Al-Ahram: A Diwan of contemporary life (504)
On drugs
The drug problem in Egypt has a history. One report estimated that there were half a million drug addicts in Egypt in the late 1920s -- when the population was 15 million. Despite an increase in fines and prison sentences, the narcotics trade failed to abate.
Professor Yunan Labib Rizk* enters the world of drug trafficking
Mohamed Ali
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The Egyptian Police: 1922-1952, Abdel-Wahab Bakr traces the history of drug trafficking and consumption. 1925 was a turning point in this history. Until then, the maximum penalty for drug trafficking was an LE1 fine and seven days in prison. Until 1914, hashish and opium consumption was widespread in Egypt. The opium poppies themselves were cultivated on a large scale in Upper Egypt even though most of the opium which was produced was exported. If hashish was the plague of the lower quarters in the cities, at least it was less harmful than opium.
According to another study, it was Mohamed Ali who had initially promoted the cultivation of opium poppies. Around the first half of the 19th century, he brought in specialists from Asia Minor, and by 1833 some 4,830 feddans had been brought under cultivation in this plant, from which were extracted 14,500 ounces of opium. What was not used to supply Egyptian hospitals was exported abroad.
Near the end of World War I, an unnamed foreign subject of Egypt introduced cocaine into the country. Although it initially became the drug of choice for the upper classes, its use quickly spread through the rest of society. It was this phenomenon that precipitated the turning point Bakr refers to in his study. In 1925, the government raised the penalty for trafficking in cocaine to between a month and three years in prison and a fine of between LE10 and LE300. If an offence was repeated, detention was no less than six months and the fine no less than LE50. Bakr goes on to relate that the increased penalties, as steep as they were, were not a sufficient deterrent, prompting the government to render them yet harsher. Thus, three years later, the fine for trafficking in cocaine was raised to between LE200 and LE1,000 -- quite a hefty sum at that time -- and the penalty for cocaine consumption was raised to between three and six years in prison and a fine ranging from LE20 to LE300. But even these stiffer penalties failed to stop the narcotics trade from booming. In 1928, police confiscated some 20,000 kilogrammes of illegal drugs. And that was only scratching the surface, given that several of the major drug merchants enjoyed immunity under the Capitulations System and were, therefore, out of the reach of local law enforcement agencies.
The report compiled by the Narcotics Bureau, which the government had created that year, confirms Bakr's assessment. According to its estimates, there were half a million drug addicts in Egypt, which at the time had a population of 15 million. "Even if one was to grant half this estimate, this would still be a large ratio," the report continues, adding, "Aggravating the situation is that narcotics consumption has spread among our peasants upon whom the prosperity of our country depends and who are renowned for their sturdiness, perseverance and placidity. Although they are familiar with alcohol, which is easy for them to obtain, they are well-known to be averse to this substance."
To illustrate the economic impact of drug addiction, the report states that were addiction to be converted into hours of work lost, or fields ignored or not put under cultivation, one would arrive at an estimated annual loss to the country of LE14 million. Moreover, "If every addict spends between five and 10 piastres a day on his habit, what money remains for their families to spend on the necessities of life?" And this was not the full extent of the waste. The report also notes that the figures of admittance into hospital mental wards were steadily climbing: 207 in 1924, 369 in 1927 and 460 in 1928. Most of these patients had become insane as a result of drug addiction.
The report then turns to the "amazing profits" to be accrued from the illegal dealings in narcotics. It estimated that it cost about LE10 to produce a kilogramme of heroin. "This quantity sold at source would cost LE28, and by the time it reaches Cairo its price will have climbed to LE60. Frequently, then, it is sold to consumers for LE300, a price which triples when it reaches the remoter parts of the countryside because by then it will have been adulterated by a third with sodium bicarbonate or ammonium salts."
Naturally the prospect of such profits encouraged drug traffickers to risk stiff penalties. But to cut down the risks, they kept inventing new and original ways to conceal their illicit produce: in fruit baskets, buried in wax, in olive barrels, in containers with false bottoms, in the bases of scales, in clothes linings and in bricks. They also continually varied their smuggling routes and means. In this respect, Egyptian geography was in their favour. Because of its extensive coastlines and large tracts of uninhabited deserts, "coast guard patrols, no matter how capable and efficient, cannot handle the situation as is necessary".
Increasingly frustrated in its drive to stop drug mongers, and backed by a public that, in the grip of the Great Depression of the early 1930s, was increasingly incensed at the drain drug abuse was having on their pockets, the Egyptian government felt compelled to declare war on this pernicious trade. On the domestic front, the campaign was spearheaded by the Ministry of Interior's Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, headed by Brigadier Russel Pasha, which pursued a two-pronged attack. On the one hand it launched an intensive awareness-raising campaign. This included a documentary that Russel, in the summer of 1931, had taken to Geneva where he attended an anti-narcotics conference. The film, which he said had been screened widely in Egypt, displayed individuals who had been so prey to their addiction that they had lost everything that had made them human. "These dregs of humanity eke out a living in the squalid quarters of the cities. Some are itinerant workers in the day and supplement the few piastres they earn from their jobs by begging around coffeehouses at night. Every piastre they collect is spent on their habit, while domestic refuse in the rubbish bins serves as their nourishment."
