Keeping whose peace?
The US wants an international force not to protect the Iraqis, but to defend the occupying army against growing national resistance, writes Abdalla El-Ashaal*
The current situation in Iraq is ambiguous to say the least. As the US becomes increasingly embroiled in Mesopotamia, its resolve to increase its presence and bring the situation under control is countered by an equally strong desire to cut and run.
Meanwhile, the Iraqi resistance continues to present a serious threat, despite Washington's psychological warfare and its policy of belittling all indigenous opposition. It is a heartrending spectacle, regardless of the identity of the Iraqis involved, and one which reached a particularly gruesome climax in the recent shoot-out against Uday and Qusay Hussein. The US meanwhile continues to suggest that this resistance, far from being an Iraqi national movement, is entirely dependent upon Saddam and his family, and can be dismissed as a vendetta waged by supporters of the former regime.
While this "war" continues, the Iraqi people are suffering agonies of loss and bewilderment. They have no sense of security, neither physical nor moral, and no vision of a future. Their country has been turned into a banqueting table for greedy vultures, and they themselves are treated worse than leftovers by people who are all too happy to pick their bones bare, without offering them anything in return.
Whether Washington's ambivalence stems from the novelty of its situation, its lack of familiarity with the traditional modus operandi of occupying powers, or its inability to don the mantle of ancient Rome and inaugurate an irrevocably new world is largely irrelevant to our analysis of the measures which it is taking in Iraq. Rather, the crucial issues seem to me to be how to define an appropriate legal framework for the "interim council", and the possible consequences of the US's call for international peace-keeping forces to help restore security.
It appears that the constants in Iraq are beginning to prevail once again over the variables, even as the latter continues to play a crucial instrumental role. Meanwhile, attempts abound, ranging from the highly realistic to the wildly fantastic, to peer into the mists and set a course for the Iraqi nation in a world whose future appears to many uncertain and bleak. If concern over the future of Iraq is directly proportional to the ambiguity that hovers over the country, it is little wonder that America's actions and their potential repercussions are attracting increasingly intense scrutiny.
To judge by its declarations and actions since the occupation, the US certainly entertains great hopes in Iraq. Whether or not these hopes are legitimate is irrelevant here, although it is equally clear that Washington does not know precisely how to go about realising them. Nor does Israel stand to benefit from Washington's current predicament, in which the time factor is of the essence.
While the US has refused to specify the duration of its occupation, in the hope that time will help realise dreams of wealth and domination that cannot possibly be fulfilled within the lifetime of a single generation, the Iraqi quagmire is turning into a more pressing problem as each day that passes brings us closer to the launch of the US presidential campaigns. If the Iraqi resistance can continue to down an American soldier or two each day, in a manner that indicates a certain degree of organisation, training and armament, the current administration will find itself in an increasingly awkward position, especially as it becomes impossible to cover up or misrepresent the nature of the resistance. The White House, therefore, wants to pacify Iraq now, so that it can push forward with its declared programme for the country, and doubtless also with its project for the region as a whole -- a project in which Israel's designs feature prominently.
The Interim Council is an example of the kind of ad hoc attempt Washington is making to restore calm, improve its own image and absorb anger. Unfortunately, the solution proposed has only fuelled resentment and thrown America's confusion into even starker relief. Worse yet, it seems that the more Washington tries to gloss things over, the more its plans backfire and the more heavily the consequences come to weigh it down. Such blundering can be seen in the way it has sought to handle criticism of the Interim Council. It was reported, for example, that the Bush administration was considering granting certain diplomatic powers to the Interim Council which it would exercise through Iraqi consulates abroad. This, it thought, would confer a degree of legitimacy on the council and help silence its critics; but the move signally failed to achieve this aim, provoking more opposition than approval.
Another important example is the way the US has responded to the criticism, which, significantly, has been picked up by a Democratic presidential candidate, that it should not be working alone in Iraq, independently of the UN. Previously, the White House had rejoiced at Resolution 1483 which, contrary to UN custom, had conferred extensive authorities on the occupying power; now, it announced that it still hoped its friends would send forces to help restore calm and maintain security, under US direction. Some countries, including Japan, Poland, Spain and certain Eastern European nations, have indicated their willingness to respond to Washington's plea. Germany, France and India, however, have refused, on the grounds that peace-keeping forces should be sent only under Security Council auspices.
