Reforming the Arab League
The Arab League, already beset by problems, is facing new, more immediate, challenges. Mohamed Sid-Ahmed comments
At a time the Anglo-American military presence in Iraq is widely regarded in the Arab world as a foreign occupation, the Arab League's refusal to send Arab troops to Iraq has been criticised by Washington. While not all Arab states see eye to eye when it comes to characterising the continued presence of coalition forces in Iraq, they have wisely chosen to close ranks on this particular issue, preferring to abstain from intervening than to add new reasons for dissension. As the Sudanese foreign minister put it: "This is a highly contentious issue. Who would be sending troops, and under which umbrella and for what purpose? To cooperate with whom? To fight against whom?"
On the diplomatic front, there is the question of Iraq's seat in the Arab League. Will it remain vacant? The league issued a statement describing the Interim Governing Council (IGC) as a "step in the right direction". Does this mean that the IGC is acquiring some form of recognition in the eyes of the Arab League? And if so, in what capacity? Given that it derives its prerogatives from the occupation forces headed by a US appointee, L. Paul Bremer, would recognising it not imply recognising the occupation as legitimate?
The legitimacy of the occupation is far from being universally accepted. A considerable number of states, including permanent members of the Security Council, continue to regard the war on Iraq as unjustified and the military occupation as illegal. Indeed, questions over the legitimacy of the war are still being raised even in the US and Britain. How can the Arabs give their blessing to an enterprise whose legitimacy is still being questioned by much of the world -- including many Iraqis? When the UN General Assembly meets next September, the situation in Iraq is expected to be the subject of intense debate, and it is to be hoped that the Arab states will by then have come up with a united stance. As matters now stand, some members of the Arab League tend to be more western-oriented than the western powers themselves in backing Bush and Blair. This is a situation which must be addressed without delay, especially now that Washington is pushing for an Arab military presence in Iraq, side by side with the coalition forces.
The future of Iraq and of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process is inextricably linked to the future of the Arab League, which depends to a great extent on its ability to reform itself and overcome the state of paralysis that has exposed it to strong criticism since the outbreak of the war on Iraq. It is with this in mind that Egypt came forward with an initiative to reform the Arab League and revive its role as a vehicle for joint Arab action. The Egyptian initiative, currently under study, raises a number of critical issues we can no longer afford to ignore, issues that determine, to a very great extent, the dynamics of inter-Arab relations. Overcoming the present dissension in Arab ranks requires a practical, political approach to these issues, not a traditional, academic one. Although relations between member states of the Arab League are adversial, not to say confrontational, on the problems that divide them, they are united in their aspiration for an overall Arab reconciliation, no easy matter in the present situation.
Actually, the reasons for discord among member states are not linked only to present circumstances. There are still unresolved differences over events that occurred in the past which continue to impact on events in the present. Among the most controversial are the two Camp David processes. Camp David I, under the Carter administration, represented a step forward in the direction of an Arab-Israeli settlement, albeit confined to Egypt and Israel, while Camp David II, under the Clinton administration, failed to resolve the Palestinian problem, the core issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It remains to be seen which of the two events is more likely to determine the course of future developments.
A few days ago, Sharon declared that he would not deal with Egypt as long as President Mubarak does not visit Tel Aviv and the Egyptian ambassador does not return to Israel. Sharon is expecting Egypt to deal with Israel in terms of the logic of Camp David I, even as he persists in his policy of liquidating the Palestinian problem in terms of the post-Camp David II logic. This is typical of the kind of issues that the Arab League will have to address.
The Egyptian initiative proposes the establishment of preemptive mechanisms to prevent conflicts of interest between members from escalating dangerously. For these mechanisms to be effective, however, an in-depth analysis of the reasons which generated conflicts in the past must be conducted -- but not in the aim of settling old scores. True, the lessons of history are important, and it is only by looking to the past and examining the underlying causes of previous conflict situations that we can hope to avoid their recurrence, but our approach should be future-oriented if we are to prevent a further deterioration of the situation.
An issue not addressed by the Egyptian initiative and which could be an important step on the road to an Arab reconciliation is the need to introduce changes to the Arab political discourse, which is rife with criticism of others and utterly devoid of self-criticism. An attempt should be made to abstain whenever possible from criticising this or that Arab state and to engage in constructive self- criticism. There is no doubt that all Arab parties have committed mistakes which merit serious soul- searching, otherwise the situation would have not deteriorated to the extent it has, and the time has come to acknowledge and accept responsibility for those mistakes.
While the Egyptian initiative is definitely a step in the right direction, I believe initiatives for reform should not emanate from one Arab state only. There is obviously a need for multiple attempts put forward by a variety of parties. The text which is finally approved should be a collective endeavour extending to all Arab parties, even if this does not necessarily mean that each state should present an initiative of its own.
Actually, the intellectual effort to be furnished should not be limited to Arab government institutions only. The debate should be extended to NGO's civil society and human rights organisations throughout the Arab world. Nothing is more dangerous than to have the debate polarise between governmental agencies on the one hand and popular organisations on the other. The Egyptian initiative did well to recall the role of the UN in giving advisory status to NGOs within the Economic and Social Council. Eliminating distinctions between governmental and non-governmental institutions is bound to promote individual initiatives, encourage creative thinking and reinforce democracy.
An issue that is often discussed and that has yet to see the light of day is the creation of an Arab Court of Justice. Although apparently not directly linked to the question of reforming the Arab League, the issue is important because creating such a court consecrates the authority of law as an authority transcending that of the ruler, and makes the latter accountable for violations of the law or the constitution.
Any attempt to reform the Arab League must address the system of voting, that is, whether resolutions should be passed by unanimous or majority vote. The system of unanimity applied in the Arab League allows a country like Djibouti to block the passage of a resolution that involves the fate of states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia or Iraq. Sticking to unanimity means giving veto powers to the weakest Arab countries and enabling them to prevent the Arab League from taking initiatives, even if strongly supported by a wide majority of Arab states, including the most powerful among them.
The idea of unanimity upholds the right of every Arab state to cling to its sovereign prerogatives without reservation, and to join other Arab states only to the extent that this would not affect its sovereignty. This is in direct contradiction with the notion that the Arab states are linked together by ties which distinguish them from other states and that these ties should be perceived as an asset, not a liability.
Moreover, in the age of globalisation, state sovereignty is no longer as absolute as it once was. Many experiments, notably the European Union, have shown the benefits of integration. The world is now moving in the direction of supranational groupings. Ironically, the Arab states, which have failed to forge a real unity among themselves, describe themselves as one nation, while European states, which do not claim to belong to one nation, have managed to put their differences aside and present a united front to the world, despite intense infighting over the centuries. Europe has succeeded where the Arabs have failed, although Zionism has been no less critical a challenge for the Arabs than Nazism was for the Europeans.
To sum up, requiring unanimity can appear as totalitarian, and, consequently, non-democratic, at a time democracy is moving forward towards still further sophistication, granting rights to the minorities and not only to the majority. Moving from unanimity to majority rule is a fundamental change in the understanding of Arab unity and its philosophy. The Egyptian initiative mentioned a number of forms that majority rule could adopt: voting by consensus, by simple majority, through a succession of votes on one same issue within the context of given restrictions, etc. Each form of vote reflects a given understanding of the role the Arab League will be called upon to play, and will require a thorough analysis before a final decision is taken.
