What will the Arabs do?
As American power focusses in on its targets, room for manoeuvre is shrinking. Ahmed Abdel-Halim* examines the consequences of Gulf War II
The transformation in the global political order that we are currently experiencing began shortly after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the breakup of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The change was cemented with the end of the first Gulf War, as the global coalition led by the US restored the regional balance of power in the Gulf and defeated Iraq's military forces. This marked the onset of a new phase in Iraqi history, which was abruptly terminated a few months ago when Saddam's regime was uprooted in the wake of the Anglo- American military campaign now known as the second Gulf War.
In the early 1990s, following the first Gulf War, President George Bush I had announced the dawn of what he termed "the New World Order". In an unprecedented move, the US took the helm as the only global superpower. It was natural that the Americans would see this as an opportunity to secure their national interests in various regions around the world once and for all. The Middle East was a prime target for such treatment for a variety of reasons, not least because of the presence of Israel, America's sole ally in the region.
The New World Order, as defined by the US, was supposedly based on several key principles, which included a commitment to the peaceful resolution of global and regional conflicts, a refusal to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations, and support for moral and political values such as democracy, human rights, civil society and a free market. Under this banner, the US then proceeded to shore up its traditional allies around the world, while working to contain other regions and nations perceived as potential competitors. At the same time, it sought to increase its influence over its allies and friends in Western Europe and Japan, while in the Middle East it set about securing a resolution to the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict.
Martin Indyck, a member of the National Security Council in the early years of the Clinton administration, unveiled America's new Middle East policy in April 1994. The crux of this policy was to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in the region. The Americans introduced a distinction between the eastern Middle East (comprising the six Gulf nations along with Iraq and Iran) and the western Middle East (the nations which are directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict). For American strategists, these two areas together formed the heart of the region, and their policy options were predicated on establishing a reciprocal relation of give and take between them. They also launched the policy of dual containment against Iran and Iraq. Indyck explained that instead of the old American policy which had sought to shore up one of the two nations at the expense of the other, the new policy would treat them equally, seeking to weaken them both, since both had the potential to become nuclear powers. In this way, the new US policy sought to maintain the balance of power necessary to ensure Israel's security.
This policy remained in force until the events of 11 September 2001. In the wake of this national catastrophe, the US began to look for ways of achieving its objectives more quickly, that is, through armed force. This shift in direction was partly the consequence of the arrival of a new administration headed by George Bush II, and the rise to power of the Republican Party, and in particular its extremist right wing. The first US experiment with armed force was the campaign in Afghanistan, which was undertaken despite heavy opposition. On a superficial level at least, America achieved a military victory, and was able to install a friendly Afghani government headed by a US client. At the same time, the Americans announced -- both directly and indirectly -- that they had decided to take over the administration of global affairs. And indeed, they are the only nation with the power to impose its political views on the rest of the world.
In the face of intense global and domestic political opposition, the US then decided to launch a military campaign against Iraq. The official justification for this was the claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. The real reasons, however, were manifold and largely unadmitted, including the need to gain control over Iraqi oil, the desire to further erode the balance of power in the Middle East to the benefit of Israel, and the intention to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict by eliminating all elements opposed to an American-style, Israeli solution.
As part of its political strategy, the US sought to mobilise the global powers against Iraq and in support of American aspirations. This plan faced many obstacles, particularly within NATO and the UN Security Council. In the case of NATO, France, Germany and Belgium all opposed the US plan to provide air defence to Turkey even before the military campaign got underway, arguing that NATO was only obliged to defend its members from a manifest threat, and not to assist the US with military preparations for an offensive war. In the Security Council, the US faced opposition from many sides, including from permanent members such as France, which threatened to veto any US-sponsored resolution that would sanction the use of military force against Iraq. France was all the more adamant given that the international inspection team formed on the basis of Resolution 1441 had not yet conclusively proved that Iraq possessed nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.
