Al-Ahram: A Diwan of contemporary life (517)
Lloyd's account
Lord George Lloyd, the fourth of Britain's high commissioners in Egypt, was arguably the most controversial. Known for his hard-line policies, Lloyd's running feuds with his superiors ultimately led to an unprecedented dismissal. It was, therefore, no surprise that Al-Ahram jumped at the chance to publish excerpts from his book Egypt Since Cromer which offered insights into Lloyd's own performance as high commissioner. Professor Yunan Labib Rizk* reviews the commissioner's work
Lord George Lloyd
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By January 1933 more than three years had passed since the death of one of the most famous British high commissioners to Egypt. Lord George Lloyd had been the fourth to hold this position since the abolition of the protectorate in 1922, having been preceded by Sir Henry McMahon, General Sir Reginald Wingate and Field Marshall Lord Allenby. As the titles indicated, he had been the second non-military incumbent.
Lloyd had resigned from his post in July 1929 after a falling out with his new superiors in the recently-elected Labour government in London. He thus became the first British representative to Egypt since the British occupation to have left in disgrace.
Commenting on Lloyd's arrival in Egypt in 1926, at a time when the constitution was suspended, Al-Ahram wrote: "In a speech he delivered before his arrival he had announced that he was going to Egypt to follow up on the policy of Lord Cromer. Then he arrived. With great pomp -- not to mention aloofness -- he paraded through the streets in a grand procession such as that of kings, and Egyptians could not help but recall the famed austerity of Lord Cromer whose carriage was drawn only by a single horse. 'This is the new Lord Cromer?' people asked. This was followed by sumptuous banquets in Menoufiya and Minia, causing those who could remember to mutter, 'We never saw the likes of this in Cromer's time.'"
The ostentation that Lloyd displayed throughout his three years as high commissioner was only matched by the severity with which he exerted his iron grip on the country. Never before had the British "ultimatum" been brought to bear with such frequency and vehemence as during Lloyd's tenure.
Shortly before Lloyd's dismissal, Foreign Office Secretary Arthur Henderson listed some of the many instances in which Lloyd clashed with his superiors. The first was in 1926, following the landslide electoral victory of the Wafd Party that would have brought its leader, Saad Zaghlul, the office of prime minister. The Foreign Office was reluctant to intervene but Lloyd was so adamant in his opposition to the nationalist leader that he continued to assail his superiors with telegrams until they finally caved in and gave him permission to intervene.
Lloyd would not have his way in the second clash, in the winter of 1926-1927, over the question of British staff in the Egyptian government. Henderson related, "Lord Lloyd wanted to overturn the policy that had been followed the previous year but Sir Neville Chamberlain, the prime minister, could find no justification for such a reversal and warned that it would only create tension. After many telegrams were exchanged, Lloyd was forced to submit to the instructions of the Foreign Office."
Lloyd prevailed in the next round which took place during the army crisis of the summer of 1927. On this occasion, the cabinet sided with Lloyd's opinion and British warships were dispatched to the Egyptian coast. The military response, Henderson added, was unable to produce a reasonable solution.
Then, in the spring of 1928, Lloyd wanted to halt the passage of the Assemblies Bill and to dissolve parliament. Chamberlain, on the other hand, had no wish to disrupt constitutional life. Although Egyptian Prime Minister Tharwat succeeded in having the vote on the bill postponed, Lloyd wanted to press ahead with his strong-armed tactics, but was once again forced to yield to Chamberlain's instructions.
A similar outcome prevailed in the spring of 1929 when Lloyd and Chamberlain butted heads over new taxes to be imposed on British subjects in Egypt. Although Lloyd backed down again he did so only "very grudgingly", as Henderson put it.
Like Henderson, Egyptians concluded that while the new Labour government under Chamberlain preferred a policy of lenience, Lloyd remained a tenacious hard-liner. In this respect, at least, he was very much a product of the traditional British imperialist school, most of whom had served in India. The most prominent exponent in Egypt was Lord Cromer, British consul-general to Egypt from 1883 to 1907. It is little wonder, therefore, that Lloyd should profess his admiration for the man who was his predecessor two decades earlier as he sought to emulate his iron grip in spite of how much the times had changed.
Although Egyptians had thought they were rid of the man after 1929, he reappeared to haunt them in the beginning of 1933. On 17 January, Al-Ahram's correspondent in London announced the publication of Lloyd's Egypt Since Cromer. This work was important not only because of the author's own performance as high commissioner to Egypt but also because he was the only other British representative to have written on his experience in the country since Cromer, whose Modern Egypt stirred intense debate upon its release in 1908.
