Pacifying foolishness
Colin Powell's visit to Syria and Lebanon was a clear message that Damascus was not being targeted, Imad Shoeibi, in Damascus, writes
When the United States threatens Syria after the right-wing in the Pentagon has won its "war" at such a small price, the threats should be heeded. They cannot be ignored, but, at the same time, they should not be inflated. First impressions might suggest that there are those who wish to crown their achievements of the latest battle by forcing other states to buckle under the threat of unbridled power. But such an assessment is static or raw, having failed to take into consideration other calculations.
First of all, such assessments take into account US actions while forgetting the most important law of classical physics: the law of reaction. The reaction may not be exactly equal and opposite to the action; it may take a different form, not necessarily military. Still, it can absorb the power of the action in one way or another. This is the role of proactive politics, which does not submit to pressure of the military type and which knows that diplomacy can sometimes absorb and deflate a military shock. Even in static calculations, the other party must be taken into account. This point is often ignored in political analysis, which have become so much shock and awe, treating US official statements as if they are air-raid sirens.
Secondly, many ignore the dynamics of the situation. Both US and Syrian politics are fluid, involve a constant process of give and take. We should thus view the situation from a dynamic, rather than a static perspective.
The US is working in a fluid context at this point, with several unknown factors to consider: a war that, it says, has not yet ended; a government that cannot be imposed; and freedoms that have been unleashed (and shot at as well).
Most importantly, the US has won the battle, but it has not won the war. These are two distinct things. A war guarantees the conditions of battle in an international and regional context. It involves financing and supply lines, and, above all, it has a political objective. Almost all of these elements are absent.
The US has not secured the international front yet; thus far, it is still in violation of United Nations law. It can only be called an occupying power at this point. While post-war Iraq is being treated as a de facto entity -- this is what French President Jacques Chirac meant when he said he would be realistic about Iraq -- the war and the post-war situation have not yet accrued international legitimacy. One only need look at the differences raging over how to treat the transitional Iraqi government, its ability to conclude legally binding agreements, and the question of Iraqi international representation.
Moreover, the US was not able to secure a favourable regional position. By directing hostile statements towards Syria, the US has created a space for Arab counteraction, as Arabs have begun to connect US claims that the war has not ended with its new threats, concluding that the war will be extended to other countries.
Most important of all, the objective of the war has been lost amid weapons of mass destruction that were not used and have not been found -- destroying all credibility of that claim -- and the sudden evaporation of most of the Iraqi leadership in an act that was almost certainly bent. This explains the easy fall of Baghdad and the US reward of a mere $300,000 for Saddam Hussein's capture.
In the same dynamic context, Syria has many choices. The outside observer looking on from a static perspective may not think them enough, but when they are brought together, they create an opportunity for Syria to exercise its own form of pressure. In other words, we must distinguish between the individual weight of each of these choices and the sum total of the impact they can have.
First of all, Syria enjoys strong relations with many Arab countries. It has acted as a mediator in several disputes between Arab and Islamic states, including between Egypt and Sudan, Morocco and Algeria, Bahrain and Iran, and the United Arab Emirates and Iran, and it can now draw upon this store of goodwill. Although the Arabs squandered their regional weight by considering themselves already done in from the outset, by quickly responding to the Syrian situation, they have given the impression that Syria is an altogether different matter and it will not be treated as Iraq was. Above all, it must be remembered that Syria is not Iraq. The legacy of equanimity and rationality possessed by presidents Hafez Al-Assad and Bashar Al-Assad differs from the Saddam Hussein's legacy of foolishness.
Secondly, Syria enjoys excellent international relations. Syria and France were in perfect agreement on UN Resolution 1441, and they still are. Syrian-British relations, just getting started for the first time in the two nations' history, represent for Britain an opportunity to once more become a presence in the Middle East after a long-standing absence. The history of Syria's relations with Russia cannot be erased by a stroke of the pen. Though Russia is no longer the Soviet Union, with the same alliances, power, and diplomatic weight, it has some influence. Moreover, if we examine the alliance of the willing -- the US, Britain, and Spain -- we should give credence to statements made by Spain's prime minister and foreign minister, which were not at all supportive of a crackdown on Damascus.
