Axial Pakastani concerns
Closer commercial and political Indo-Israeli bonds alarm Pakistan, reports Iffat Idris from Islamabad
Click to view caption |
Pakistani opposition figures protest in front of the Pakistani Parliament against President Pervez Musharraf's authoritarian domestic policies
|
This month's historic visit by Ariel Sharon to India -- the first ever by an Israeli prime minister -- testified to the two countries' mutual interests. In the 11 years since India established diplomatic relations with Israel the two countries have striven to promote bilateral trade and cooperation. The evolution of these components of the Indo- Israeli relationship have nevertheless recently ruffled Pakistan's feathers.
To date, the most important component of bilateral Indo-Israeli trade is arms and military technology. India is the biggest spender on Israeli arms, while Israel is the second-biggest supplier of arms to India and could soon replace Russia at the top. Parallel to this commercial relationship is a growing concordance of ideologies and strategic goals. The most notable aspects of this are a shared commitment to tackling global terrorism, especially the Islamist variety, and a common aspiration (realised in the case of Tel Aviv, still sought in the case of New Delhi) to form a profound strategic and military alliance with the United States.
Intelligence cooperation between India and Israel -- facing problems of Kashmiri and Palestinian armed resistance respectively -- predates even the establishment of diplomatic relations. India has recently publicised its desire for a broader cooperation. Indian National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra publicly announced Indian ambitions for an "axis of three" with Israel and the United States in addressing the influential American Jewish Committee in Washington in May. The justification he presented was the countries' common struggle against terrorism. So far the US is denying plans to develop any such axis, though it has welcomed the friendship between Israel and India.
What is the impact of all this on Pakistan? The answer can be gauged from President Pervez Musharraf's candor in an interview conducted just before Sharon's visit to India. Asked about the growing relationship between Israel and India, he said, "The India-Israel nexus carries a lot of danger and we are very concerned about it."
It is not difficult to fathom why. Any improvement in India's military capability will only increase the edge it already enjoys over Pakistan in conventional arms. The Phalcon early warning system is the next item on the Indian shopping list. A deal for the purchase of three systems from Israel, worth around $1 billion, is set to be signed shortly. The Phalcon will greatly bolster Indian defence capabilities, and even allow them to monitor and decode Pakistani radio transmissions. Its effectiveness can be gauged from the fact that the US blocked an Israeli sale of the system to China. The Indians are also keen to buy the anti-ballistic Arrow missile from Israel (Washington has not yet given clearance for this), which would again weaken Pakistan's conventional capabilities.
The Indo-Israeli anti-terrorism alliance also endangers Pakistan because, in the Indian worldview, the main terrorist threat comes from their western neighbour. Furthermore, since 11 September New Delhi has had some success in convincing the international community that the problem of Kashmiri separatism is one of terrorism and should be understood as part of George Bush's "war against terror". (In this it has followed the Israeli example; Sharon quickly equated Palestinian violence with the war against terror.) This wins sympathy for India and drains it from the Kashmiris, whose cause Pakistan supports.
But by far the biggest danger to Pakistan lies in the "axis of three" postulated by Mishra. Should the US join Israel and India in a strategic anti- terrorism alliance, Pakistan would suffer a huge blow. For a start, it would greatly increase the chances of Israel gaining US clearance for arms technology transfers to India. Second, it would send a green light to New Delhi to carry out its own preemptive and/or punitive strikes against Pakistan as a response to (or preventative measure against) terrorist violence. Thirdly, it would diminish what small chance remains of America intervening in the 53-year-long Kashmir dispute and pushing India to the negotiating table.
Pakistan's options to counter the threat posed by the Indo-Israeli courtship are limited. It can appeal to the Americans to block arms and technology transfers by Tel Aviv. Bolstering its nuclear arsenal to make up for its conventional arms deficit is another option. Finally, it can take the wind out of India's sails by strengthening its own relations with Israel. It would be no exaggeration to say that over the past few months Pakistan has attempted all three -- in particular, the third.
President Musharraf dropped the bombshell that Pakistan may recognise Israel during his recent trip to the US. The motivation for this was a desire to cultivate American support as much as to sabotage Indo-Israeli friendship. Tel Aviv responded enthusiastically to the presidential overture, but so far strong domestic opposition within Pakistan has prevented the matter being taken any further. Opposition is particularly vocal from the religious right, but anti-Israel sentiment is shared by the general public. Even if Islamabad does buck public opinion and recognise Israel, this is unlikely to curtail the highly lucrative bilateral trade between Israel and India. Hence it will not ease the threat of India's growing conventional arms advantage.
America is perhaps Pakistan's most realistic hope. So long as the US needs Pakistani support and cooperation, it is unlikely to make any move that would overtly favour India. Washington's decision to browbeat Pakistan into supporting the war in Afghanistan and reject voluntary offers of help from India speaks volumes about the relative importance of the two countries for the US (at least for now). US Under-Secretary of State for South Asia Christina Rocca unequivocally dismissed an axis between America, India and Israel. On the downside, though, American friendship towards Pakistan has been notoriously fair weather; there is a long history of Washington dumping Pakistan once its interests have been served.
President Musharraf has every reason to be worried by growing Indo-Israeli collaboration. Should America also throw its lot in with India and Israel, he will have infinitely more cause for alarm.
