Questions of resolve
By
Salama A Salama
The planned meeting between US President George Bush, Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, has lulled some into thinking that Washington is finally taking its duties towards the Middle East issue seriously.
Unfortunately the steps taken so far towards implementing the roadmap do not augur well: on the one hand Bush's belated moves followed in the wake of the war on Iraq and the feelings of defeat and frustration to which it gave birth in the Arab world; on the other, the Bush administration viewed it as a victory that served Israeli needs by toppling a regime that represented a threat to it.
Arabs, for long enraged at the US administration for daily ignoring Israel's onslaught against the Palestinian people are now convinced that the US will not act unless in the service of Israel, and often in coordination with it.
True, Bush initially appeared determined to move towards implementing the roadmap and did not immediately bend to Sharon's demands for its alteration. But at the same time Bush showed readiness to take into account Israel's reservations on several vital issues.
Sharon began by toying with one of the basic provisions of the roadmap -- the freezing of settlements and the dismantling of those built since 2001. Then he demanded the omission of the article dealing with the right of return in exchange for agreement on the creation of a Palestinian state. And this before the two sides have begun to implement even the first steps.
No one can trust Sharon's intentions, and it is not enough for Bush to declare that Sharon has notified him of his "agreement to the roadmap, but with a few reservations".
The three-way meeting would not have been arranged in the absence of clear indications that it might succeed: these not only include the Israeli cabinet's approval, albeit by a slight majority, but an optimistic assessment of the outcome of a second meeting between Abbas and Sharon.
The most important thing about the first phase of implementation is that steps by both sides are undertaken simultaneously -- that Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian towns and territories be accompanied by an end of suicide operations and the cycle of violence. You cannot ask one party to exercise self- restraint and not the other. The Palestinian factions cannot be asked to surrender their right to resist in the absence of Israel honouring its own commitments.
Recent history has taught us the folly of being overly optimistic. During the previous administrations' attempts at mediation, when an agreement was apparently within reach, Israel exploded all possibility of reaching any equitable resolution in a single stroke. And still the US is determined to exclude from the process the other members of the Quartet.
US Secretary of State Colin Powell has announced that within days Washington will be sending a number of diplomats, security and intelligence experts to coordinate efforts to implement the roadmap , and that the group could eventually comprise the kernel of a monitoring team. But the tricks Israel is keeping up its sleeve are seemingly endless. Take, for example, the announcement by the Israeli minister of interior that Jews will be permitted to worship at Al-Aqsa Mosque: it is a clear act of provocation, an attempt to ignite the situation in much the same way Sharon did when former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak allowed him to march into Al-Haram Al-Sharif. The result, everyone knows, was the second Intifada.
Progress may be made on the roadmap, but this will not happen if Sharon empties it of content with the help of a US administrati on pressed for time before the next presidential elections.
