Playing the popularity game
Arafat must understand that he doesn't have to be the most popular guy in town to get his job done, writes Sami Moubayed*
That Yasser Arafat is not too fond of Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah is no secret. He is upset that Hizbullah managed to liberate South Lebanon in May 2000 while his own efforts led only to the occupation of Beirut in 1982. Nasrallah further endeared himself to the Palestinians when Hizbullah came out in favour of the Intifada in September 2000, allying itself with Hamas and Islamic Jihad and abducting Israeli soldiers in October 2000 in order to put pressure on the then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Nothing could embarrass and further enrage the PLO chairman more, however, than the latest prisoner exchange deal being negotiated by Nasrallah and Israel, via German intermediaries. If it works 450 Arab prisoners, many of them Palestinians, will be released, something he PLO has repeatedly failed to secure under Arafat.
When, in 1985, Ahmed Jibril of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC) secured the release of 1,150 Arab and Palestinian prisoners in exchange for three Israeli captives Arafat publicly applauded the deal though privately he resented that he had not been the one to secure it.
Though the Israeli cabinet has in outline approved the deal with Hizbullah many issues remain pending. Some in Israel are sceptical, claiming that the prisoner releases will only encourage more violence against Israel. They disagree with Ariel Sharon's argument that the exchange could raise Israeli morale while at the same time renewing confidence in his leadership which has suffered in recent months given his failure to stop the violence.
The deal involves Hizbullah releasing the bodies of three Israeli soldiers, abducted in 2000, and an Israeli businessman, Elhanan Tennenbaum. In return Israel will provide maps indicating the location of landmines in South Lebanon and set free hundreds of Arab prisoners, possibly even Marwan Al-Barghouti, the charismatic West Bank leader who led the early stages of the current Intifada.
This would be a great embarrassment for Arafat. In 1988 Arafat's then aide-de-camp, the charismatic Abu Jihad (Khalil Al-Wazir), architect of the first Intifada, was killed by Israel in 1988. Arafat failed to save or protect him then just as he has now failed to protect Barghouti. Both men were immensely popular in the occupied territories and the cessation of their activities represents a real blow to Arafat. But unlike Nasrallah, who insists in every speech on the release of his arrested comrades Arafat has made no reference to Barghouti since the latter's arrest in April 2002.
Another prominent detainee earmarked for release is Mustapha Al-Dirani, the Hizbullah leader abducted from his home in South Lebanon in 1994. He was the man who captured Ron Arad, the missing Israeli pilot, in 1986. The fate of many missing Palestinians might also be revealed if Nasrallah succeeds in his diplomacy. Some of the released might be one-time members of Arafat's entourage, like Nabil Salameh, missing since 1982. Salameh is the cousin of Abu Hassan Salameh, the leader of Arafat's Force 17 killed by Israel in Beirut in 1979. Nabil Salameh was an early member of Fatah and a co-founder of Black September, the resistance organisation created after the bloodbath in Jordan in 1970. Abducted by the Israelis in Beirut in 1982 he has been missing since. Both the PLO and his family have refused to accept that he is dead though under PLO rules anyone missing for more than four years is presumed dead. Arafat refused to accept Salameh's death until 1997, when he gave up hope of retrieving his comrade. The irony is that if Nabil Salameh is still alive it may well be Hassan Nasrallah who secures his release.
The success of the deal hinges on Israel agreeing to the release of Samir Al-Qontar, the Lebanese Druze member of the Palestinian Liberation Front arrested in 1979 for killing five Israelis near the coastal town of Nahariyeh in north Israel. An Israeli court sentenced him to 542 years in prison (99 years for every victim and 47 years for attacking an Israeli officer during interrogation). Al-Qontar, described by Nasrallah as the "dean" of prisoners in Israeli jails, has served 24 years of that sentence. No deal will be made, Nasrallah insists, unless Al-Qontar is released.
A successful deal will dramatically raise Nasrallah's reputation in the Arab world. And it will leave Arafat with a single option to enhance his own reputation for efficacy -- to work on domestic reform and make life better for the Palestinians.
Arafat must address the plight of 3.5 million Palestinians, 61 per cent of whom are below the poverty line, making less than $1 a day. Currently 282 villages are under siege. Average income has dropped by 46 per cent since 2000. According to a recent UNDP report the Palestinian Authority (PA) faces bills of $930 million to repair the infrastructure. UNICEF reports that 600,000 children are denied access to schools in the occupied territories, 580 schools have been closed by Israel and 9,300 teachers are deprived of safe passage to their classrooms. These are the real problems Arafat faces. He must work on giving the Palestinians a better life, and this will be achieved only by investing in Nasrallah's diplomacy and being proud, rather than embarrassed, by it.
* The writer is a Syrian political analyst.
