Turmoil in Afghanistan
A wary and defeated Bush administration is scrabbling to get NATO reinforcement in Afghanistan, writes Negar Azimi
Two years after America launched its campaign against Taliban-era Afghanistan, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, a long sought-after peace in the war-ravaged country remains elusive. Security hardly exists beyond the capital city of Kabul, where the 5,500-strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is based. Attacks on both American and rival Afghan factions are a daily norm. Over 300 persons -- among them aid workers, US soldiers and Afghan guerrillas -- have been killed since the beginning of August.
Given such a grim backdrop, last week's announcement that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) had approved the extension of ISAF forces outside of the capital comes as a landmark gesture.
NATO's announcement, though only an idea in principle, arrives in the aftermath of months of lobbying from the United Nations, human rights groups, NGOs and Afghans alike, for an expansion of the ISAF's reach. NATO assumed control of the force from Germany and the Netherlands in August, both of whom had jointly led the force since February. The alliance, which has never engaged in military activity outside of Europe, will now take part in an unprecedented expansion of its mandate into Central Asia.
Speaking to Al-Ahram Weekly from Kabul, Professor Barnett Rubin, director of studies at New York University's Centre on International Cooperation, stressed the inevitability of the NATO decision.
"It had become absolutely clear that the previous US strategy was not working, and that more international security forces were needed outside of Kabul," said Rubin.
Indeed, routine insecurity outside of the capital has highlighted the need to expand the ISAF force, while last week in particular was testament to just how chaotic pockets of the country continue to be. On 8 October, clashes between Tajik Jamiat-i-Islami and Uzbek Jumbeish-i-Milli factions in the north near Mazar-e-Sharif left upwards of 60 persons dead in some of the worst fighting in two years. While both sides agreed to a cease-fire the following day, prospects for a sustainable peace remain precarious. Rivalry between Uzbek General Abdul-Rashid Dostum and Tajik warlord General Atta Mohamed has been ongoing for the better part of a decade.
Arriving on its heels, the news on Saturday that nearly 40 Taliban prisoners had escaped from detention in the southern city of Kandahar has only managed to heighten tensions.
The current model of maintaining peace outside of the capital is based upon the role of four Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), composed of clusters of soldiers and development workers. While the advantage of PRTs may lie in their ability to get acquainted with a particular area and its particular needs, their efficacy has been hampered by both limited resources and limited mandates; the PRTs cannot intervene in factional fighting, and furthermore, may not even act in the name of safeguarding human rights.
According to Jim Ingalls, co-director of Afghan Women's Mission, a valid concern in the expansion of the ISAF will be ensuring that its structure differs from that of the arguably ineffectual PRTs.
"The sense that is coming from NATO is that the expanded ISAF is going to look a lot like the Provincial Reconstruction Teams that the US, Britain, New Zealand, and now Germany have been operating. These are not positioned to enhance security, but rather to provide services that NGOs are already providing," Ingalls told theWeekly.
Meanwhile, the US is at least partly to blame for the problem of insecurity, backing armed warlords who often call the shots in mini-fiefdoms outside the capital. Torn between its immediate military goal of capturing remnants of Al-Qa'eda and the Taliban, for which it often needs the help of the warlords, and long-term, sustainable reconstruction efforts, which largely depend on eliminating them, a tension between competing priorities continues to plague US efforts.
Last week, in what was perhaps the Bush administration's most significant acknowledgement of shortcomings in their Middle East policy since the end of major combat operations in Iraq in May, the White House announced an ambitious revamping of its role in both Afghanistan and Iraq.
In addition to a request for an $87 billion package for both countries, the administration has announced the creation of the "Iraq Stabilisation Group", to be run by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. Changes are on the way for Afghanistan, as well. While the State Department has been charged with the Afghan reconstruction effort so far, the White House will now assume these duties, in a significant transfer of mandate.
And in a quickie one-day visit to the southern city of Kandahar earlier this month, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage emphasised his country's commitment to Afghan reconstruction, announcing that congress would most probably approve a supplementary reconstruction package of $1.2 billion.
Some, however, are sceptical about the US's renewed concern for Afghanistan. Ingalls, for example, points out that the bulk of new US funds for the country are not designated for crucial reconstruction tasks, but rather, to ensure interim President Hamid Karzai's reelection, and by extension, to consolidate US military interests. Ninety per cent of the $87 billion package is earmarked for US military uses, while a significant portion of the $1.2 billion reconstruction package will be used to fund the new Afghan national army -- hence bolstering the power of Karzai, a leader who enjoys little influence outside of the capital, but is widely viewed as a guarantor of a continued US presence in the country.
"In other words, the goal of the aid is to enhance the military bargaining power of President Karzai with respect to the warlords, and improve his chances of election in June," noted Ingalls.
In addition to consolidating strategic positions within the region, the Bush administration's heightened interest in Afghanistan reflects that country's importance in the context of impending US presidential elections. A rising number of Americans are raising questions concerning their government's problematic involvement in the region. A healthy Afghanistan, one in which democracy is flourishing while the US is busily pumping in funds for reconstruction, will doubtless reflect favourably on Bush and company.
But before lofty talk of reconstruction can take place, there are basic needs to be met. Disease and hunger continue to be widespread, while the effects of years of drought and a lack of economic prospects create a limbo that is anything but welcoming. The fate of the country's women is also still a significant concern. London-based human rights watchdog Amnesty International released a hefty report last week chronicling continued abuses of women, from lack of recourse to justice to widespread discrimination and mistreatment. In some provinces, warlords have effectively sealed off access to schools, as is the case in and around Herat, where Ismail Khan has created an environment for women that is an eerie throwback to the Taliban era.
It is no wonder, therefore, that countless Afghan refugees living in Pakistan, Iran and further afield are reluctant to repatriate. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), approximately 1.1 million refugees remain in camps in Pakistan alone. An estimated 220,000 are internally displaced within Afghanistan itself.
In the meantime, the next year will be a telling one for the country. A constitution has been drafted after nearly one year of deliberation, and has been approved by a 35-member constitutional commission. The draft is to be debated in a national assembly in December, paving the way for Afghanistan's first national elections, to be held in June of 2004.
Some, such as NYU's Rubin, think the drafting of a constitution will prove a "meaningless exercise" if security is not ensured -- and that means an end to warlordism and a dramatic bolstering of a weak central government.
Furthermore, given the patchwork nature of Afghanistan, any constitution must guarantee the protection of minority rights -- a delicate balance to strike in a country so diverse. The Brussels-based International Crisis Group, among others, has warned that the alienation of the Pashtun ethnic majority in the country, and their lack of representation in the political process, could breed disaster.
Doubtless, the enlargement of the ISAF will be one crucial step in ensuring security, and by extension, a viable reconstruction effort at large. And it is only if a climate conducive to political participation is created that national elections will mean anything.