We cannot view these choices as static, and we cannot act as if the American ghoul is going to devour us. In contrast, the more we examine the long-term political impact of the war in Iraq -- knowing that war is not waged for war's sake -- we will realise how much the US will shortly be in need of all nations in the region in order to extricate itself from its predicament. An Iraqi government unrecognised by its neighbours will be meaningless, and it will be a burden on the US. Indeed, without creating a new political and administrative situation that is acceptable to Iraq's neighbours, stability cannot be achieved.
More importantly, unless Iraq's neighbours play some sort of role, the country's ethnic, religious, and ideological composition -- even the character of Iraqis themselves -- will not allow for a united Iraq, nor will it provide the kind of stability necessary to exploit the nation's oil wealth. Thus, tensions in relations between Damascus and Washington must be reduced.
In raising the issue of weapons of mass destruction, claiming they were transferred from Iraq to Syria or that they are being produced locally in Syria, the US is acting foolishly, and it will ultimately harm American interests. A slew of logical responses can be molilised to show that Syria does not possess weapons of mass destruction and that no such weapons were transferred from Iraq to Syria. (This was, by the way, a claim made repeatedly by Israel before the war. At that time, the US gave no strategic importance to it; since it was preparing for the war on Iraq, claims like this would have nullified the whole justification for that war, i.e. that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction).
Despite all that could be said to prove that Syria does not possess weapons of mass destruction, the accusations being put forth at the present moment hurt the US and Israel more than Syria. When the accusations were made, Syria proposed to Arab members of the United Nations a collective resolution to rid the region of weapons of mass destruction, including those possessed by Israel. For the first time, all Arabs rallied around a defined objective and pursued a united policy; this is in the interests of neither the US nor Israel. The proposed resolution puts the US in a difficult position: if the administration truly fears that such weapons will be used against it or be given to terrorists, how could it not accept the resolution? In turn, why is it being selective in its drive towards disarmament? The party that would be most affected by disarmament would be Israel because it is the only nation in the Middle East that has produced and acquired weapons of mass destruction.
This explains the confusion of John Negroponte, the US representative in the UN Security Council, when he stated that the proposed resolution interested the US but it would not necessarily adopt it.
The announcement that US secretary of state would soon visit Damascus meant two things: firstly, that the political machine had started to move, and secondly, that US embarrassment over the Arab proposal may force Washington to seek a bargain.
This may seem to some an overly optimistic analysis, but it is realistic, just as it is realistic to realise that one does not wage war for war's sake. Ghouls and genies are no more than imaginary beings. Human beings construct systems and rules for engagement; no matter how much they try to rebel against them or destroy them, they find in the end that they must return to them. The US and the neo-conservatives in the Pentagon may want to completely discard the international system established after World War II, replacing it with a system in which only the US has the right of veto. But the US has not yet devised a way to implement the plan except through shows of force. How would the alternative work legislatively and legally? They may try, but they are forced to return once more to the prevailing order.
This swing of the pendulum complicates political action in the US because the legacy of US political relations and politics in general never allows ideology to hold sway in the long term. Between the madness of the Department of Defence and the pragmatic rationality of the State Department, the weight of existing international institutions becomes selective, with selective wars, selective interventions, selective rules, and the selective application of international laws. But raising the issue of weapons of mass destruction in the United Nations will again give prominence to that institution that some wish would vanish -- selectively, of course.
Israel suffers most from the US use of weapons of mass destruction as a pretext for action. If the US reasons that it cannot accept the proposed Arab resolution regarding weapons of mass destruction in the region because peace has not yet been achieved, the proposal can be linked to a text that urges the implementation of all Security Council resolutions concerned with peace in the Middle East, making peace and disarmament one bundle. But Israel's reasons for maintaining its arsenal go beyond the Arab world to what it sees as an Islamic threat, or a global threat more generally. As a nation, it lives with a security complex, turning it into a way of living. It has no justification for its existence or continuity without weapons of mass destruction because it knows that its roots are not planted deep.
There is a wide gap between US justifications for disarmament and Israeli justifications for maintaining its arsenal, just as there are differences between the tendencies of the Pentagon neo-conservatives and the interests of the US. This gap leaves the US administration several choices.
Let us assume that using the pretext of disarmament, the US freed the region of traditional weapons -- the only kind found in the vicinity of Israel -- just as it is doing in Iraq. What sort of strategic mindset stands behind such nonsense? If there is no deterrent to Israel, will it not be encouraged to expand regionally? Is the extension of Israel a strategic necessity for the US? In other words, is it in the interest of the US elephant for the Israeli frog to grow any fatter?