Given the significance of this work, it is little wonder that Al-Ahram should wish to present it to its readers. On 22 January 1933, the newspaper announced: "We have the good fortune to have in our hands a copy of the first volume of this book, the publication of which was reported to us by our correspondent in London on the day of its appearance. As the public is undoubtedly eager to get a taste of the opinions of the former high commissioner to Egypt, we have decided to publish what we believe to be the most significant extracts to Al- Ahram readers."
In his preface, Lloyd confesses that Modern Egypt had served as his model because "it is the scales upon which should be weighed all subsequent historical works on Egypt written by the British after their stay in the Nile Valley." He resumes, "Cromer wrote on a period during which he oversaw the affairs of Egypt. He had first-hand knowledge of the individuals about whom he wrote, he was fully familiar with the forces that worked behind the scenes and the policies he followed in Egypt were for the most part of his creation and the result of his experiences."
Cromer's account of political developments in Egypt ends with the ascension of Abbas II to the throne in 1892. Although Lloyd felt it unnecessary to repeat the events that occurred during the rest of Cromer's tenure, "I, nevertheless, thought that not to include an introduction on events prior to 1907 would be to leave certain blanks that need to be filled." His solution was to take 1904 as his starting point. That was the year in which London and Paris signed the Entente Cordiale, in accordance with which France relinquished its claims in Egypt, bringing Egypt's international status into a new era. "Also at about that time, there were signs of the emergence of a new force in the political mentality in Egypt and of the increasing frailty of the Ottoman state."
From the outset, Lloyd made his imperialist leanings known. It had been 50 years, he declared, since the British occupied Egypt (1882). Although that half-century was only a speck in Egypt's millennia-long history, British policy during that period had demonstrated "our practical nature and our genius at looking at matters head on". He also said that although Britain had initially intended to remain in Egypt for a short period of time, "in order to establish a solid government founded upon honourable and humanitarian principles", it found itself compelled to remain in order to ensure that such principles took hold.
That humanitarian spirit that the British were so keen on instilling was constantly threatened by the ruling Turkish aristocracy, "which stood ever ready with hands outreached to grab any authority we threw their way in order to turn it to their selfish advantage and personal ends, as had been the case in bygone days". Lloyd then asks, rhetorically: "How could we be certain that retrogressive elements would not resurface as soon as we evacuated the country, ruining what we had accomplished and revert the government to that pitiful state that courts foreign intervention?"
In a subsequent chapter, Lloyd discusses the system of government established by the British. The Legislative Council, the Legislative Assembly, the municipal councils and the like "formed the parliamentary embryo founded by the British occupation". The British also attempted to reform the judiciary system, which consisted of a variety of national, religious and "mixed" courts. The latter represented attempts to counter the injustices of the Capitulations System that granted immunity to foreign subjects. The British, Lloyd claimed, had long hoped to bring an end to the Capitulations System which they believed hampered the progress they were trying to achieve in the country. Indeed, Lord Cromer believed that he had made a breakthrough in this regard with the Entente Cordiale of 1904 which was later approved by Germany, Italy and Austria.
It is particularly interesting to read Lloyd's take on British policy with regard to the Egyptian nationalist movement. By declaring that their occupation was only temporary, in deference to international sensitivities and in order to avoid diplomatic problems, the British, in Lloyd's opinion, opened themselves to criticism. It also created an awkward situation for authorities on the ground in Egypt. Many Egyptians "tried to cooperate with us but they would be branded as traitors and defectors because we freed them in some respects while keeping their hands tied in others [the capitulations]".
Abbas II, who became khedive in 1892, was perhaps Cromer's most formidable adversary. "He began to fuel a fanatical patriotism so as to channel the hostility of the nationalists into resistance against the occupation." The khedive's primary instrument in this drive was Mustafa Kamel, the founder of the modern nationalist movement in Egypt. "Handsome and energetic, Mustafa Kamel was a natural demagogue, aided by a rare gift of eloquence and great drive and tenacity." It was also Lloyd's curious belief that "elder Muslims" viewed the nationalist leader with suspicion but that students worshipped him and grieved inconsolably upon his death.
