'Only themselves to blame'
Former US Ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, believes that Arab and American interests require a long-term presence in Iraq. He talked to Khaled Dawoud in Washington
Martin Indyk
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Former US ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, admits he was among "hardliners" within the Bill Clinton administration when he served in the top position related to the Middle East peace process, Iraq and Iran. It was Indyk -- now director of the Saban Centre for Middle East Policy at the influential Brookings Institution -- who formulated the so-called "dual containment policy" towards Iraq and Iran. In an interview with Al-Ahram Weekly, he also revealed that he was personally pushing for a regime change in Iraq towards the end of President Clinton's second term in 2000.
However, Indyk conceded that at no stage did he envision the possibility of a full fledged military campaign to overthrow the Iraqi regime and occupy Iraq, as happened recently under the leadership of President George W Bush -- which opened the door for what he described as "profound change in the region".
And what was the main factor behind such an unprecedented move? Indyk's answer was very short. "9/11", he said. He added, "The fact of the matter, is, yes, there were hardliners like myself in the Clinton administration who believed that Saddam Hussein was evil and doing terrible things to his people, and that something needs to be done about it. But there was no appetite for such a thing. It wasn't just the president who had no appetite for it, the American people did not have an appetite for it."
However, after the suicide attacks in New York and Washington, "there was a very different situation because we were attacked in our homeland, innocent people were targeted and died in large numbers. So that produced a sense of insecurity which justified the argument that we needed to take care of threats to American interests that related to sponsors of terrorism."
He added that, "the link between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qa'eda was fairly weak -- it still is fairly weak -- but those in the administration, like [Deputy Defense Secretary] Paul Wolfowitz, who had already determined when they came into the administration before 9/11 that regime change in Iraq was going to be one of their priorities, now found themselves in the situation where the American public was prepared to support something which they never supported before."
Meanwhile Indyk's estimate as to the duration of the US occupation of Iraq seems to contradict the common view of two to three years within the administration. "Five to 10 years is perhaps realistic," he told the Weekly. He added that staying that long was necessary to maintain both Arab and American interests. Being out of office, the former US ambassador seemed more at ease to reveal what happened in reality behind closed doors during meetings between Arab and US officials. "Look, you talk to elites in the region, and they would tell you: 'for God's sake don't leave. Forget about our rhetoric. We will always tell you that you should leave immediately, but please don't leave.'"
He explained that such an attitude was a reflection of the understanding of the facts on the ground. "This is typical of the word game that is played in the Arab world: you are against occupation because that is a very important value in Arab political culture, but if you are faced with the consequences of an American withdrawal that leaves a political vacuum that is going to be filled either by Iranian influenced Mullahs, who want to set up a Shi'ite theocracy or Iran, Turkey, Syria all engaged in pushing their own people, or, we, in order to get out, basically leave behind a shadow state, and it just becomes Saddamism without Saddam. Those are the three alternatives and they are all bad, so people have to put the rhetoric aside for a moment and say what is in the best of interest of the people of Iraq, the region and the United States."
Indyk, however, dismissed Arab fears that the US invasion of Iraq would be followed by similar military moves against other countries in the region -- dubbed as sponsors of terrorism by the US -- namely Syria and Iran. "Yes, it is unprecedented, (the US occupation of Iraq), but it is not necessarily going to be followed by US interventions to change other regimes." He added, though, "it will really depend on the circumstances, and the circumstances aren't there at the moment. But if Iranian or Syrian sponsorship of terrorism continues in a way that affects our security interests, then, it is possible that we would have a different style."
In his view, what President Bush is seeking to do after toppling the regime in Iraq "is to just use the demonstration effect of Iraq to put other sponsors of terrorism on the defensive, mainly Iran and Syria. Despite the fact that there might be some in the government who say let's take a left turn and go into Syria or lets take a right turn and go into Tehran, I don't think that that's the view of the White House. In fact, they keep on saying it is different strategies for different situations; in particular, they said this in the case of Iran. What they want to do is to get behind the Iranian people who want democratic change, and they see regime change coming out of Iran through that process, rather than through military intervention, which in the case of Iran would be very costly for the United States and could really become a quagmire in a way that Iraq is not."
One of the most important consequences of the US presence in Iraq, meanwhile, was President Bush's recognition that this would require his direct involvement in the peacemaking between the Arabs and Israel, and particularly on the Palestinian track, Indyk said. He noted that the US president was very much unwilling to get involved in the Middle East process, and that his recent moves to bring together Israeli and Palestinian prime ministers in a summit meeting indicated that "we are now seeing a different Bush."
The US president, Indyk said, "became persuaded that there is more of an opportunity now because the sponsors of terrorism are on the defensive, [Palestinian President Yasser] Arafat is being sidelined, and [Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, aka] Abu Mazen had emerged. Besides, he became more open to the influence of [British Prime Minister] Tony Blair, who regarded moving on the Palestinian front as the top priority, and Bush had to listen to him because Blair risked his political life for George Bush."
Indyk also has another explanation for Bush's change of heart. "Don't forget that his father [President George Bush] also made war [on Iraq] and then tried to make peace in terms of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference [in 1991]. And we should not underestimate the kind of rivalry between father and son, the son always trying to avoid the mistakes his father made."
Yet, Indyk believes that the US president could fail if he does not get the support he needs from Arab countries, particularly in terms of fighting terrorism and backing Abu Maze,n who told his people that "'there is no military option, there will only be one authority and it is not acceptable for others to go around carrying arms.'"
Indyk said that after Arab countries got "what they have been crying for, for two and half years, -- the engagement of the president of the US -- if they just let him do it and sit back like they did during the Clinton era, then they will only have themselves to blame if he gets disillusioned". He also pointed out that Bush "has got many things to do. Look at his agenda: Iraq, Al- Qa'eda, North Korea, the economy and the elections. So, when we give him the benefit of the doubt, we should not take it for granted."
