More than meets the eye
The recent Palestinian talks in Cairo were not as unproductive and divisive as they were made to appear, says Fahd Suleiman*
The Geneva agreement and its surrounding fanfare cast something of a shadow over the Palestinian-Palestinian dialogue in Cairo which ended last week. Even before the meetings convened many of the Palestinian parties involved felt that they were being asked to take the Geneva agreement and similar recent initiatives as their frame of reference, especially given the unofficial backing by the PA of the Geneva Accord.
However, this initial cloud of suspicion was considerably allayed when the parties agreed to exclude the Geneva initiative from the discussions. This helped ensure that the latest dialogue between the Palestinian factions stuck to its original track (promoting unity of rank and purpose, and a common programme), and remain an extension of the various rounds of talks that have been held since Cairo hosted the first Palestinian-Palestinian dialogue at the beginning of this year.
On the other hand, before the Cairo dialogue ended, a renewed climate of tension descended, regretfully fuelled by certain Palestinian circles, indicative of a degree of polarisation over the questions of a cease-fire and the mandate of the PA.
Because of its volatile beginning and inconclusive ending, the Cairo dialogue has been greatly misjudged. In spite of the fact that there was no closing statement reflecting areas of consensus, the talks were considerably productive, and the inroads that were made will undoubtedly serve as the basis for forthcoming agreements on a number of issues.
Yes, something was achieved in the Cairo dialogue, not only with regard to issues over which there is generally little disagreement (the Intifada and the resistance to the occupation, the unity of the Palestinian movement at home and in the diaspora, the questions of prisoners and detainees, Jerusalem, Israeli settlement construction), but also with regard to the question of the right of return, which, against the backdrop of the Geneva initiative and its surrounding discord, has assumed a greater value as a point of convergence among all parties that participated in the Cairo dialogue.
In addition, two other important phenomena should be considered among the successes of the recent round of Palestinian talks in Cairo. The first is the general consensus over the need to transcend the tendency of the PA and PLO to monopolise the decision-making power on matters affecting the national destiny and to develop a formula for joint or united leadership and an effective mechanism for pluralistic participation in the decision-making processes. It is important to note, in this regard, that Palestinian Islamists have expressed their willingness, in principle, to join a reconstructed PLO that, in such a case, would faithfully reflect the pluralistic character of the Palestinian movement as well as the relative influence of the individual factions.
The second phenomenon is the agreement over the need to safeguard civilians on both sides of the conflict. This means that Palestinian factions are willing to stipulate clearly a commitment to halting all operations targeting civilians within Israel in exchange for Israel halting all violence against civilians on the Palestinian side. Since the outbreak of the Intifada, opinion was divided over this issue. One side believed that striking deep into Israeli civilian centres would both serve to balance the losses suffered on the Palestinian side and, operating on the principle of the "balance of terror", to deter aggression. The opposing side advocated a strategy of "prolonging the attrition" in accordance with which resistance operations would limit their targets to military objectives and Israeli settlements in the territories occupied since 1967. This strategy conforms more closely to what international opinion (especially after 11 September) would regard as legitimate resistance to occupation. In addition, targeting civilians only unites Israeli society against an alleged threat to its existence, whereas the focus on military and settlement targets sharpens divisions within that society over the value and costs of perpetuating the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.
The question of the cease-fire received a disproportionate share of attention in the press, especially given that the differences between the Palestinian factions meeting in Cairo regarding this issue were not over principles. The national consensus on this question emerged over three major turning points since the Intifada; the first being the Dolphinarium disco bombing in Tel Aviv on 1 June 2001, after which the PA received an Israeli ultimatum threatening to invade PA territories. The second occurred in the wake of the Haifa and Jerusalem bombings on 1 and 2 December that same year. Sharon at the time was in Washington, which gave him carte blanche to unleash a two-month long campaign of repression that drove home to the factions the gravity of the peril awaiting the Palestinian cause. Finally, on 29 June 2003, the government of Mahmoud Abbas succeeded in obtaining Washington's approval for substituting the requirement, as called for under the first phase of the roadmap, to disarm and dismantle the Palestinian resistance infrastructure in exchange for a cease-fire.
In all these phases, the Palestinian side showed conviction in and commitment to a cease-fire, but the cease-fire was invariably violated by Israel. Against the backdrop of divergent assessments of the gravity of the Palestinian situation and how this might be affected by Washington's predicament in Iraq and the crisis of the Sharon government in Israel, the Palestinians meeting in Cairo differed, not in principle, but on the optimum conditions and mechanisms of a cease-fire. Some were of the opinion that Israel should be required to make certain commitments before agreeing to a cease-fire, whereas others suggested the head of the Palestinian government explore the possibilities of receiving sufficient guarantees in return for a cease-fire and report his findings to the individual factions before making a decision. It is in this connection that the question of what was perhaps inaccurately termed a "mandate" arose.
