Critical summitry
Mohamed Sid-Ahmed wonders whether the two Middle East summits represent a window of opportunity for a breakthrough towards peace
Only a compelling reason could have driven US President George W Bush to take part in two consecutive summit meetings with Middle East leaders within less than 48 hours. True, it is impossible at this juncture to group all the key players together in one meeting because the Saudis refuse to deal directly with the Israeli leadership -- at least so far. But the compelling reason behind the US administration's decision to push ahead with the visit regardless of the complicated logistics involved seems to be the upcoming presidential elections to be held next year. Convening the two summits despite this inconvenience highlights how important both must be for Washington and that they can by no means be dismissed as a simple formality.
The battle for the US presidency has already begun, against a backdrop that is somehow reminiscent of the campaign between the first President Bush and Bill Clinton in 1991. Bush had scored a decisive victory in the war he led against Saddam Hussein following the latter's invasion of Kuwait. But he was not reelected to a second term. In a recent address to a Democratic Party convention, Clinton shared the benefit of his experience with his party's potential candidates, telling them they had to be aware not only of their opponent's strengths, but also of his weaknesses.
This advice served Clinton well during his campaign. The first President Bush's main weakness was the socio-economic problems that arose during his presidency and overshadowed his victory in the Gulf war and defeated his bid for a second term. The economy was Clinton's main strength, allowing him to win a second term despite the scandals surrounding him. As to the incumbent president, he shares his father's main weakness, which is an economic slowdown, but not his main strength. The first President Bush accomplished what he set out to do with the war he launched against Saddam Hussein; his son cannot claim to have scored a decisive victory in either of the two wars he waged since taking office. The situation in both Afghanistan and Iraq is still unsettled, the whereabouts of Bin Laden and Saddam still unknown and, with the lamentable state of the Palestinian problem, the whole Middle East remains a dangerously volatile hot spot. So far, Bush's popularity remains high, but unless the economy picks up and the mess in the Middle East is sorted out before next year, there is no guarantee that he will win a second term.
Bush is aware that he cannot rest on his laurels, and that the economy and the Middle East are landmines on the road to his reelection. Will he try to consolidate the achievements of the Iraqi war by implementing his slogan of two states in Palestine, one Jewish and the other Arab, or will he allow Sharon and his team of ultra-hawks to destroy his chances of winning a second term?
There are signs of something new in Sharon's position. Speaking to Likud legislators angered by his government's endorsement of the roadmap, he said: "You may not like the word, but what's happening is occupation. Holding 3.5 million Palestinians under occupation is a bad thing for Israel, for the Palestinians and for the Israeli economy." According to an article in the Israeli daily Ma'ariv, Sharon had "broken a huge taboo" by using the word "occupation" to describe the Israeli presence in Gaza and the West Bank.
This was the first time Sharon referred to Israel's control of the Palestinian territories as an "occupation". He has very often argued against the establishment of a Palestinian state, which he said would be a permanent threat to Israel. In an attempt to appease the Israeli far-right, who believe Israel has a legitimate right to all of Palestine, for both religious and security reasons, Sharon tried to get out of the fix by explaining that what he had meant was that the Palestinians were occupied, but that the territory was not. But the real question is whether Sharon's statement is just a tactical manoeuvre, or whether it is paving the way for a more fundamental strategic change. In other words, did Sharon intend to help Bush in his presidential campaign, or was he just trying to ease Bush's pressure on him and quieten his fears at a time two crucial summits were being held, one American-Arab and the other American-Palestinian-Israeli?
The common denominator of both summits is the presence of US President Bush and Palestinian Prime Minister Abu Mazen -- and the absence of Yasser Arafat. But for both Sharon and Bush, the replacement of Arafat by Abu Mazen is legitimate only to the extent that Abu Mazen succeeds in convincing the various Palestinian factions, particularly Hamas, to renounce violence. However, despite his assertions that he could quickly persuade the militant groups to declare a limited cease-fire, this has not yet happened. Where does that leave the roadmap? It will take more than conciliatory rhetoric and ambivalent formulas coming out of the two summits to break the deadlock in the peace process.
The negotiations are being resumed on the assumption that both parties, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, have accepted the roadmap for peace formulated by the Quartet (the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations). However, Israel has expressed 14 reservations about the roadmap. In an interview to Ha'artz, Abu Mazen played down the importance of the reservations: "This is a historic opportunity to return back to normalcy. It is vital the two peoples feel something is changing on the ground. In any case, nobody will pay any attention to this or that reservation." The way out, according to Abu Mazen's statement, is to adopt a pragmatic stand, even if the fundamentals remain the same, especially when it comes to the Jewish settlements on the one hand and the Palestinian's right of return on the other. On both issues, Sharon refuses any concessions.
But can this pragmatic approach be enough to overcome the difficulties? The ruling Likud Party categorically opposes the right of any Palestinian to return to Israel proper, while Hamas refuses to lay down its arms until Palestinian statehood is declared. This places Abu Mazen before a tough choice. If he fails to satisfy the conditions laid down by the Likud, he risks being sidelined like Arafat, and confirming Israel's claims that the Palestinian Authority is incapable of reforming itself and should be disbanded. On the other hand, if he ignores Hamas's demands, he risks being assassinated as an American and Israeli agent.
All in all, Abu Mazen's situation is extremely precarious. If Bush is determined to have his Middle East trip succeed for reasons related to the coming US presidential elections, he will have to put considerable pressure on Sharon. American pressure is the most likely explanation for the success of the first meeting between Abu Mazen and Sharon on 29 May.
However, the fate of the roadmap is contingent on the absence of any acts of violence in the coming period, particularly in the critical days and hours before the Bush-Abu Mazen-Sharon summit on 4 June. And this no one can guarantee. Abu Mazen has announced that he is on the verge of reaching an agreement with Hamas over a cease-fire. But spokesmen for the Israeli government say this is not enough, and that terrorist networks must be disbanded and their members arrested. For their part, spokesmen for Hamas insist that the attacks will not stop unless Israel stops killing Palestinian civilians, releases Palestinian prisoners and puts an end to its acts of aggression.
Any agreement between Abu Mazen and Hamas must be preceded by an agreement between the leaders of Hamas themselves, as well as among the various militant groups that remain uncommitted to the peace process. And even if the Palestinians do manage to agree among themselves, there is no guarantee that they will remain bound by any such agreement. After all, a number of cease-fires were declared in the past two years, only to fall apart amid mutual accusations and recriminations. Abu Mazen's call for an end to armed resistance has come up against Sharon's systematic policy of shooting the Palestinian police responsible for maintaining law and order. That is probably why Abu Mazen sees his request for a cease-fire as a more realistic first step than expecting that all violence can be ended at one stroke. The ball is now in Sharon's court. How will he act?
