arab world, efforts must be accelerated to speed up reforms, modernisation, and cultural enlightenment. Unless this is done, democracy will remain a thin veneer that could peel away with time. The responsibility for democratisation is not America's responsibility alone. The Arab political and cultural intelligentsia must play its part by providing a clear and enlightened vision for the future of the region.
* The writer is editor-in-chief of the quarterly journal Al-Demoqrateya (Democracy) published by Al-Ahram.
