The future of the Arab League
Can the Arab League survive its present crisis, asks Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
The forcible removal of the Iraqi regime and its replacement, for the time being at least, by a foreign military occupation, raises important questions about the future of the Arab League. While it is true that not all Arab League member states are genuinely independent, it is also true that they enjoy the requisite degree of independence that qualifies them to invoke "sovereignty", albeit more nominal than real, and to become members of the United Nations. Britain accelerated the creation of the Arab League before the end of World War II to introduce a number of "friendly" Arab states into the nascent international organisation in order to guarantee for itself a better bargaining position in the construction of the post-World War II order.
But things did not work out according to plan. In the wake of the war, British imperial power found itself beset on all sides by national liberation movements in most of its dependencies, including those in the Arab world. The new dynamic was reflected in the Arab League, which developed its own agenda, independent from, and often at odds with, London's designs for the region. With the creation of Israel in 1948, the Arab League, despite its failings and weaknesses, became the symbol of collective Arab resistance to the new challenge. At the time, not all the Arab states enjoyed the same degree of independence. Some had crossed from colonial domination to real independence so successfully that they came into open collision with Western imperialist powers, notably during the Suez crisis. Others enjoyed only formal independence. But gradually the Arab countries under full-fledged Western occupation vanished from the scene, and all Arab countries became members of the Arab League.
Nearly fifty years on, we are suddenly faced with a situation in which a leading Arab state is being ruled by an American, whether the retired general, Jay Garner, or the veteran diplomat specialised in fighting terrorism, John Bremer. Does this mean that Iraq's seat in the Arab League will be filled, and its votes cast, by a representative of the Pentagon or the State Department, or will Arab League meetings convene in the absence of an Iraqi representative? And, in that case, will resolutions issued by a majority of members be regarded as unanimous?
A couple of years ago, it was decided by participants at an extraordinary Arab League summit to hold regular summit meetings once a year. Their decision, which was enshrined in a unanimous resolution, promised to usher in a new stage in the chequered history of the League, marked by more purposeful and united approach to regional problems. For a while, it seemed the status of the League had been enhanced by the summit resolution, which indicated that Arab leaders were willing to subsume their individual will to the collective will. It was believed that regular face-to-face meetings could eventually create a mechanism in inter-Arab relations capable of overcoming reasons for friction and unresolved tensions, and hence of curtailing obvious manifestations of inter-Arab collisions.
But what actually transpired has been just the opposite, with meetings given over to exchanges of mutual flattery or mutual recriminations, sometimes degenerating into shouting matches in which Arab leaders hurl personal insults at one another. It would appear that the decision to make summit meetings compulsory has sharpened animosities rather than the opposite. Obviously a whole new approach is necessary if the Arab League is to become an effective decision-making body reflecting the collective Arab will. Europe, which is made up of several nations, succeeded in building one supra-national organisation, the European Union, to speak in the collective name of all Europeans. But while the Europeans managed to set aside historical feuds and state affiliations in the belief that strength lies in unity, the Arab countries, which see themselves as one nation, are unable to present a united front to the world. This is a dilemma that only the Arab League, the institutionalised expression of pan-Arabism, can solve.
Dr Esmat Abdel-Meguid, Amr Moussa's predecessor as secretary-general of the Arab League, said frankness is a prerequisite for inter-Arab reconciliation. Unfortunately, however, whenever member states engage in a frank exchange of views the result is an exacerbation of tensions and animosities, not a smoothing over of differences. Indeed, the underlying causes of friction between Arab capitals have proved in recent years to be an effective deterrent to the prospect of Arab unity. One important, albeit unspoken, source of tension is the uneven distribution of oil reserves, and hence of wealth, among the various Arab states. The problem is compounded by the fact that the have-nots believe the oil price hike which enriched the haves was made possible thanks to the October 1973 war that they, the have-nots, waged, and feel cheated out of their rightful slice of the cake.
Meanwhile, the cake itself is in danger of disappearing. With the war on Iraq, the United States has proved that it can embark on preemptive wars with impunity. What is to prevent it from using military force to impose its control over the sources of oil in the region? In the immediate aftermath of the oil price hike, Western journalists featured scenarios in which American armed forces seized Middle East oil fields, and the only reason these scenarios did not materialise at the time was because of the possible response of the Soviet Union. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the use of military force to ensure the uninterrupted supply of oil can no longer be discounted. Then there is the question of the reconstruction of Iraq. The United States is pushing for the lifting of sanctions to have Iraq carry the cost of reconstruction. These are just two of the many challenges facing the Arabs, challenges they can only overcome if they speak with one voice through the Arab League.
An immediate challenge to which the Arab League must address itself is the preservation of Iraq's Arab character. In the name of planting democracy and a culture of peace in Iraq, the defeat of Saddam's regime will be followed by a concentrated effort to eradicate the pan-Arab identity invoked by successive Iraqi governments to justify their confrontational stance towards Israel. Indeed, it is not only Iraq's identity that is at risk but even its integrity. Divided between Shi'ites, Sunni and Kurds, the country was kept together only by Saddam's autocratic rule and aversion to democracy. It is hard to envisage a genuine democracy taking root in conditions where the new Iraqi regime will be forced to confront two challenges simultaneously, one a democracy imported from abroad with traits not compatible with many national and cultural characteristics, and the other a dictatorship inherited from the past.
The Arab League is also called upon to guarantee the preservation of the Arab character of the regional system, a difficult task while its member states continue to display more disunity than unity. There has already been an American-Israeli attempt to have "Middle Easternism" replace pan-Arabism as the dominant ideology in the region, by pressing for the establishment of a common Middle East market that would include Israel. There is no doubt that we will witness similar attempts in future, especially with globalisation removing barriers and blurring distinctions between Arab and non-Arab states in the region, such as Turkey and Iran. The direct American rule of Iraq will dissipate differences between Iraq and Israel. The continued existence of the Arab League is vital if the Arab identity is to be preserved. The disappearance of the Arab League exposes the Arab Mashreq to fragmentation into small entities among which Israel, though not necessarily bigger in size, is bound to acquire the status of a superpower.
As a regional organisation, the Arab League must also have a say when it comes to determining the shape of world order, and is called upon to play a role in changing the former bipolar world order into a multipolar order rather than a unipolar order under the hegemony of the United States (with Israel standing as a junior partner by its side). So far, the Arabs are absent in the global battle over whether the world order should become unipolar or multipolar, despite the fact that the Middle East is one of the main arenas in which this battle is being fought.
A few days ago, the four main Egyptian opposition parties issued a joint declaration announcing that they are preparing a united programme for quick political reform and expressing unconditional support for the stand adopted by Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa against the American invasion of Iraq. Let us hope the ruling National Democratic Party adds its voice to theirs, especially when it comes to supporting Moussa. Knowing Moussa, I am sure he would not hesitate to resign if he believed this would better serve the cause. But we do not want him to resign. On the contrary, we want him to continue in his efforts to turn the Arab League into a real forum in which the Arabs can come together to confront the problems and challenges facing the Arab world at this critical juncture. The problems of the Arab League, however intractable, can be solved and eventually will be. Amr Moussa addresses these problems from a political perspective, which is the very opposite of a technocratic, instrumental approach. He is not, as some would have it, merely an employee, but the representative of the collective Arab will. As such, it is his duty not to desert the ship as it is on the verge of sinking, but to remain at his post until the end. Contrary to others, Moussa is aware that his position at the helm of the Arab League carries a very important symbolic meaning. In a way, it can be compared to the symbolic meaning of the statues which once adorned Baghdad, whose downfall represented more than the downfall of mere statues.
