The way ahead
The Middle East will change. But will it because of US prodding, or in spite of it? Asks Osama El-Ghazali Harb*
Condoleezza Rice, the US national security adviser, recently joined the chorus of US officials advocating change in the Middle East. Since the end of last year, a new US vision has been taking shape, with officials adding pieces to the jigsaw puzzle through various public statements. Richard Haas, in an appearance at the Foreign Affairs Council on 4 December 2002, spoke of the need to promote democracy in the Arab and Islamic worlds with US help. Then, Colin Powell launched his plan for a US-Mediterranean partnership at the Heritage Foundation on 12 December 2002. This was followed by President Bush's speech on 26 February at the American Enterprise Institute, in which he spoke of the need to reform the political map of the Middle East, foster the spread of democracy in the region, and undertake wide-ranging political and economic reforms. Other US officials sounded a similar note, including Elizabeth Cheney, a diplomat in the Near East department of the State Department and the daughter of the US vice-president. Speaking at the recent World Economic Forum in Amman, she hinted at modernisation programmes for the region totalling $100 million.
Following the occupation of Iraq, reform in the Middle East has acquired a new urgency. According to the US strategy formulated in the aftermath of 11 September, the matter of "changing" the Middle East is next on the US agenda after the elimination of Al-Qa'eda in Afghanistan and Saddam's regime in Iraq. Despite the problems the US is facing in both Iraq and Afghanistan, it seems determined to proceed with its third objective, that of reforming the Arab and Islamic worlds.
In a sense, the United States is now a Middle Eastern country. US forces are stationed on Iranian, Turkish, Syrian, Jordanian, Saudi, and Kuwaiti borders. Iraq is in US hands, and has just begun exploring its own vision of democracy and free market economics.
In an article in the Washington Post dated 7 August, as well as a lecture at a press association in Dallas delivered around the same time, Rice spoke of the US resolve to "transform" the Middle East, exactly as it transformed Europe following World Ward II. She mentioned that the Middle East, with 12 countries and a population of 300 million, has a GDP below that of Spain, a country with 40 million people, attributing this situation to what some Arab intellectuals call a "freedom deficit".
In a nutshell, we are now faced with a declared US intention to introduce political and economic change in the Middle East in the foreseeable future. The buzzword here is democratisation. But, can democracy be imposed by outsiders on a given community or a number of communities? Even if it was theoretically possible for an outside contribution -- of any magnitude -- to further democracy, what are the chances for and obstacles to such a move by the US in the case of Middle East countries? What shape will it take? And where do we stand on all of this?
By definition, democracy is an act of free will by which society chooses its method of self-rule. Democracy cannot be achieved unless a society is convinced of its merits and willing to apply it. This is what happened in western Europe, the cradle of democracy. And, this is the case in other democracies. However, it is not impossible for an external power to further democracy in a given country, for instance through removing a dictatorial regime or through assistance to civic reform and political education in the aftermath of a tyrannical rule, so long as the communities and nations in question are opposed to the ousted regimes, willing to accept democratic principles, and prepared to negotiate with the external power in question. This was exactly the case in Germany and Japan after World War II. In her article and speech mentioned above, Rice drew a parallel with Europe. She said that just as Germany became the cornerstone of a free and peaceful Europe, Iraq could become the mainstay of a new Middle East, a region in which ideologies of hate will have no place.
Having stated the problem, let's look closer at the implications. Democracy in our countries cannot be a result of US, or non-US, pressure. External elements may affect, positively or negatively, the democratic process in our countries, but only to a limited extent. This does not mean that we reject democracy, or that our societies are not ready for it. The opposite is true. The call for freedom and the fight against tyranny have been an integral part of our national political experience since the very first years of the modern Egyptian revival. A century ago, Egypt played host to the great Arab thinker Abdel-Rahman Al-Kawakebi and enthusiastically greeted his book The Nature of Tyranny, in which he advocated freedom and democracy. Egypt's struggle for liberation coincided with its struggle for a constitution and for civic rights. In its liberal years, 1922-1952, Egypt witnessed an astounding revival of culture and art. Many intellectuals would agree that the biggest drawback of the July revolution was its indifference to democracy. Most Egyptians would admit that the lack of democracy was a main factor in the defeats of 1948 and 1967, just as it was instrumental in Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the fall of Baghdad in 2003.
To say that democracy cannot be imposed from the outside is not to say that the domestic scene is not ready for democracy. We want democracy, regardless of what the US says or does. We know that without democracy our countries will not be able to make progress or overcome their problems. The need for democracy is not in question. However, democracy may take any of a variety of forms. Democracy in the US is different from that in France, Japan, India, or Turkey. Our recent political legacy puts a premium on "social justice", perhaps more than is true for other countries. And, our Islamic culture limits some of the "individual" freedoms common in other societies. Yet, the yearning for democracy is alive, and the desire for freedom in this part of the world is as intense as elsewhere.
