When to engage?
Washington is hesitant about sending American troops to Liberia, exhibiting once again a preference for disengagement from African conflicts, writes Negar Azimi
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A refugee cautiously looks out from his tent as the sound of mortars are heard, at the Greystone refugee camp in the grounds of the US Embassy in the Liberian capital Monrovia
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In October of 1993 the image of a young American GI's body dragged through the streets of the Somali capital Mogadishu by seemingly jubilant Somali commandos was broadcast to television sets around the world. The proliferation of this shocking image was largely responsible for the United States' eventual withdrawal from a highly touted humanitarian mission and a virtual halt on American interventionism in armed conflicts abroad.
This resultant tendency towards disengagement was apparent in Rwanda, where in 1994 the US and other countries failed to intervene in genocide that left at least 800,000 dead.
Ten years after the debacle in Somalia, the US is now puzzlingly angling towards involvement in another Liberia's civil strife, raising questions as to whether this gesture marks the onset of a novel era of compassionate interventionism. As of press time, the Bush administration had deployed roughly 2,300 marines to the Liberian coast, likely with the intention of leading a multinational peace-keeping effort in the civil war- torn West African nation. The development is admittedly a surprising one and resolves marked ambivalence that started with President Bush's whirlwind five day, five country tour of Africa two weeks ago.
Facing mounting international pressure in recent weeks, the administration had cautiously transported a force of marines towards the Liberian coast in anticipation of a potential involvement while carefully toeing a line advocating a regional response from ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) or other means.
A likely scenario would involve a West African contingent of 1,000-1,500 troops supported by US forces in logistics, communications and command and control capacity. Some advocate a US ground presence as well. Either way, UN peace- keepers could take over following an interim period.
Though pressure in favour of intervention has come from the United Nations, West African governments and the humanitarian community, among others, President Bush continues to face significant opposition to committing troops in this fashion. After all, American troops are already arguably overextended in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan, while the overwhelming concern both within the Pentagon and among Congressional Republicans is to avoid a repeat of the Somali fiasco.
Indeed, the current administration's tendencies are a far cry from those of the Clinton administration, which initially was more inclined towards nation-building and compassionate multilateralism, demonstrated in its involvement in conflicts in Haiti and Somalia.
Professor Donald Rothchild of the University of California at Davis has long been observing US-African policy. His book on the subject will soon be published by Routledge.
"Clinton's successor, George W Bush, came to office proclaiming his distaste for a proactive commitment to multilateral peace-keeping, democracy promotion and a generous economic aid policy. African issues were placed at a relatively low point in terms of Bush administration's foreign policy priorities," Rothchild told Al Ahram Weekly.
Given such a foreign policy framework and the US's limited security and economic interests in Liberia, the question remains as to why the American administration would bother getting involved in the Liberian tragedy at all. The historical ties between the two nations as well as the current position of the administration globally nevertheless suggest that a case for intervention exists.
Liberia was established in 1847 by freed American slaves and from the beginning the government had a hand in its development. Some scholars have called the US relationship to the country since that time one of "virtual colonialism", particularly regarding its relations with the American-Liberian settler community.
And what of security questions? The case of Somalia demonstrates that countries with weak governance and unpatrolled coastlines are potential hotbeds for terrorism. Significantly, Liberian President Charles Taylor has already been linked to Al-Qa'eda operatives through a diamond smuggling scene.
Beyond security issues and historical affinities, there is also the question of the Bush administration's image. Intervention in Liberia may serve to highlight the friendly face President Bush donned for Africans during his tour and may prove that he does indeed care about the continent's plight.
These reasons, combined with the US's unparalleled capability to mount rapid response to crises worldwide, make the case for intervention difficult to ignore.
"Here is a situation in which everyone is calling on Bush to intervene, from the rebels and the government to the United Nations and the Liberian on the street," Human Rights Watch West Africa researcher Leslie Lefkow told the Weekly. "This is not about the US taking an interventionist approach. It is about stopping an already catastrophic situation."
Liberia has been at war internally for 14 years. In the conflict Taylor's government is pitted against the rebel Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) -- a group largely composed of ethnic Mandingo citizens. A second rebel faction, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), recently split from the LURD and made significant gains in past months. As it stands, over one million Liberians are either refugees or internally displaced, while 200,000 have died since Taylor's so-called Christmas Eve rebellion in 1989. Forced recruitment for combat as well as forced labour are the norm on both sides of the struggle. Famine and disease are ubiquitous, with basic services such as electricity, clean water and a minimal level of security virtually non-existent.
But the Liberian conflict is hardly only an internal ethnic struggle. Liberia's war is part of a larger story within the region that brings together Sierra Leone, Guinea and the Ivory Coast in a contest over diamonds, timber and other resources.
In this part of the world internal conflicts within states tend to spill over. Guinea and Liberia have accused each other of supporting armed anti-government rebels, while the Sierra Leonean government has accused Liberia of providing support to the Sierra Leonean rebel faction the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). LURD, in the meantime, is reportedly receiving support from the government of the Ivory Coast.
For his part, Taylor is an infamous war criminal. He has been indicted for war crimes by the Special Court in neighbouring Sierra Leone, though his extradition to face those charges a practical impossibility. Nigeria has already graciously accepted to receive Taylor in his inevitable step from governance into exile.
In the meantime, with every passing day more lives are lost. The current rebel offensive on Monrovia is the third attack in the past six weeks, while fighting has left hundreds of civilians dead or wounded. Rebel control of the countryside has translated to mass migration to the capital, Monroevia, where nearly half of the civilian population awaits change amidst precarious iniquity.
For those who argue derisively that in diffusing the crisis in Liberia the US would be playing the role of the world's policeman once again, the crucial intervention of Britain in Sierra Leone and France in Ivory Coast demonstrate that other prosperous nations have taken on special responsibilities in the region. The French have also led the international force in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where nearly three million people have been lost in the last 15 years.
"You have to admit that interventions in the region have made a difference in Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast," Lefkow said.
In the end, Liberia is not Somalia, where absence of a clear mandate and lofty aspirations ended in disaster. Here, the pieces are in place for an effective intervention. Every side of the conflict has voiced its favour for US mediation and a final settlement, while ECOWAS has already committed its own force. Rather, the humanitarian risks of non-intervention are far too great. The international community's experience of non-action in Rwanda has taught us this lesson the hard way.