The elephant may carry the frog on its back, spoiling it and listening to it sing, but it is unreasonable for the US to let Israel grow as fat as the elephant itself. It is unacceptable to US interests and, even more importantly, dangerous for Israel itself.
Colin Powell's Middle Eastern visit, limited to Syria and Lebanon, is a positive sign, by which the US State Department hopes to convey its wish to begin a new, positive dialogue with Syria. In choosing to spend the night in Damascus -- a first for a US secretary of state -- Powell let it be known that Washington is not worried about Syria's present role. This comes after Damascus has shown its willingness to engage in a dialogue, which Powell stated he hoped would be honest and frank as both discussed the ongoing changes in the Middle East.
Syria sees no need to alter the way it interacts with the US: it deals with the major issues on an individual basis, rather than as a whole. As concerns terrorism, for example, Damascus has cooperated with the US while disagreeing with its definition of terrorism and the way in which US addresses the results of terrorism rather than its causes. Along with the US, Syria believes there must be regional peace, but it does not believe that UN resolutions and the legitimate framework for peace should be ignored in favour of negotiations based solely on security, at the expense of rights and the framework itself. This is what Powell can expect to hear regarding the roadmap, in which security concerns overwhelm the desire for peace. For Syria, the document puts the cart before the horse, making the results of negotiations the starting point of the peace process. Damascus considers this a waste of time.
Observers in the Syrian capital believe that Colin Powell will broach symbolic, rather than practical issues in Damascus. Talk about Hizbullah is an implicit indication of US fears that Syria may support a similar type of resistance in Iraq. It appears Powell has been reassured that Syria will not intervene for two reasons. First of all, there is no logistic need, since there are at least six million weapons in southern Iraq. Secondly, for Syria, the primary conflict is the Arab-Israeli conflict; it does not need to involve itself in secondary conflicts. Damascus opposed the war in Iraq not only because it violated international law, but also because it opened a new battlefront, sidelining the major regional conflict.
The second order of Powell's visit was the roadmap, which is, for Syria, a matter for all Palestinians. Washington's references to Palestinian organisations are an implicit reference to the roadmap and its hopes that the language and stances of Palestinians that oppose it will not become overly strident. Damascus views the whole matter as a show for the media, since operations are not carried out from Damascus, but from the occupied territories. If the Americans truly want democracy, then they should accept the objections to the roadmap by the important segment of Palestinians living in exile.
As for the subject of Palestinian organisations in Syria, Damascus pays no attention to the issue; for Syria, these organisations express the will of Palestinian refugees, the majority of the Palestinian people. From a democratic perspective, their opinion must be considered. As far as Hizbullah is concerned, Syria sees the matter as a Lebanese affair. Hizbullah is part of the Lebanese social fabric, a political party that seeks to liberate occupied land. Its liberational role will end when the Israeli occupation of Shebaa Farms ends. As for Iraq, the Syrian position remains the same.
Secretary Powell chose to give his press conference before meeting with President Assad, thus giving clear reassurances that Syria was not being targeted. According to Powell, there had been misunderstandings about US intentions towards Syria. He had come to take President Assad's opinion on regional changes -- that is, he did not go to Damascus to give orders. He specified two subjects open for discussion: regional stability and the roadmap, implying that other countries may be invited to join the peace process. According to broad outlines laid out by Powell, the visit covered general regional changes, including Iraq and the roadmap. This, in turn, means that the subject of weapons of mass destruction was not part of the dialogue between the two parties. It seems Washington preferred to avoid the subject considering the embarrassments it might cause. If it agreed to the Syrian Security Council proposal to rid the entire region of weapons of mass destruction, it would harm the interests of the US administration and the Zionist lobby. If it did not support the resolution, its credibility would be damaged before the American public. It appears that Washington preferred to close that file and return to politics.
"Give and take" was the description given to the talks between President Assad and Secretary Powell. This only confirms Syrian claims that Washington did not make demands, but that the two parties engaged in a dialogue of equals.
Once more, we cannot treat American statements as if they are the howl of a demon, or the end of the world. Overlapping interests leave no room for "either/or" choices, or black and white; there are always clouds of grey, and tomorrow there will be more colours still. When rationality faces unthinking foolishness, it does not always need to use shock and awe tactics. Sometimes, foolishness must be pacified. Continuity is a sign of rationality; impetuosity and impulsiveness, always temporary, are the signs of madness.
The writer is a professor of political science at Damascus University.