As for the DFLP, we maintain that a reciprocal, synchronised and conditional cease-fire must be linked to international guarantees and international supervision by all parties of the Quartet and to the immediate halt to the construction of the racist separation wall. It should also be linked to provisions cited in internationally approved agreements and proposals -- such as the Mitchell Plan, the Tenet Report and the roadmap -- calling for the unconditional release of all Palestinian prisoners and detainees, without discrimination, the complete halt to all settlement construction and the dismantling of any such construction that took place after March 2001, the lifting of blockades and closures, and a complete halt to the daily acts of aggression, home and field demolition and assassinations, the return of the occupation forces to their lines prior to 28 September 2000 and the lifting of the ban on Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem.
At the same time, we have no illusions about the possibility of a resumption of negotiations under the government of Sharon, which effectively offers us two options: either to accept a Palestinian "state" with only temporary borders and consisting of isolated cantons on only half of the West Bank and in Gaza, or a completed colonialist wall extending eastward, westward and around Jerusalem.
This bitter prospect compels the Palestinians, in addition to unifying ranks and organising themselves to withstand a prolonged onslaught through all available means, to consider the political and organisational actions that would provide the highest level of protection to the Palestinian people and their Intifada. Indeed, this was the primary function of the talks in Cairo, from which emerged the following:
The Palestinians must act to end their internal political stagnation that Sharon exploits so deftly in order to press ahead with his plans for the systematic destruction of the Palestinian entity. Towards this end, they must adopt the notion of reciprocity as a central approach to their dealings with Israel. That is, for every step the Palestinians make Israel must undertake a commensurate step, the implementation of which must be monitored internationally and backed by international guarantees.
In this regard, talks in Cairo were not confined to the conditions and mechanisms for a cease-fire, which was regarded as an effective alternative for safeguarding the resistance. They also explored, though not deeply enough, the approaches and methods of the entire Palestinian political movement. It was precisely on this point that the Palestinian concord we aspire for hit the shoals of declining confidence in the PA because of the tendency of its leadership to ignore the commonly held choices of parties and organisations representing large bodies of Palestinian opinion. Because of this general climate, it is possible to understand why the subject of the so-called "mandate" to the PA should have been portrayed as having stirred such heated debate between those who maintain that the PA as the legitimate government of the Palestinian people does not need a mandate from the factions and those who argue against the legitimacy of the PA. In fact, the issue was considerably overblown. All that was really being considered was the demand that the PA take steps towards the realisation of national gains (on the condition of reciprocity) without making definitive commitments. This demand falls within the context of the attempt to devise a mechanism for broader and more effective participation in the decisions affecting issues vital to all political forces in the Palestinian liberation movement.
This brings us once more to the question of participation in the decision-making process and the mechanisms for following through on the decisions. It was this issue for which the recent round in Cairo was unable to find practical solutions, although a certain degree of progress was made. It also brings to the fore the question of the common programme. Certain parties, availing themselves of various ideological pretexts, have been deliberately vague over objectives, to the degree of suggesting a surreptitious departure from the spirit and provisions of the international resolutions intended to guarantee and fulfil Palestinian national rights. It is difficult to dispute the fact, for example, that the refusal to specify the boundaries of the state that we are fighting to create does not help the Palestinian movement to counter Israeli-US pressures to accept anything less than the borders of 4 June 1967.
2004 will be a year of US presidential elections, intensification of the crisis in Iraq and ongoing confrontation in Palestine. It will be a decisive year for the Palestinian cause and the fate of the Middle East as a whole, and it will be absolutely crucial for the Palestinians to promote and institute a collective and cohesive political drive. This drive must have meaningful direction, one untainted by PR campaigns and hypothetical negotiating processes such as the Geneva initiative which will never have a chance of seeing the light of day, one that enjoys the unanimous support of the Palestinian people and that can, at the very least, contribute to minimising the dangers to the cause and safeguard, to the highest possible extent, the Palestinian people and their fight for independence.
"Cairo II" helped pave the way forward for forthcoming talks. That our imperative now is to capitalise and build on the progress the recent talks have achieved is both a hope and a perception that we believe is shared by all political forces, without exception.
* The writer is a member of the politburo of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and head of its delegation to the Palestinian factions talks.