One may argue that democracy cannot result from outside pressure or intervention, without totally excluding the possibility of the US promoting the development of democracy in our countries. No sensible person can possibly reject outside help (American or non-American) that may facilitate democratisation in our societies. There are, unfortunately, a number of objective historic factors that make our people suspicious about the US's professed intention to democratise our societies.
Since World War II, the US has not been a strong proponent of democracy in the Arab world. The US's interest in the region has been focussed on oil, combating Communism, and the protection of Israel. None of these objectives requires democracy, rather they all call for a firm hand. Under US protection, dictatorial and conservative regimes flourished in our region. US policy-makers made a point of not interfering with conservative governments out of respect for the "traditions" of the region. US political science justified the lack of democracy in dictatorial regimes by praising their ability to modernise society through the military and the bureaucracy rather than by democratic means.
Consequently, the current US defence of democracy sounds like political opportunism motivated more by US security needs than a desire to promote civil liberties in this part of the world. This impression is only fortified by a US foreign policy that seems to belittle democracy in international relations and that gives precedence to narrow US interests over global needs in many fields, including the environment.
Add to this the US's flagrant and continuous bias towards Israel, which has twisted the course of democratic evolution in our countries and sullied the image of the US in the Arab world. There is no doubt that the Arab-Israeli conflict was one of the foremost reasons for the Arab world's poor democratic record. The need to confront the "enemy" was an oft cited excuse by Arab regimes, particularly those posing as progressive or revolutionary, to fetter or postpone democratisation. "No voice should be louder than that of the battle," we were told. Posturing about the confrontation with Israel and Zionism gave a veneer of legitimacy to regimes that have lost any ability to improve their societies or defend the soil of their homeland.
The helplessness of Arab regimes and the repeated defeats in confrontations with Israel fuelled public rage against the US, Israel's main ally and supporter, even in Arab countries officially close to Washington. Interestingly, Israel's supporters in the US hotly deny that US policy in the Middle East has anything to do with the hatred felt towards the US in this region, attributing the latter instead to religious and cultural reasons, old and new. Their aim, of course, is to absolve Israel from responsibility for America's poor image in the region.
The current US campaign against terror did nothing to alleviate Arab and Muslim suspicions concerning US intentions. US officials occasionally profess the kindest feelings towards Islam and Muslims, yet political statements and media often associate terror with Islam and link the fight against terror with the need to reform the Islamic discourse. Most Muslims are horrified by any talk of the US getting involved in a revision of their own creed.
Does this mean that the US cannot possibly support democratisation in our countries. It can, but through gentle help, not crude prodding. Here are a few suggestions as to what the US might do:
First, the US could play a role in preparing the "regional" climate for democracy. It could do that by helping to find a just and enduring settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The success of the US in resolving this conflict in a manner that fulfils the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, foremost their right to an independent state, would create a new climate in the region, one that is different from that seen over the past half a century or so, one in which democracy may finally thrive.
Second, the Arabs are watching to see how the Americans intend to act in Iraq. Will the United States really create a free and independent regime in that country? Will it end its occupation at the earliest opportunity? Or, will it drag its feet and dig itself into a hole?
Third, there is much room for assistance in economic development in the region. The Americans have already proposed a US-Middle Eastern free trade zone. It would make perfect sense for the US to provide programmes to boost those sectors and institutions deemed essential to democracy, without tying these programmes to political or cultural conditions.
Democratisation will have to be carried out by our own people, the governments and the opposition. The more we understand the crucial need for democratisation, the less troubled we would be by the haughty US references about the way the contemporary world -- particularly the Middle East -- should shape up. Since the early 1980s when President Hosni Mubarak took office democratisation in Egypt has been marked by two developments. The first is the transformation from a one-party system to a multi-party one, a process that Mubarak's predecessor Anwar El-Sadat began but left unfinished. The other is that democratisation had to be introduced simultaneously with the battle against terror, a matter which complicated its pace and the context in which it is to proceed.
There is much we have to do to foster further political reform and democratisation. At the same time, we are faced with many forces -- bureaucratic and ideological -- that oppose this reform, resist it, and hope to postpone it. Yet, the only way is ahead, towards democracy, regardless of what the Americans say or do.
* The writer is editor-in-chief of the quarterly Al- Siyassa Al-Dawlia (International Politics), issued by Al-Ahram, and member of the Shura Council.