The press played an important role in the awareness-raising campaign. Under the headline, "Addicts and addiction in Egypt", Dr Dadgon, a psychiatrist, observed that addicts could be divided into two categories. First, there were those who were put on medication to remedy a mental or physical ailment and who become addicted, "inadvertently, as a result of taking certain drugs". These, however, "are only a small minority and should not be the subject of legislation as effective means exist to cure them of their addiction."
The second category consisted of those whose addiction grew from a desire to satisfy a psychological craving, such as lust or other forms of sensual gratification. "There is nothing that should draw these individuals to narcotics apart from moral weakness and a propensity to vice. Great efforts have been exerted and enormous sums of money spent towards reforming these enemies of their own persons. However, the more we double the care we devote to protecting them from their self-inflicted harm, the more determined they become to ruin their health and compound the problem." The solution for this category of addicts was to create special asylums in which they would be put under a rigorous regime "until they comport themselves in a manner that raises them to the ranks of their fellow human beings". Dadgon goes on to state: "There is no doubt that if the government can eliminate the narcotics problem, it will be able to devote a greater part of its energies to the development of governmental services and the enhancement of knowledge and know-how." However, for officials to succeed in this mission, they needed to be more familiar with the nature of addiction. From his position in the hospital, the psychiatric ward director was able to identify three types of addicts who frequented the hospital. The first were those who wanted to be cured without pain. "The essential cause of their addiction resides in their mental makeup, for which reason it is only with the greatest difficulty that they can overcome what infects them." The second type consisted of members of the "baser classes" who check into hospital in order to obtain a new set of government-issued clothes "which, as soon as they are released, they sell in order to purchase narcotics". In the third category were those who wanted to return to their addictions, after a period of forced abstinence, although in lesser quantities. Dr Dadgon concludes that treating mental illness entailed treating drug addiction, which would also work to reduce the crime rate, adding the familiar maxim: an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.
Al-Ahram felt it would be useful to familiarise the public with the types of substances to watch out for. On 2 July 1932, it published a list describing the most commonly used addictive narcotics. These included opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine and hashish.
Non-governmental organisations also made important contributions to the campaign to fight drug addiction. For example, Al- Ahram reports that on 10 April 1932, a medical committee in the Conference of the League of Students met in the clinic of Dr Ali Ibrahim Pasha to discuss what they could do to combat drug addiction.
The other prong of the anti-narcotics war was to step up the clampdown on trafficking. Newspapers of the period were filled with news of the trials of drug gangs, and the stiff penalties they received were meant to give heed to others whose greed might lure them to engage in this illicit trade.
Perhaps the most famous case of the time was that involving a gang headed by a certain Mohamed Nafie, a senior official in the Railways Authority. The court came down on Nafie and his accomplices to the fullest extent of the law, sentencing them to five years prison and a LE1,000 fine. The case was important enough to draw the attention of the London Times, which commented, "The sentence against Nafie delivered a mighty blow to the vice ring in the East. Nafie's intelligence and energy could have paved the way to a high-level position in the Railways Authority. Instead, he preferred to get rich in a grander and faster manner, which he found in the trafficking in drugs and became, in this capacity, an extremely dangerous criminal and a peril to society."
So sensational was this case that Al-Ahram allocated a good portion of its front page of 17 June 1932 to a set of photographs. One showed the gang's hideout: "a large underground warehouse whose entrance is concealed by the floor tiles of the room above". Two other pictures stood side by side, one of First Deputy Prosecutor Riad Rizqallah in charge of prosecuting narcotics crimes and the second of Inspector Henry Gordon Farar of the Cairo police drug squad. "To these two men goes the credit for bringing charges and unearthing the evidence," observed the caption. Another picture displayed some of the evidence: "rubber-lined sacks filled with hashish and sheets of paper to manufacture the packages for distributing heroin". Last but not least was the photograph of ring leader Mohamed Nafie, who appeared quite urbane and elegantly attired.
As is still the case today, drug trafficking could be a family business, with certain families dominating the field. Such was the case with the notorious Kretli family in Alexandria who used their connections in the customs district for their large-scale hashish smuggling operations. After having long kept the family under surveillance, the police arrested the family head, Mustafa, and his brother, with the hope of uncovering the rest of their ring.
These actions and others were beginning to pay off. On 13 December 1932, Al-Ahram featured a report on the state of drug trafficking in Alexandria where lived the highest concentration of smuggling rings. Its most important finding was that prosecutions of drug mongers had fallen off, which it attributed to three causes. Firstly, like all other fields of economic activity at the time, the drug trade was in a slump due to the worldwide depression. Naturally, there were still many driven to crime by economic need. In this regard, the report noted a curious phenomenon: some individuals dealt in small quantities of drugs openly in the hope that the police would arrest them and send them to prison where they would be housed, fed and dressed at the government's expense. Secondly, according to the report, most of the big narcotics gangs had already been arrested and brought to trial. Thirdly, the stiff penalties they received created a powerful deterrent to others.