When the US was asked to reconsider its decision to go to war in the light of the lack of hard evidence to back up its claims, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice famously opined that "the price of not going to war is much greater than the cost of war." This decision was accompanied by an unprecedented military mobilisation; indeed, US armed forces had already entered the region in large numbers. Intense political pressure was applied to members of the international order and the countries of the Middle East to convince them to give in to America's demands. Vice-President Dick Cheney visited the region to attempt to garner political and military support; when he failed to get everything he was asking for, the US was forced to turn to other nations it had been ignoring up to that point.
The key player in this next stage was Turkey, which confounded expectations by refusing to allow US troops on to its territory. Indeed, Turkey stuck by its guns not only during the preparatory stages, but even after the war had begun. Yet despite this rebuff, the US continued to dispatch troops to Liwa Al-Iskandarouna on Turkish territory. When Turkey still refused to climb down, the Fourth Brigade had to be withdrawn and redirected to Kuwait.
By way of contrast, Israel trumpeted its unconditional support for the US from the beginning. This came as no great surprise, since the American decision to go to war was taken with one eye on Israel's interests and its political, strategic, and military objectives.
In addition to the political manoeuvring that accompanied military mobilisation, the US also began to plan how it would deal with Iraq after the invasion. As has now become clear, the decision was taken to occupy Iraq just as Germany and Japan had been occupied after World War II. To this end, the US undertook wide-ranging intelligence operations, launched an extremely subtle psychological war, and began to prepare the political cadres who would direct Iraqi affairs on its behalf. At the same time, it began to mobilise various elements within the Iraqi resistance, convening several conferences whose main objective was to lay the groundwork for a continuing US military presence in Iraq.
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In the wake of the Anglo-American campaign on Iraq, the global and regional situation has changed. The US has shown the world that it is capable of carrying out its political, military, and strategic decisions alone, and that it can ensure that other regional and global powers fall into line and allow it to implement its designs. Nevertheless, it has also become clear to the Americans that they will have to widen the scope of international participation in the next phase of the war and reactivate the role of the UN if they are to achieve fully their regional and global objectives.
American reactions to those nations that opposed it during the build-up to the war -- in particular Russia, Germany, and France -- have varied. In accordance with its vision of Russia's future role, the US has decided to ignore its failure to cooperate, and proceed with enhancing ties and stepping up cooperation. A similar approach has been adopted with regard to Germany, due to political and strategic considerations, and also out of deference to Germany's role in NATO. German-American relations are presently best described as neutral, but they could easily warm should Germany respond positively to the upcoming US-sponsored changes in the European order. France, however, is a different kettle of fish; the US clearly intends to take some sort of punitive measures, and will seek to isolate the country politically, in response to France's threat to use its veto in the Security Council.
As regards Iraq itself, America's military and political strategy was to provoke a state of chaos in the wake of the military invasion, which would then provide the political grounds for the US to maintain direct control over the country in the long term. The fact that General Jay Garner was rapidly replaced as governor by Ambassador Paul Bremer has been interpreted by many as a sign of political failure. But US strategy towards Iraq remains unchanged. If changes were made, they were partly an attempt to adapt to the situation on the ground, and partly influenced by an internal power struggle between the secretary of defense and the secretary of state. More than anything, this volte-face should be seen as reflecting domestic electoral considerations, not as a failure of American planning.
The end of the war in Iraq has led to geostrategic and geopolitical changes in the Middle East, and particularly in the Gulf. Geopolitically, from the American perspective, the relative political weight of the nations of the region has shifted; geostrategically, American military forces are again based in the Gulf. The US has moved most of its central command structure to Qatar, while the best part of its military might is now concentrated in the land forces inside Iraq. This change matches the US's political objective of reorganising the region in accordance with its own interests. Obviously, there will be knock-on effects on the potential US presence in other possible campaign arenas. The balance of power within NATO will have to change to overcome the political problems faced by the US before it launched its war. Asia will also continue to require attention, both in the form of the arch-enemy North Korea and, more generally, China.
