A possible victory
Celebrations of the October War are not about triumphalism, writes Amr El-Choubaki. Rather, they are about the reconstruction that made that victory possible
The October War represents not just a simple military victory by the Egyptian army. It means far more than that, marking the coming of age of the new military and political concept that effected a national transition away from the conditions that led to the defeat of 1967 and towards victory.
Three decades on celebrations of the October victory cannot be restricted to the recollection of good memories, or remembering the heroism of our armed forces. We must also recall how the impetus towards reconstruction that occurred after the defeat of 1967 -- the result of a rare occurrence in contemporary Arab history, the willingness to look at our failures -- was an indispensable preliminary step .
It began when the political leadership admitted responsibility for the defeat. In his resignation speech in 1967 Gamal Abdel-Nasser took full responsibility, announcing that he would step down -- a rare example of a political leader admitting responsibility only to be brought back to power by popular demand.
A critical examination of the errors that led to the 1967 defeat followed, leading to the emergence of a new framework that allowed for the establishment of new political and military enterprises. Those responsible for the defeat were held to account irrespective of their positions within the military establishment and a new leadership was assigned the task of rebuilding the armed forces which later crossed the Suez Canal, destroying the myth of Israeli supremacy.
The present lack of both the ability to revise positions, and to drive forcibly towards the kind of reconstruction that allowed for the October victory, has wreaked havoc in the Arab world. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 the Iraqi regime refused for more than a decade to accept any culpability, a refusal that facilitated the American goal of occupying Iraq. Indeed, it is possible to argue that it is the absence of any critical revision in the Arab world at large that made it possible for Israel to attack Syria, Egypt's partner in the October War.
The balance between the political system, its ideology and strategic thinking on the one hand, and reality on the other, was corrected following the defeat in 1967 in such a way as to ensure that practices were suited to circumstance. The vicious circle of a closed and dogmatic ideology completely divorced from day to day circumstances was broken, and Egypt escaped the resort to sloganeering to paper over practical failures that many Arab states had fallen into.
That is why Egypt accepted the Roger's Plan in 1970 and a thaw in Egyptian- Saudi relations. Arab solidarity and the prioritising of Arab interests and the liberation of occupied Arab land over political conflicts or consideration became possible as a rare state of consensus came to prevail in the Arab world. This was practically demonstrated in Egyptian-Syrian military coordination and Arab support for both countries, support that would climax in the Gulf states stopping oil exports to Israel's Western allies. Ideological differences that had pigeon-holed the Arab world into reactionary and progressive states were suddenly null and void. Egypt opened up to Europe, particularly to France under De Gaulle, and broadened the circle of its alliances beyond the former Soviet Union.
Arab solidarity was a crucial component of the entire enterprise. Egypt succeeded in creating a state of harmony within the Arab world and a consensus over several goals despite the discrepancy between the political systems that then prevailed, all of which contributed to the Arab victory.
The October War, and those aspects of it described above, constitute a convergence of factors unique in contemporary Arab history. Everyone, irrespective of beliefs or differences, was committed to the minimum level of agreement that might ensure collective Arab support for the countries fighting the war. Calls for Arab unity regardless of the specificity of individual states, or the absolute refusal of such calls because of that very specificity were by- passed in favour of something far more practical.
The October victory paved the way for different forms of Arab solidarity, for action that was not embedded within a sloganeering national unity. The victory underlined the necessity for a consistent strategic vision vis-à-vis Israel and the liberation of Arab land while at the same time respecting the cultural and political specificity of individual Arab states.
Three decades later, the significance we attach to celebrating the October victory resides in precisely this, that it was the result of a comprehensive revision of past mistakes. And this is where the true meaning of October resides. It is a celebration of the making of victory.