According to Lloyd, two events, both occurring in 1906, gave an enormous boost to the nationalist movement and Mustafa Kamel's leadership. The first was the Egyptian-Turkish border crisis in February, triggered when Ottoman authorities laid claim to the southern Sinai. Egyptian nationalists deftly exploited this incident by inflaming religious passions and expanding the scope of the pan-Islamic movement. The second was the Dinshway incident which erupted in June when a group of British officers accidentally shot the wife of a local official in that village, triggering a firefight that resulted in several deaths. The subsequent trial and execution of several villagers involved inflamed anti-British sentiment. In Lloyd's opinion, had the authorities demonstrated a modicum of moderation in the sentences they issued, the affair would eventually have been forgotten. "Unfortunately, the special tribunal that was formed passed sentences that Lord Cromer later described as just but harsh. At the time, Cromer was in England. Had he been present, there never would have occurred the mistake of carrying out the executions and lashings in public."
Such was Lloyd's admiration for Cromer that he regarded him as the "second founder of modern Egypt"; Mohamed Ali being the first. In a separate chapter dedicated to Cromer, who died in 1917, Lloyd records some of the opinions for which the consul-general became famous. On government, Cromer believed that it was Britain's duty to found a viable, strong and, above all, stable government. "We will not need to keep a close watch on the activities of this government but it is important to ensure that its activities conform to the general principles of Western civilisation," he said. On literary and intellectual life in Egypt, Cromer advocated "elevating the Department of Education to a separate ministry and placing it under the supervision of one of the most famous men Egypt has known". To many of Lloyd's contemporaries it would have come as a surprise to learn that this man was Saad Zaghlul who at the time the ministry was created was "in the vanguard of Egyptian political moderates". With regard to the future of the British in Egypt, Cromer, according to Lloyd, established a mixed legislative council out of the belief that "this was the only way for Egypt to attain proper self-rule and a reasonable degree of independence". This was because the British were in Egypt "as guardians, not of British interests, nor of foreigners carrying debt bonds, but rather of the Egyptian people and the peasant masses".
Even a child would find it difficult to swallow such a claim, which is perhaps why Al-Ahram devoted its editorial of 31 January 1933 to Lloyd's chapter on Cromer's views. Under the headline, "On Lord Lloyd's book, The British in Egypt -- Reasons for success and failure," the editorial writer attempted to refute many of Cromer's, and by extension, Lloyd's, assumptions. In response to the claim that Egyptians were disinclined to democracy, the writer countered that Egyptians were "enamoured" with democracy. "They confronted the great powers for the sake of democracy because those powers -- Britain and France -- had deprived them of the right to control their own financial affairs. Their parliament was pointless if financial matters were outside the scope of its power and jurisdiction. Can those who fight for democracy be considered ignorant or contemptuous of its ideals and principles? The Egyptian revolution was waged in defence of democrats and in support of democratic government."
Although the editorial admitted that Cromer was instrumental in making considerable progress in certain domains, such as agriculture and irrigation, it held that he was an obstacle to progress in other fields such as industry and education. However, the British's greatest failure was that, in their arrogance, they imagined that they could work independently of the people. The inevitable result was that "they lost their way and floundered. Then Lord Lloyd arrived, linking his present with Cromer's past, and met with even greater failure, because he overlooked the fact that Lord Cromer had some support among nationalists."
It was as though Al-Ahram, through this editorial, attempted to persuade readers that Lloyd's book was not as important as it had been billed. In any event, it was not long before the second volume appeared. In June 1934, Al-Ahram announced the news to its readers, reporting that the 400-page Egypt Since Cromer, Volume II, covered from the 1919 Revolution to Lloyd's departure from Egypt in 1929. As it did with the first volume, Al-Ahram published those selected extracts that it felt best epitomised the changes that took place in the British colonialist mentality.
As was the case the world over, the Great War and its aftermath had had an enormous impact on the British presence in Egypt. Lloyd was firm in his conviction that until 1914, the British believed in their colonial mission even if there were differences over how to implement it. "However, after 1920, the doctrine of the right of peoples to self-determination shook the foundations of this faith. It is this doctrine that now sets the guidelines for relations between Egypt and Britain."
At the outset of the war, Britain declared a protectorate over Egypt. Although British authorities at the time stated that the measure was purely temporary, Lloyd maintains that "the intention was to make Egypt part of the empire once and for all." To corroborate he cites Lord Cromer, himself. In Abbas II, which appeared in 1925, the former consul-general to Egypt stated, "After having stood in the balance for 33 years, Egypt's political fate was finally resolved when it entered the realm of the Empire."