In spite of this progress, the report charged that there was insufficient cooperation between the various branches of the security agencies. There were virtually no contacts between the coast guard and the police, for example. The report went on to state, "This lack of cooperation has manifested itself in another form. Some government agencies have not taken the necessary measures to assist others in the performance of their duties. An instance of this came to light recently in the case of a government employee accused of drug smuggling. Although the defendant was pronounced innocent, the court maintained in its ruling that because the evidence against him had been so strong he should not remain an employee in a government agency. Nevertheless, the man is still at his post, which by its very nature presents him with the opportunities to engage in smuggling."
Also, in spite of the big dent law enforcement officials had made in drug trafficking, the Alexandrian criminal court confessed that it was stymied by foreign dealers in the country. In an article in the London-based Empire Review, Hafez Afifi complained of the impact of this trade on Egypt's "international position", by which he was referring to the Capitulations System under which foreign residents were immune from prosecution in Egyptian courts. The existence of this system, he complained, impeded the creation of a uniform criminal code. "It can happen that a particular narcotics case could come under four or five different laws in four or five different consulates, each of which would issue different rulings, ranging from a small fine to a long prison sentence."
The Capitulations also hampered the police in their pursuit of offenders. Frequently, the police had to act quickly in order to arrest a suspect or stage a raid on their homes. When foreign suspects were involved, however, precious time was wasted while consulates were notified and consular officials performed their bureaucratic requirements, often giving the culprits the chance to escape or to hide all traces of their activities. Afifi concludes, "There is no situation that demonstrates more clearly the ills of Capitulations than that which we are discussing, for criminals not only benefit from their privileges but this very system, in effect, offers an incentive to crime and draws to Egypt large numbers of undesirables."
Nor were the Mixed Courts, where foreigners could be tried in front of panels of Egyptian and foreign judges, a solution. Russel Pasha himself described these courts as more of a farce than anything else. When brought before these courts, he said, "narcotics crimes are treated as a misdemeanour, punishable at most by a couple of days in prison and a few piastres," whereas in their own countries, the perpetrators of the same crimes would be facing decades in prison.
However, the drug trade had a much larger international dimension. Hafez Afifi relates that, in response to anti-narcotic conferences sponsored by the League of Nations, many of its members amended their laws to provide for closer supervision of pharmaceutical manufacturers and harsher penalties for trafficking and addiction. The result was not only that narcotics exports from these countries dropped, but that the industry itself had relocated to Turkey, which in 1930 alone had exported at least four tons of heroin. This development prompted the League's Anti-Opium Information Bureau to notify the Egyptian prime minister, among other heads of state, to take the necessary precautions to combat what had become an international phenomenon. "Governments are mistaken to believe that they can fight this trade within their borders alone," a memorandum declared, adding that sources of narcotics could only be uprooted under the auspices of the League of Nations which under the Versailles Treaty was charged with ensuring the implementation of the international agreements on opium. In keeping with this principle, the bureau urged the Egyptian government to divide its budgetary allocation to combating narcotics into two portions: 90 per cent to be earmarked for the domestic battle against drugs and the remaining 10 per cent to be contributed to the League of Nations so as to assist it in disseminating the relevant documentation and information. Were the Egyptian government to agree to this measure, the memorandum added, it would receive the praise of the international press.
Encouraged by these developments, the Cairo police commissioner issued a bulletin containing the steps to be followed in narcotics cases involving subjects of those nations that were signatories to the Capitulations agreement. Curiously, although the bulletin stated that foreigners charged with narcotics offences were to be handed over to their consulates within 24 hours of filing charges, Greek expatriates and subjects were to be handled differently. Due to the large number of narcotics cases involving individuals of this nationality it was thought that different procedures were called for.
Perhaps it was this phenomenon that prompted Al-Ahram to send a special correspondent to Alexandria to cover a case that was currently being tried in the Greek Consulate, where several defendants were facing charges of smuggling under the cover of the customs wavers granted to the Italian Consulate. The correspondent could not help but to deride the sentences the consular court handed down. The two ring leaders were sentenced to eight months in jail of which they had already served four in preventive detention. Three others were released on grounds of "sudden decline in health", and the last two got off by simply refusing to recognise the jurisdiction of the consular court.
To Egypt's good fortune, Turkish subjects did not enjoy the immunities under the Capitulations System. Although Ankara applied to be included in the list of nations accorded capitulatory concessions -- not surprisingly, given the recent boom in its drug industry -- Egypt was not willing to accede. Egyptians had suffered enough from this bane on their legal and law enforcement systems, and had long been clamouring to end it. Fortunately, Egyptians did not have too much longer to wait. Less than five years later, the Capitulations would be finally abolished under the terms of the 1937 Montreux Convention.
* The author is a professor of history and head of Al-Ahram History Studies Centre.
