Time to move on
What is the Arab Mutual Defence Pact? As Abdel-Moneim Said* points out, even some of its most vigorous proponents know little about it
This series is approaching its end. In it, as in the series on the Arabs and 11 September, I have attempted to identify glaring inconsistencies in attitude and logic among Arabs in dealing with matters of war and peace. The central premise of these articles is that the catastrophes the Arabs encountered in the past and are facing today were not the product of a foreign conspiracy, but rather the result of flaws in their own perceptions and analyses. The aim is to help the Arab world develop a way of dealing with the future that is more rational. Perhaps, then, Arab countries will avoid having to fling themselves at the doorsteps of other nations.
The Iraqi war and its aftermath cast into relief an Arab world caught in that tremendous clash between the history of its struggle against colonialism and imperialism and the present day reality of a struggle of a different order, a struggle between the backwardness that gives rise to governments such as that of Saddam Hussein who propelled his country, along with the rest of the Arab world, from one disaster to the next, and the rest of the world, which is no longer willing to put up with the folly of the Arabs. Unfortunately, the Arabs behaved no differently on that occasion than they had in the past.
Take for example the case of Qatar during the war. That country, as we know, is home to the Al-Jazeera satellite station, CNN's number one rival in keeping spectators, in this region at least, glued to their television screens. Al-Jazeera broadcasts everywhere and has correspondents posted in every critical location and battle. It has also managed to recruit a host of foaming-at-the-mouth radical Arab nationalists who possess a remarkable talent for portraying a war of their own making, regardless of what is happening on the ground. The at once tragic and laughable irony is that only steps away from Arab nationalist command headquarters was the American military operations command headquarters directing the aggression against our sister Iraq. Undoubtedly, too, Al-Jazeera's talk show guests were put up in the Doha Sheraton or the Gulf Hotel, where they shared their morning open buffet breakfast with the generals from the US, British, Australian and Danish armies, before heading their separate ways -- the generals to command base to direct the machinery of war against Iraq and the radical Arab commentators to Al-Jazeera studios to urge the Arab masses to stand up and fight.
Such a scene could only occur in the Arab world, where everyone, in the end, can feel just great. When the dust cleared, Arab opinion pundits patted themselves on the back because they had vented steam for themselves and the masses and because they had done their national duty and supported the jihad against American imperialism and opportunism. The generals, of course, were jubilant because a nation that has surrendered itself to idle dreams and slogans is a nation that has an astounding capacity to repeat its mistakes and therefore was easily defeated. The Qatari people, too, breathed a deep, self-congratulatory sigh of relief because they had had their say, through Al-Jazeera, about the need to uphold the dignity of the Arab nation and, had simultaneously, bolstered their historic friendship with the world's sole superpower by hosting General Tommy Franks and his colleagues from the "international coalition".
Such inconsistencies, however absurd they sometimes are, reveal the predicament of Arab thinking and political action, a predicament that can be partially traced back to the 1991 Gulf War, but has also been evident in all the battles the Arabs fought with Israel. The predicament, then, lies in an inability to bridge the gap between fantasy and fact. To a considerable extent, the gap is the product of something far more serious: plain ignorance.
How frequently during the US-British war against Iraq did we hear prominent and not so prominent Arab journalists and writers invoke the Mutual Arab Defence Treaty. Arab governments must mobilise to crush the invading forces, they cried, because, according to the treaty, when an Arab nation is attacked the others must act immediately in keeping with the right to mutual self-defence. Then, once the echo died down, people recorded another black mark against their governments, which were clearly working for the Americans. This phenomenon occurred not only in the present war, but also during the Iran-Iraq war, the war between Libya and Chad, the Lockerbie crisis, the Mauritania-Senegal face-off, and every other flare-up, or even spat, between an Arab country and a state that was not a member of the Arab League. All the while, appeals to the Mutual Defence Treaty never once inspired people to take a look at its provisions and, more importantly, what happened to it over the past half century.
In the interests of putting an end to circuitous discussions of things about which we know next to nothing, the Mutual Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty between the nations of the Arab League was signed during the 12th regular session of the Arab League Council on 13 April 1950 and later ratified by member nations. This early experiment in collective Arab support is particularly noteworthy in light of the phase through which we are currently passing. On the one hand, that agreement is based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, which states that nations, individually or collectively, have the right to defend themselves against foreign aggression. On the other, it draws on the traditions of mutual self defence established by various international alliances to enable them, not to "resist", to remain "steadfast" or to make an "honourable stand", but to win in the event of a military confrontation.
True, Article 2 of the defence pact states, "The State Parties to this treaty hold that any armed aggression against one or more of these states, or against their armed forces, is an aggression against them all. The State Parties, therefore, are committed to come to the aid of the state or states under attack, and, separately or collectively, to immediately take all measures and use all available means, including recourse to armed force, to repel the aggression." However, this provision does not stand alone. Article 1, which precedes it, states, "The State Parties to this treaty, in the interests of perpetuating and sustaining their peace, security and stability, declare their intention to settle all their disputes through peaceful means, whether these disputes arise in their mutual relations or in their relations with other nations."
Iraq can hardly be said to have a record of attempting to settle its disputes with fellow Arab nations, such as Kuwait, or with non-Arab nations, such as Iran, through peaceful means. Nor has any other Arab regime been so successful at creating enemies regionally or otherwise as the Ba'athist regime in Iraq. Nor had Iraq -- like some other Arab nations in the past, it should be added -- ever been inclined to invoke Article 3, calling upon State Parties to consult with each other in the event of a threat to their territorial integrity.
Equally, if not more significant, is Article 4, which stipulates that the State Parties should cooperate to support and enhance their individual and collective ability to resist aggression militarily and "to participate, in accordance with their resources and needs, in developing their individual and collective means of self defence against any armed aggression."
The upshot is that no Arab government or collection of thinkers, writers and ranters on Arab satellite TV panels should be raving on about the Arab Mutual Defence Pact if peaceful avenues were not explored, if threats were not discussed and if there had been no cooperation in building up military defence capacities. Nor is it legally or politically logical to ask Arab governments to enter into losing battles precipitated by revolutionary Arab regimes that excel at plunging headlong into uneven confrontations and at dragging the rest of the Arabs down with them.
It is astonishing that the vast majority of Arab commentators on the so-called Arab order and its defence pact have not so much as glanced at its text or at its military supplement, both of which call for the creation of a Permanent Military Committee and a Mutual Defence Council. These two bodies are charged with drawing up military plans to counter potential threats to make recommendations regarding the organisation and upgrading of the armed forces of the member nations. Where are this committee and this council? Has anyone heard, recently, of any activities regarding organisation, training and upgrading of our armed forces recommended or supervised by these two bodies? As long as such measures are not adopted and as long as we know precisely how things stand, why do those people who never stop shouting keep harping on about applying an agreement that they know full well has never been put into effect since its inception?
Perhaps not many are aware that Arab League archives have noted that two Arab governments had registered reservations concerning the defence pact. The first is Yemen, which wanted to exempt from the second article those Arab nations that had defence agreements with other countries and objected to Article 6 which stipulated that decisions by the Military Council be adopted by a two-thirds majority vote. The second country was Iraq, which wanted Article 2 to emphasise the notion that participation should be in accordance with a state's resources and needs, and which shared Yemen's reservations over Article 6 regarding vote taking in the Military Council -- a body that was never actually created.
Now that matters are a bit clearer with regard to the Arab Mutual Defence Pact, those who still want to talk about it can do so seriously. Perhaps, though, it is time to move on to another subject.
* The writer is director of the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