Confusion reigns with regard to the relationship between US and international forces, and between Washington and the UN. This dangerous ambiguity is reinforced by the possibility that France and Germany may agree to take part in peace-keeping operations should the Security Council resolve to create an intervention force for Iraq. It is hard to exaggerate how difficult the Security Council may find the task it has set itself, should it choose to go down that route, having effectively legitimised the US occupation of Iraq, in clear violation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
Nevertheless, it is essential to distinguish clearly between the UN and US approaches to Iraq, for they are as different as night and day. Security Council Resolution 1483 has conferred upon the US a mandate to carry out certain tasks which will ostensibly benefit the Iraqi people. As long as this resolution is in force, Arab governments, along with a large segment of world opinion, will continue to urge the US to complete these tasks as quickly as possible and then withdraw. The opinion of the international community is similar: either the US should work in accordance with Resolution 1483, or it should withdraw and let the UN assume full responsibility. America's attempt, however, to co-opt the UN into filling the gaps in the situation it has created is potentially very dangerous, and it does not require much effort of the imagination to foresee the kind of consequences to which it might lead, if the UN were to take the bait.
America is an occupying power and, as such, Iraqi resistance to its presence is sanctioned under international law. For the UN then to create a peace- keeping force under these circumstances only begs the question of the nature of the "peace" it intends to help keep -- the answer, of course, being the Pax Americana.
The international community must not sanction the occupation of Iraq, thus empowering the world's sole superpower to violate international law on more or less whatever pretext it chooses. It is one thing for the US to appeal to its allies to create a peace-keeping force outside the UN framework. Such a force would clearly be subordinate to American forces and would thus be complicit in their illegal occupation and in the repression of a resistance which constitutes a legitimate means under international law towards the exercise of the right to self-determination. That is bad enough.
However, it would be quite another thing for the Security Council itself to create such a force. To do so would compound its sin of condoning the occupation via Resolution 1483, thus dangerously blurring the line between the peace and welfare of the Iraqi people and the safety of the occupying forces. Such a curious precedent might conform nicely to America's opportunistic approach to international law and UN organs, but it should be firmly opposed by all other nations. The Arab nations in particular should be especially adamant in this regard. They must insist that in invading Iraq, the US has jeopardised that country's stability, its territorial integrity, indeed its very future. If they are to participate in an international peace-keeping force, they should insist that they will only do so after the occupying forces have withdrawn and on the condition that the aim of the peace- keeping mission is to generate a climate of confidence enabling the Iraqi people to create viable institutions of government and exercise their right to self determination.
Curiously, though, some officials in the Arab world would appear to be so enamoured of the idea of peace-keeping forces in whatever guise, that they, too, have lent their voices to the appeal. But, however well-intentioned these persons may be, they are only helping to prolong the tragedy and defeat the hopes of the Iraqi people. Iraq, after all, is an ancient society, which unquestionably has the capacities required to manage its own affairs. At the same time, one can easily see how such a confusion has arisen. For the Arab world is simultaneously calling for foreign forces to be brought in to stand between the Palestinians and the Israelis, in line with the appeal issued by President Yasser Arafat on 21 July. However, it is important to bear in mind that there are substantial differences between the Palestinian and Iraqi situations. In Palestine, peace-keeping forces are needed to protect a defenceless people from the brutality of the Israeli occupation authorities; the so-called peace-keeping force in Iraq, however, would be protecting the American occupation forces from the Iraqi resistance. To put it another way, the aim of bringing in an international force in Palestine is to hasten the end of an occupation, whereas the purpose of such a force in Iraq would be to perpetuate the occupation and prolong the Iraqi people's sense of loss and uncertainty, as well as the anxieties of the international community.
I therefore hope that the Arab governments and media take heed of the political and legal pitfalls which surround such a move, and adopt a policy along the lines of that set out by Prince Saud Al-Faisal during talks in Cairo on 23 July 2003. The Saudi foreign minister said that his country would support sending a peace-keeping force to Iraq on two conditions: firstly, that the US occupation ends and, secondly, that this force be formed in accordance with a UN Security Council resolution.
* The writer is assistant to the Egyptian foreign minister.
