Pakistani predicament
Sectarian violence rears its ugly head once again in Pakistan, reports Iffat Idris from Islamabad
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Pakistani Shi'ite Muslims shout slogans as they hold a banner during a demonstration in Multan
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Getting back into the normal work routine after a few weeks' holiday is always hard. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's return to Pakistan, after a successful four-nation tour abroad, would have been difficult anyway -- thanks to the on- going clash with opposition politicians over the controversial Legal Framework Order. But it has been made even harder by the reappearance of bloody sectarianism on the streets of Pakistan.
On Friday 4 July three unidentified men entered an imambargah (Shi'ite shrine) in the centre of Quetta, Baluchistan province, in the middle of Jum'a (Friday) prayers. Two of the men opened fire with automatic weapons, raking the packed congregation for 10 minutes. There was then a huge explosion outside the main prayer hall, as the third assailant let off a suicide bomb. The two gunmen tried to flee the building but were shot by the private guards of the imambargah. One died on the spot, the second in hospital. The death toll of Shi'ite Muslim worshippers at the Asna Ashari Hazara Imambargah was initially put at 34 but, according to the Edhi welfare trust, has since risen to 53.
In Quetta, angry members of the Hazara tribe (to which the majority of victims belonged) took to the streets to vent their fury. Mobs burnt vehicles, and attacked government and private buildings. A madrasa (Qur'anic school) in the city's neighbourhood of Marriabad was set ablaze. Much of the mobs' wrath was aimed at the police, blamed for not providing adequate protection and for favouritism towards Sunni Muslims. With the situation escalating out of control, paramilitaries and eventually the army had to be called in to restore order, imposing a curfew on the city.
The curfew was partially lifted on Saturday when 32 of the dead were buried amidst tight security. Locals seized the opportunity to stock up on supplies, while stranded travellers fled the city. The atmosphere in Quetta remains charged, with the very real threat of imminent reprisal attacks from any side.
Feelings are running especially high among Hazaras because this is the second time in as many months that their community has been targeted. On 8 June, 13 police recruits were killed when their vehicle was fired on by unidentified men on motorbikes. All those killed were Hazara Shi'ites. While there could have been a possibility that the policemen were attacked by anti- government militants, there is no doubt that Friday's massacre had a sectarian motive.
Pakistan has long been familiar with sectarian killings, but the scale of this latest attack has shocked the nation. President Musharraf was in France when news of the massacre broke. Immediately condemning it, Musharraf promised to take "stern action" against those responsible. The president also appealed to the Hazara community to show restraint and not react with violence. Prime Minister Jamali quickly visited the city to personally express his sympathy for the bereaved, while he and other politicians have united in denouncing the killings. By Sunday, 15 alleged members of banned extremist organisations had been arrested in the city.
The problem in Pakistan -- and the reason why Hazaras have little faith in the government's promises -- is that sectarian killings have regularly been followed with similar rhetoric, but then a lack of substantial action. Demonstrating their cooperation, the government has made high- profile arrests, but those detained tend to be scapegoats rather than the actual perpetrators. On 22 February nine worshippers in an imambargah in Karachi were gunned down as they prayed. Those responsible have still not been brought to justice. Pakistan is home to countless other examples of unsolved and unpunished sectarian murders.
Pakistani authorities are also apt to blame a "foreign hand" for sectarian violence, or indeed any kind of terrorist attack in the country, conveniently focussing the spotlight away from their own security and intelligence failures. In this case too, the president, prime minister and information minister all alluded to the possibility of foreign assailants -- most likely from neighbouring Afghanistan. But eyewitnesses at the scene, as well as the wider Hazara community, have rejected that possibility. They say the assailants spoke to each other in Baluchi, and blame local Sunni extremists for the atrocity.
To be fair to President Musharraf, he has shown greater commitment and made more progress in dealing with Pakistan's sectarian menace than any of his civilian predecessors. On numerous occasions he has publicly attacked what he describes as "the extremist minority". Several militant groups associated with sectarian violence have been banned, including the viciously anti-Shi'ite Sipah-e-Muhamed and Sipah-e-Sahaba.
But as a leading English daily pointed out in its editorial the day after the Quetta killings: "Mere condemnations and resolve of the kind expressed by the president and prime minister are not enough. They should prove by deeds that they are capable of rooting out the menace of terrorism, especially of the sectarian variety." The editorial also noted that banning the groups has only driven them underground -- it has not dismantled them.
Sectarian violence in Pakistan is part of the country's wider problem of militant extremist Islam. Its origins trace back to the 1979-1988 war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. American funding and Pakistani assistance promoted the proliferation of a huge number of militant Islamist groups and madrasas inside Pakistan. Washington needed the Islamists to "wage jihad" against the Soviets in Afghanistan, while Islamabad needed them to bring in billions of American dollars. Hence both turned a blind eye to the radical ideology and methods that were advantageous in the short term.
This strategy's nearsightedness became apparent shortly after the Soviet Union's exit. While radical Islamists in Afghanistan formed the Taliban, and continued to seek domination of the country, their brethren in Pakistan turned their attention towards Indian Kashmir or to sectarian opponents inside Pakistan. Each act of sectarian killing provoked a cycle of revenge killing. Civilian governments failed to curb the menace, either because they needed the militants as proxies in Indian Kashmir, or because they lacked the will and the strength to do so. That failure in turn allowed the religious militants to flourish and grow in strength.
The result of tolerance towards Pakistani Islamists was that when Musharraf seized power in October 1999, he faced a formidable foe: heavily-armed and well-trained Islamist sectarian organisations with substantial financial resources and a huge pool of recruits in the country's thousands of religious madrasas. Dealing with such a foe was going to be difficult.
His task was made somewhat easier by 9/11 and the worldwide backlash against terrorism and extremist Islam (and the Taliban specifically, of course) that it triggered. Musharraf could strike against sectarian groups with an unusual degree of public support. That in turn meant that religious parties, who would normally be expected to mobilise massive street protests against any government attempt to curb religious activism, were unable to do so.
The real threat for Musharraf now is not the religious political parties or public opinion, but the dedicated and highly effective underground sectarian groups. As Friday's attack showed, they want and are capable of horrendous carnage. The killing in Quetta was Pakistan's first sectarian suicide bombing. Musharraf must develop a comprehensive strategy to root out and crush these militant ideologues -- quickly.