These shifts have triggered a number of other developments in the region: Israel's role has been enhanced and a new Middle East "peace process" launched. In addition, the Gulf Cooperation Council is set to be remodelled: it is proposed to expand the GCC's membership to include Jordan, Yemen, and -- once some sort of internal stability has been achieved -- Iraq. If this happens, it will be extremely significant, because it will represent the de facto creation of a new Middle Eastern organisation to replace the Arab League. It will, in essence, be the concrete realisation of America's plan for fundamental changes in the Middle East, and a sure sign that US forces will remain in Iraq for the foreseeable future.
Thus far, the US seems determined to continue the process of change it has set in motion in Iraq and the Middle East, but the successful execution of this plan is contingent on several factors. There will be political obstacles, both from the American public, and from friends and allies abroad. Regular ongoing American losses -- both material and human -- will recall the experience of Vietnam, and will necessarily have an impact on US policy. Moreover, the financial cost of control through conflict and occupation is further weakening an already debilitated US economy. Although much of the economic burden of maintaining a military presence abroad will be shifted onto the Iraqi oil industry, this is still an important factor that will deserve close attention.
It will be some time before the US will be able to use its army against another nation in the region. In the mean time, it will have to rely on the political and strategic consequences of the war to shape the future of the Middle East. While it might seem that the regional balance of power has already been permanently altered, these changes in actual fact remain quite fluid. It is still possible today for other parties to influence the course of events, but this will become progressively more difficult as time passes and the changes become ingrained. This is particularly true as regards stability in the Gulf, the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the new threat represented by the role of neighbouring non-Arab nations such as Turkey and Israel. We must also bear in mind that US support for Israel is now virtually absolute, thanks both to American domestic considerations and to the desire to support Israel's regional position, which serves both Israeli and American objectives simultaneously.
Two countries -- Iran and Syria -- deserve special attention during the coming stage. Iran now finds itself in an extremely difficult situation. It senses that it is the next American target in the Gulf; regime change there represents the next step towards enhancing Israeli security and furthering US regional objectives. As certain Iranian officials have stated, Iran has not only been put on the defensive, but it effectively has its back to the wall. As a result, it is attempting to mobilise resistance to US policies and to reestablish alliances that will help it when the moment of confrontation arrives. This is clear from President Khatemi's recent tour of Arab countries and Iran's proposal to create a regional security arrangement that would exclude any foreign power, and particularly the US. It has also proposed the establishment of a regional security council managed by regional powers without the power of veto. Thus far, however, these plans remain firmly in the realm of ideas, especially given the diversity of Arab attitudes towards the US and the reservations of certain Arab countries -- particularly the Gulf states -- towards Iran's political ambitions.
Syria is still in the spotlight, as the US openly pressures it to align with American and Israeli objectives. The US has prepared the charge sheet well in advance: Syria, it argues, possesses weapons of mass destruction, is giving refuge to terrorist organisations, and maintains a military presence in Lebanon. Pressure on Syria has increased as a result of its new geostrategic position, surrounded as it is by Israel, Turkey, the new Iraq, and Jordan, where policymaking is determined in tandem with the great white ally, the US.
One important question then remains: will these new conditions affect Egypt? Yes, is the immediate answer. These ongoing transformations have already had an impact on the situation in Europe and across the globe, and they have brought about a shift in the balance of power in the Middle East. The most significant ramifications have been economic, and this will necessarily affect us too. But Egypt is still in the process of achieving a proper balance between its Arab and regional obligations and the need to maintain a presence in global policymaking circles. That is why the country is instituting a number of changes in domestic policy to adapt to the new international climate. Nevertheless, Egypt must react to the ongoing international and regional changes, and must take advantage of the present state of strategic and political flux to play a positive role in international relations.
The New World Order as implemented by President George Bush II may not yet have stabilised, but the markers are already plain. America remains the peerless political power. Europe is still attempting to balance its own global interests with the requirements of US policy. Russia, China, and North Korea have also begun to recognise the new political situation and deal with it. The situation in the Middle East is still crystallising, though the changes being effected are profound. We will have to work hard to understand them if we are to act effectively on this new reality. The US itself, though super-dominant, will continue to adapt to the consequences of its invasion and will further develop its political and economic strategies. The question that remains to be answered is: what will the Arab countries do?
* The writer is a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
