Indonesia's endless war
The resumption of war in Indonesia's troubled but oil-rich province of Aceh spells disaster for the country's nascent democratic system, writes Damien Kingsbury
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Members of the Indonesian elite force (BRIMOB), or mobile brigade, hang on a helicopter during a drill in anticipation of a major military offensive against separatists in Aceh
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Indonesia's resumption of hostilities -- euphemistically called an "internal security operation" -- in the northernmost province of Aceh has seemed inevitable ever since the now failed cease- fire agreement was first signed on 9 December last year. The fundamental positions of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian military (TNI) were always fixed, mutually exclusive and irreconcilable.
The failure of this cease-fire is just the latest of many -- since the current round of conflict in the oil and gas rich province broke out in 1976 -- all of which have foundered on the problems of Acehnese claims to independence and the TNI's resort to brutality to resolve what have essentially been political problems.
GAM's bottom line is that it wants a referendum on independence. The TNI is stridently opposed to any such referendum, and believes the issue can now only be resolved by "wiping GAM out".
The Indonesian government also wants the Acehnese to accept a proposal that allocates greater resources to the province and a degree of political autonomy. However, GAM says that this proposal is too limited, and that political autonomy is meaningless. The lack of confidence in political autonomy follows the failure of a similar package implemented in 1963 -- which itself followed 10 years of armed conflict, a general distrust of both the central government in Jakarta and the TNI, and rumours of the TNI's role in the local economy.
The now failed cease-fire follows an intensification of the Aceh conflict over the past two years, and subsequent pressure from some quarters in Jakarta and the United States to seek a political compromise. GAM has talked, but has also used the lull in hostilities to organise its supporters, thereby angering the TNI.
During the cease-fire the TNI launched numerous operations into GAM territory. It recently organised a series of "civilian" assaults on observer posts as a pretext for requiring further talks on the cease-fire. It then used disagreement over the date of the talks -- proposing a date that allowed time for neither side to attend -- as a pretext for claiming GAM's bad faith and, subsequently, an end to the cease-fire.
Indonesia's President Megawati Sukarnoputri is close to the TNI leadership and supports the resumption of hostilities. Megawati's two most influential ministers are former lieutenant-generals, who compete for favour within the TNI. Indeed, Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and the TNI's leadership, had been threatening a resumption of war for weeks prior to the failure of the cease-fire. At the same time, the TNI has moved thousands of new troops to Aceh, bringing the total to over 50,000 (GAM has around 4,000 fighters and an active support base of around 10,000).
Susilo also said that any future talks with GAM would be predicated on its fighters laying down their arms before the TNI withdrew to "defensive positions". Anyone with experience of the TNI would regard this requirement as an invitation to a slaughter.
The TNI now plans to crush GAM once and for all. TNI chief General Endriartono Sutarto says the military will be going "all out" to finish GAM off, leaving little doubt about its intentions. This offensive is likely to push GAM back into the mountains, and lead to the destruction of suspected GAM support bases. Already, over the past two years, tens of thousands of houses have been destroyed in Aceh, and more than 4,000 people -- mostly civilians -- have been killed. Additionally, torture and rape have been commonly used as methods of coercion.
The problem for the TNI and for Indonesia is that it is exactly this policy of trying to resolve political problems through brutality that has led to widespread and increasing support for GAM and Acehnese independence.
Aceh has had a long history of fighting outsiders, including the Dutch and the Japanese. This renewed round of conflict in Aceh will probably see the TNI notching up many military successes. But after 27 years of failure, the TNI is unlikely to defeat GAM. The new offensive is unlikely to win the hearts and minds of the Acehnese people, and may only sow the seeds of future war.
The writer is head of Philosophical, Political and International Studies at Deakin University. His most recent book is Power Politics and the Indonesian Military (Routledge-Curzon, London, New York, 2003).
