Not that easy
Washington's plan to give power back to Iraqis earlier than planned has hit a snag as an influential Shi'ite leader voiced opposition to indirect elections, writes Salah Hemeid
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The grieving family of Sabah Hassan, who was killed by US mortar fire as he made his way to the mosque on Monday
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Last month the Bush administration and the Iraqi Interim Governing Council (IGC) agreed on a plan to transfer power to Iraqis by next summer, well ahead of what was previously announced. The agreement was prompted by mounting resistance to the occupation and an increasing number of American casualties, and comes just as the US presidential election season is getting underway.
But the two-week-old plan, widely seen as an "exit strategy" for the Bush administration in Iraq, seems to be falling apart under objection by Shi'ite religious leaders. The Shi'ite opposition is now raising serious doubts about whether the 30 June deadline for ending the American occupation in Iraq is still feasible.
Ayatollah Ali Al- Sistani, Iraq's senior Shi'ite cleric, had expressed reservations about electing an interim assembly that will write a "basic law" and select a provisional government to take over power from the United States. The US-IGC initial plan envisaged an indirect system of town hall gatherings and regional caucuses to pick delegates for a national assembly. The assembly, a cornerstone of the new blueprint, is due to be formed by the end of May.
But Al-Sistani, who has been wielding his influence on Iraq's political transition since the occupation began in April, had declared that nothing less than direct election was acceptable -- a demand the United States and the Governing Council are now having to weigh. Al-Sistani has also been pressing for official recognition of Islam and questioned, in particular, the role of the provincial councils in nominating caucus members.
Al-Sistani's objections have thrown the Bush administration and the Interim Council into disarray, forcing them to reconsider their programme. While the administration wants to ensure a speedy transfer of sovereignty to a friendly Iraqi administration before the presidential elections next year, council members, many of them jostling for power in any future regime, will need to follow some sort of electoral process to ensure the government's legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqis.
Al-Sistani has vast influence over Iraq's 15 million Shi'ites. So far he has urged them to show patience with the occupation and his support is crucial for the legitimacy of the political process. An edict he issued demanding that the new constitution be drafted by an elected body was the key factor that forced the US to shift gears and transfer sovereignty to Iraqis before full elections.
Al-Sistani's objections seem straightforward, but they underline Shi'ite politico- religious ambitions to play a major role in shaping Iraq's future. It was not unexpected, therefore, that both the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Islamic Da'wa Party have been spearheading the opposition. While they argue that the present formula could not be democratic, their main objective is that direct elections could help bring a majority of their supporters to the proposed assembly. Abdel-Aziz Al-Hakim, SCIRI chief and IGC member, whose movement aspires to play a major role in Iraq's future, has warned that if Ayatollah Al-Sistani's views are not heeded, "there will be a real problem in this country."
However, not all Shi'ite leaders agree. Ahmed Chalabi and Iyad Allawi, two secular, pro-US Shi'ite Muslims voiced reservations to Al-Sistani's objection. "The main thing is to restore sovereignty for the Iraqis. Of course it would be preferable that [the transitional assembly] reflects the people's opinion, but for elections to be held all Iraqis must participate, including four million of them living in exile," Chalabi told the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera television network. In a separate interview, Allawi said, "the electoral process, which requires a census, will take 14 months at best."
The Kurds, Iraq's second largest ethnic community, seem also reluctant to support Al-Sistani's reservations. Premature direct elections in the Kurdish areas might re- ignite old rivalries between the two main parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which jointly control the northern enclave.
As resistance to the American occupation escalates in the so-called Sunni Triangle, the Sunni Arabs, who account for about a quarter of the 25 million Iraqis, require considerable attention as well. They will likely balk at the current political formula, which they fear will diminish the power they enjoyed under Saddam Hussein. If they refuse to engage in the new process they could undermine the US plan or stall the political transition altogether. Observers believe that Sunnis might have little incentive to cooperate with the United States, because they think they can get a better deal after the Americans leave.
The Bush administration's strategy has so far advocated a united Iraq with sources reporting that it is still holding to its plan of Iraqi self-rule by the end of next June, despite the rumblings of Shi'ite disapproval. It is also maintaining its support for the Interim Governing Council, which it says plays the leading role in bringing all Iraq's religious, sectarian and ethnic communities together in the task of building a new pluralist Iraq. But it should not go unnoticed that in recent weeks some senior American analysts have been suggesting breaking up Iraq into three entities. In a recent article in The New York Times, top analyst Leslie Gelb suggested a three-state solution: Kurds in the north, Sunnis in the center and Shi'ites in the south.
The general idea, he wrote, is to strengthen the Kurds and Shi'ites and weaken the Sunnis, then wait and see whether to stop at autonomy or encourage statehood. This three- state solution is the only viable strategy and it is manageable, even necessary, because it would allow Washington to find Iraq's future in its natural but denied past, he wrote. It is not clear, however, if such scenarios are figments of a fertile imagination or yet another blueprint being drawn up by Washington's decision-making bodies.
As the Bush administration works on a new power-transfer framework for Iraq, the stakes rise as more Iraqis and Americans fall dead in attacks and counterattacks. On Sunday, scenes of destruction and death littered the Iraqi town of Samarra, 100 kilometres north of Baghdad, after fierce clashes between US forces and insurgents. US military officials said 54 Iraqis were killed and dozens were wounded. US commanders vowed Monday that Samarra's clashes would serve as a lesson to those fighting their forces in Iraq. Sunday's fighting was the bloodiest combat reported since the fall of Saddam's regime. Of the 434 US service members who have died since military operations in Iraq began, 298 died in hostile action.