It would have raised no few eyebrows to read what Lloyd described as the "benefits" that Egypt had collected from the war. "Egypt during that terrible war was safe, comfortable and well- off. It had financial assets totalling more than LE100 million, and a portion of this amount, LE13 million was used to purchase Egyptian credit bonds from abroad, thereby alleviating the foreign debt burden. Egypt emerged from the most horrific and destructive of wars wealthier than it had been before it, suffering no noteworthy budgetary deficit."
After reviewing developments in the post-war period up to the outbreak of the 1919 Revolution, Lloyd airs his views on the response of British authorities. In his opinion, the Milner Commission, sent to Egypt to investigate the causes of the "uprising", should never have entered negotiations with the "extremists" led by Saad Zaghlul. The commission was far too indulgent with these elements, making concessions to the Egyptian Wafd Party that ultimately undermined the British position in Egypt. The commission had played directly into the hands of a group that "harbours animosity towards the British and seeks a complete separation of the bond between them. The weapon this group used towards this end was to hurl the charge of treason and betrayal at all who differed with their views, even though many who had resorted to this weapon had more to fear from Egyptian independence than they had to look forward to."
In light of such opinions one can better understand Lloyd's heavy-handed policies during his term as high commissioner. He clearly perceived the populist Wafd Party as a collection of demagogues and hypocrites. During the first year of his term, from 1926 to 1927, he charged that Wafd Party leaders were attempting to infiltrate and politicise the army. "Everyone recognised how that situation could have gone out of control were it not for certain impediments, the most important being the presence of a British element in the Egyptian army and the government, and the possibility of calling in British forces." Also, in justification of the British decision to intervene by force in that crisis, he argued, "On what grounds can it be maintained that the two hostile camps would not have resorted to violence in order to monopolise power? If Britain had not intervened and if violence had erupted it would have been impossible for Britain, having relinquished all means to protect foreign lives and interests, to insist that other foreign nations refrain from intervening in the defence of their subjects and interests."
Not only did Al-Ahram show excerpts from Lloyd's two- volume work but it also published excerpts from its reviews in the press. In Britain, not a small body of opinion felt that the former high commissioner had been out of touch with the times. In its lengthy review of Egypt Since Cromer, the Manchester Guardian of 8 June 1934 criticised Lloyd for his desire to "turn the clock back" to Cromer, adding, "What is essential today is to work towards self-rule [in Egypt]." The article also took exception with Lloyd's tendency to speak of patriotism as though it were a new invention. "Patriotism in essence is as old as history itself. Even in times when it manifested itself the least, it still was readily apparent. This is how the educated in India and in Egypt feel towards a government supervised by Britain, however much good that government seeks to achieve."
In Egypt, Lloyd's book, not surprisingly, came under the harshest attack in the Wafd Party press. Referring to Lloyd as a person whose only significance in the world resided in the position he had once occupied, Al-Jihad remarked, "From the political standpoint, he is a man from whom no good can come either to the Egyptian or to the British nation. For such as he to have risen to high position demonstrates that nepotism is as pervasive in England as it is among the Oriental peoples." Another Wafd Party mouthpiece, Al-Balagh, commented that Lloyd's book exuded the spite that had overcome him since his dismissal from his post in Egypt since 1929.
But even non-partisan newspapers, such as Al-Ahram, gave the book a cold, if not a contemptuous, reception. In one review, the famous female poet and commentator Mae Ziyada remarks, not without a drop or two of sarcastic venom: "The critics malign Lord Lloyd in their claim that he did not love Egypt or the East. Their proof of this is that his judgement upon them was too harsh and that he did not believe them to be equipped for parliamentary rule, independence and democracy. They have overlooked the fact that love sometimes calls for strictness that compels the closing of windows, the locking of doors and the fettering of hands in iron."
Nor would Al-Ahram's Editor-in-Chief Dawoud Barakat remain silent on the subject. Under the headline, "Lord Lloyd and his sunglasses", he writes, "Our subject, here, is the type of man who fears that his eyes may be harmed from the harsh glare of the Oriental sun. Therefore, before the ship he has taken to our country drops anchor in our port, he puts on his dark glasses to protect his eyes from our bright sunlight. Lloyd was also one of those for whom the sunglasses became such an integral part of their sight that they can only view the world through them." Perhaps this metaphor was the kindest reception Egyptians could give to Lord Lloyd's history which, regardless of the crudeness of his opinions, remains a landmark in the writings of former British officers in Egypt.
* The author is a professor of history and head of Al-Ahram History Studies Centre.
