Are we over the worse?
War-torn East Timor braces itself for life without the United Nations, writes Damien Kingsbury
As the United Nations scales down in East Timor ahead of its scheduled departure next May, this fledgling state is wrestling with forces that could offer it a stable future or, should matters not be well managed, tear it apart. More than ever, East Timor's future is in the balance.
Since its vote for independence from Indonesia and subsequent destruction by the Indonesian National Military Force (TNI)-backed militias in 1999, East Timor has in many respects staged a remarkable recovery. This is due in large part to UN and foreign non- governmental organisation (NGO) assistance. Most buildings have now been repaired, businesses thrive and there are more cars, trucks and motorbikes on the roads than ever before.
However, development is not just about material progress, but also social and political participation, representation, accountability and freedom. And it is upon such political development that the growth and security of material progress depends.
Perhaps a key to such political development is that, in their wisdom, the East Timorese chose to have a ceremonial rather than an executive president. This means that critical state decisions are not in the hands of one person -- even if that person is Xanana Gusmao. The reality is that Gusmao will not be president forever, and his eventual replacement might be much less benign or genuinely popular.
The moral authority of the presidency, though, weighs well against the government executive, which in turn is balanced by the elected legislature from which it is drawn. An executive chosen from an elected legislature remains accountable and must always perform at a level that retains the confidence of the legislature.
An independent legal system -- without which no state can effectively function -- is also in place as a check against legislative or executive caprice. However, with little time for training, this branch is not yet living up to its full potential.
No state can claim political development without a loyal but critically active opposition. The Democratic Party and Social Democrats in particular provide a socially progressive alternative to the governing Fretilin (the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor), and may force Fretilin into a coalition after the next elections.
After two positive experiences with voting, East Timor's people have also taken the democratic process to heart. This alone is perhaps the most positive sign for the future.
However, against these positives, East Timor's political ledger also records some serious negatives, which taken together have the potential to throw the country into chaos. Most potentially damaging is the growing unpopularity of the Fretilin government, due to its perceived arrogance, elitism and allegations of abuses of power. Although Fretilin holds around two-thirds of the seats in the legislature, it achieved them largely by representing the core of the pro-independence movement. The gloss of that status is now fading.
Although the Democrats and Social Democrats are a viable opposition, neither party has developed any coherent set of policies other than succumbing to World Bank pressure to borrow. East Timor has little capacity to repay such loans, the potential benefits of which are not clear.
East Timor will also likely undergo a slump in professional expertise when the UN leaves. Given the sometimes uncooperative responses of the Fretilin government to international organisations, this slump is not likely to be picked up by non-UN agencies.
In particular, elements of the former Internal Political Front, the clandestine urban wing of the armed resistance under Indonesian rule, have not accommodated well to civilian rule. Certain members of this former organisation believe they remain a law unto themselves.
In an environment in which there are grievances against the government, and in which many expectations remain unfulfilled, there is also fertile ground for destabilisation. This task has been undertaken by the so-called Committee for the Popular Defence of the Republic of Democratic Timor L'este (CPD-RDTL). Not surprisingly, while the CPD-RDTL draws on some disaffected East Timorese youth, and a few ex-members of the guerrilla force Falintil (the Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor), it is also notable for its significant numbers of ex-militia members.
The CPD-RDTL does promote issues of genuine concern to ordinary East Timorese, but it relies on violence, intimidation and extortion. Populism linked to violence is the stuff of fascism, and the CPD-RDTL is neo-Nazi in all but name.
Cross-border smuggling, and threats by members of the Integration Struggle Troops (PPI) militia to again "plant the red and white [Indonesian flag] in East Timor", also adds to instability. This reflects the underlying tension that exists between Indonesia and East Timor, not least among sections of the TNI despite official Indonesian pronouncements to the contrary.
Having made a large and costly investment, the international community is unlikely to watch East Timor be overtly destabilised. The strategic location of East Timor also means that the United States in particular will want to see it remain stable, which in turn means having an accountable government. The recent presence of US warships just off Dili, including an aircraft carrier, was a clear sign that US strategic interest remains high. Australia remains committed to East Timor as well, although wary of offending Indonesia by retaining a robust presence along the border. Australia's army battalion is due to withdraw in 2004, but there are already calls from border communities for a military company to remain in each district. East Timor's Border Patrol Unit has limited capabilities.
Most likely, East Timor will bump along after May 2004, certainly with many problems but also with some strengths. If the major political groups can continue to respect the rule of law, then the future of East Timor looks more positive. However, abandoning the rule of law, or failing to have it properly applied, will almost certainly spell disaster for the fledgling state.
If East Timorese need any motivation to remain on the path of tolerance and respect for the law, they need only to recall their own history. The cost in lives, up to 1999, was staggering by any standard. Harvard genocide expert Ben Kiernan estimates 150,000 of 650,000 died between 1975 and the mid-1980s -- additional to the destruction and death of 1999. As with Indonesia itself, the price of going back to the bad old days is too high to contemplate.
