Seeking chaos
There are powerfully vested interests in maintaining the instability that prevails in Iraq, argues Ahmed Abdel-Halim*
When, in the aftermath of the war in Iraq, Washington announced that it would maintain a military and political presence in Iraq the US-British so-called "liberation" force was overnight transformed into an army of occupation. Subsequently, it became apparent that Washington's much touted model for democratic ideals -- based on German and Japanese post-war rehabilitation -- were not taking root. Nor could they. Freedom, liberty, free market economy and civil society are all inconsistent with the presence of an occupying power. How can Washington claim to be promoting democracy and the right to free political association after having demonstrated its determination to change the form of government by the illegal use of force of arms? The US model for Iraq has been subjected to a doubly lethal blow -- through the flagrant discrepancy between ideals and application and through Washington's loss of international credibility. Washington was foolish in thinking the post-war rehabilitation of German and Japan was automatically transferable to Iraq. The cultures of German and Japanese are fundamentally different from that of Iraq, or, for that matter, Arab culture in general.
It is little wonder, therefore, that Iraqi resistance to US-British occupation began immediately after the cessation of hostilities. Contrary to US claims the resistance is not a monolithic, unified phenomenon. Rather, it is the manifestation of widespread discontent among diverse segments of the Iraqi people. To persist in claiming otherwise and casting the blame on any single group of individuals is not only a form of self-deception, but also a self-renewing invitation to resistance.
The Iraqi resistance follows a two pronged strategy. On the one hand sustained armed resistance aims at inflicting the highest possible human and material losses on the occupation forces. Accumulating losses will revive the spectre of Vietnam for the American public and generate a snowball effect of grassroots pressures opposed to the continued presence of US forces in Iraq. On the other hand the resistance seeks to create as much chaos as possible in order to facilitate further armed resistance in the hope that cumulative pressures will force the US to revise its policy in both Iraq and the Middle East, the ultimate aim being that Washington evacuate its forces from Iraq.
There are three factors that will compel Washington to take the decision to leave Iraq, I was told recently by an American with close contacts within the US administration. The first pertains to its ability to form an international coalition, efforts towards which end have so far proven unsuccessful. The second concerns the deteriorating US economy and its effects on Bush's prospects for a second term while the third and most important factor is the political cost associated with increasingly high casualty rates. In the interim, as pressures mount, the US may opt for the tried and tested tactic -- divide and conquer -- used by the British in their imperial heyday. Ironically, that strategy is likely to further the sewing of chaos which is one of the aims of the resistance.
The assassination of Ayatollah Mohamed Baqir Al- Hakim, and its consequences, encapsulates what is currently happening in Iraq. It is clear that the incident is being exploited by those who seek the continuation of occupation, not least elements within the US embarrassed by the absence of the WMD that formed the initial pretext for the invasion.
The assassination of Al-Hakim must also be seen within the context of divisions within the Iraqi Shi'ite community, specifically the divide between Shi'ite youth, led by Sheikh Muqtada Al-Sadra, and the traditional Shi'ite leadership as embodied in the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution over which Al- Hakim presided. The incident could well have been an attempt to incite internecine Shi'ite violence and to exacerbate sectarian and ethnic tensions between the Shi'ites and Sunnis, and between Arabs and Kurds. It also has the spin-off of directing Shi'ite vengeance towards the occupation forces. Whatever the case, it heightened the potential for chaos.
There are, too, external dimensions that must be considered. Turkey and Iran both have important, if divergent, interests in Iraq. Ankara is keen on preventing the emergence of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, a concern that informed Turkey's actions before, during and following the US-British military operation in Iraq. Ankara, after all, was reluctant to withdraw its forces from northern Iraq when asked to do so by the US.
Iran, unlike Turkey which is safe from US threats, is currently the object of an escalating US campaign of vilification. Tehran is accused of developing nuclear weapons that could threaten Israel, of harbouring terrorists with connections to Al-Qa'eda and with supporting organisations Washington brands as terrorist, notably the Lebanese Hizbullah and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine. The vast majority of Iranians are Shi'ites, with ties to the Shi'ites of Iraq, and with the breakdown in border controls between Iran and Iraq the US believes that Tehran is infiltrating agents in order to destabilise the country and fuel resistance. More generally, the US believes Iran, with its Islamic revolutionary past, poses a threat to the Gulf, the Middle East and, indeed, the entire world.
A subsidiary aspect of the external dimension is the suspicion that terrorist organisations -- as the US terms them -- are behind the disturbances, including the recent Al-Najaf bombing that claimed the life of Al-Hakim. Iraqi sources have announced that four Arabs have confessed to committing the crime with the assistance of four others still at large. The sources added that the apprehended individuals, who are being held near the site of the bombing, are suspected members of Al-Qa'eda, and that they have confessed to plotting to assassinate other political and religious leaders and to sabotage the water, electricity and oil infrastructures. Regardless of whether or not these confessions are true, there is the question of whether these foreigners could have infiltrated Iraq and undertaken such acts without inside help. Consider, for example, the fact that, according to the governor of Al-Najaf, the perpetrators used 700 kilogrammes of explosives in rigging the car bomb that was detonated by remote control.
To characterise the disturbances in Iraq as terrorist operations contributes little to any understanding of developments. The political map on which events are taking place was drawn by the US when it took the decision to intervene militarily in the Middle East, occupy Iraq and declaring its intention to remain there indefinitely on the pretext that it was seeking to establish a model democracy to be emulated by other countries in the region. As long as this political context remains chaos will persist, as will resistance operations the US brands as terrorist.
Unfortunately, prospects for change remain bleak. Washington has given no indication that it is willing to loosen its grip on Iraq. The interim Iraqi council it has created is cosmetic and widely criticised. Attempts to pass some of Washington's burdens to other parties by creating an international peace-keeping coalition that would include Arab and Islamic forces have found no takers among Arab and Muslim nations and precious few among other countries of the world, including the US's closest allies. More importantly, US policy in Iraq, towards Iran and in the Middle East in general, is clearly designed to protect Israel in an especially provocative way. In a recent article, Martin Indyk urges his government to apply the Iraqi model to occupied Palestine. Specifically, he called for an international force to be sent to the occupied territories to impose a solution -- designed by Israeli with US backing -- on the Palestinian-Israeli problem.
Within the bigger picture it would seem that the US is set not only to perpetuate its military and political presence in Iraq but also to continue its use of military force in the region in order to impose a set of values, not all of which conform to the needs or the constitution of the societies of the region. These values are to be reflected in democratic forms of government, codes of civil liberties, civil societies and NGOs, free market economies, modified educational curricula and much more.
The US may or may not succeed in generating these changes. The indications so far suggest a strong likelihood of failure, which in turn gives rise to a number of questions. Will failure compel Washington to revise its policies towards Iraq and the Middle East? Indeed, could they precipitate a reevaluation of its entire foreign policy outlook? Is it not time that Washington comes to terms with the fact that regional and international stability can only be secured through peaceful means, through non- intervention in the domestic affairs of other nations, respect for the principles of international legitimacy and the revival and enhancement of the role of the UN and other international and regional organisations? These are pressing questions. They require affirmative answers if critical problems in this region and elsewhere are to be resolved. The alternative is that already dangerous situations will spin out of control.
* The writer is a strategic studies expert and member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
