Reproducing 9/11
Mohamed Sid-Ahmed discusses the significance of the flare up of terrorist acts this week
Were the carefully planned and well- executed terrorist operations carried out in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Israel this week a repeat performance of the 11 September scenario? What motivated the perpetrators of the Riyadh and Casablanca attacks may be different from what triggered the recent spare of Palestinian suicide attacks, but in the final analysis the net result is the same: the shedding of innocent blood and widespread destruction. What is certain is that what we are seeing today does not only reflect a defect in any specific location or concerning any specific issue, but in the whole world system, perhaps even in the course of contemporary history itself. This raises the issue of how deterministic the movement of history is. In other words, what is the relationship between what is deterministic on the one hand and contingent and accidental on the other? Of course, these are philosophical questions with no clear-cut answers. Here an empirical approach might be useful. Let us consider what actually happened in history.
First, let us consider the validity of the theory that backwardness is the most appropriate launching pad for development. The theory was questioned in the mid-19th century by the founders of modern socialist thinking who, contrary to what is commonly believed, assumed that a certain degree of capitalist development was necessary to create the conditions required for building socialism. They argued that socialism could not come into being in a backward environment, and that, although it is the negation of capitalism, it is also its product. Thus, socialism could not emerge in a vacuum, but only in a developed capitalist society, where the mechanisms necessary to build a socialist society are sufficiently mature. This, in the opinion of the founders of modern socialism, was a historical necessity. But history followed a different path, as socialist revolution broke out not in the developed capitalist societies of Britain, Germany and the United States, but in the agricultural societies of Russia, Eastern Europe and China. Is it only a coincidence that socialist experiments suffered setbacks?
This dilemma provoked fierce debates in the ranks of socialists all over the world at the beginnings of the 20th century, particularly after the success of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. The communists argued that, once they had seized power, there was no question of giving it up on the grounds that the revolution was bound to fail because it had broken out in a backward environment. The social-democrats, for their part, believed the revolution could not succeed in a society that lacked any capitalist development. Stalin took the final decision, and insisted on continuing with the revolution in Russia, whatever the setbacks suffered by the revolutionary movement elsewhere in the world. He came up with the theory of "building socialism in one country" and upholding its achievements wherever they materialised, as long as conditions were not yet ripe for further successes of the revolution in other places. This approach proved to be extremely costly. Backwardness stood as a serious obstacle on the road to socialist development, preventing the achievement of the many hard tasks required to bring about a socialist transformation of society. Repression replaced revolutionary consciousness as the motor for social development, to the point where millions of citizens were accused of joining the counter- revolutionary forces and entire social classes were physically liquidated. Despair, alienation and fear replaced the hope that social emancipation was supposed to deliver. Socialism acquired traits that often resembled those of fascist practices. A new privileged class came into being and exploited the conditions of repression and oppression to promote a stifling bureaucracy. Thus, instead of being gradually overcome, class struggles were reactivated in new forms.
What was true for socialist societies also applied to the national liberation movements which sprang up in most of the countries which had been subjected to colonial rule. These experiments also witnessed the emergence of a new class which tried to appropriate most of the accomplishments of the revolution and was largely responsible for the propagation of feelings of hopelessness and despair. Thus movements attributed to liberation objectives, whether social or national, came up against formidable obstacles. Confrontation between these movements and between the forces of world capitalism evolved into a confrontation between two military pacts, NATO and the Warsaw pacts. The decisive factor in determining the balance of power between the two pacts was an unprecedented arms race which threatened both sides with mutual extermination -- until one of them collapsed and conceded it could no longer sustain the race.
The arms race was based on an equation of mutual deterrence, or mutual neutralisation, between the two sides. The sudden collapse of one of the contenders in the race meant not only that the balance of power between them no longer held, but that the world order which had governed international relations after World War II had come to an end. Whatever the shortcomings of the Soviet Union, it prevented rejectionist forces all over the world from acquiring a nihilistic character and kept terrorism in check. The disappearance of the Soviet Union cleared the field for a takeover by the forces of hopelessness and despair, who have asserted their presence on the world stage with a campaign of terror unprecedented in scale.
The spread of terrorism is not the only negative result of the disequilibrium brought to the global balance of power by the disappearance of one of the two superpowers. Another is the emergence of the United States, with its overwhelming military, technological and economic superiority, as the self-appointed leader of the world, rather than, as had previously been the case, one of the five great powers with veto prerogatives in the Security Council. Today, there is nothing to deter the United States from doing exactly as it pleases anywhere in the world. No longer content to be the first among equals, it has cast itself as the guardian of a world order over which it reigns supreme. Any challenge to its authority is dealt with severely. Thus when its sense of invincibility was shaken by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, it reacted swiftly and violently, using its immense military might to go after the alleged perpetrators. In the name of eradicating terrorism, the Bush administration did not hesitate to launch two wars in two years, and is now occupying two once sovereign states. But its war on terror has been met by a succession of terrorist acts, most recently in Riyadh and Casablanca.
The problem is how to break out of a vicious circle in which an equation of attacks and counter attacks is coming to represent a greater danger to global security than the equation of mutual deterrence which prevailed during the Cold War. Under the previous bipolar world order, neither the world capitalist pole nor the world socialist pole was outside the scope of "international legitimacy". Today, a new bipolarity has emerged in which only one of the two poles is inside international legitimacy. As Bush put it, "whoever is not on America's side is on the side of terrorism."
There can be no return to the form of bipolarity that prevailed under Cold War conditions. In the context of globalisation, it is impossible to envisage the strict division of the world into two geographical poles each composed of a bloc of states. Confrontation is now between inter-connected, overlapping parties. Terrorism has no specific national identity.
Globalisation depicts itself as having transcended the bipolarity of the past. But bipolarity will not be overcome as long as the world is divided into haves and havenots, privileged and marginalised, people inside and others outside world legitimacy. For bipolarity to disappear, it is not enough to suppress terrorism by coercion and repression. It is also necessary to eradicate the reasons that engender terrorist behaviour. The international system must be reformed to ensure that it is no longer in the interests of anyone to resort to terrorism. Is the United States, as the unique superpower, ready to support the necessary reforms? Or is it still driven by feelings of revenge, as it was when it dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to avenge Japan's destruction of its Pacific fleet in Pearl Harbour?
There is no indication that America is willing to undertake such reforms. It is more concerned with guaranteeing its hegemony over the oil resource of the Middle East (oil is expected to remain the main source of energy throughout the coming decades), rather than with restoring order and security throughout the region. As far as America is concerned, the only reforms to be introduced to the international system are those that will reflect its status as unchallenged world leader, not bring it down to its former status as one among a number of other great powers.
In the recent period, the US administration has been talking a lot about propagating the principles of democracy in the Middle East. However, it is difficult to imagine democracy taking root in a country like Iraq, whose people have been stripped of all their sovereign prerogatives by a foreign occupation that shows no signs of ending in any foreseeable future. America itself admits the difficulty of imposing a western-style democracy imported from abroad under these circumstances. The real test will be whether it can ensure the security and stability necessary to deter terrorism and prevent repeat performances of 11 September, not only in the United States, but also in the Middle East and the world at large.
