The long road ahead
Beginning with the war that ousted Saddam Hussein from power and ending with his capture, 2003 afforded Iraqis a great deal of suffering yet presented them with high expectations,
writes Salah Hemeid
Iraqis flee coalition strikes on the southern city of Basra; former Iraqi Information Minister Said Al-Sahhaf delivers his notoriously skewed updates from Baghdad during the war; the towering statue of Saddam Hussein is pulled down in Al-Fardous Square
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The war in Iraq, launched this spring by the United States, can hardly be considered over. In addition to the pockets of resistance in Saddam's strongholds of the Arab Sunni triangle that the US army has yet to deal with, Washington is now entrenched in yet another war on the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates for the political rebuilding of the devastated nation.
Since US President George W Bush declared major operations war over on 1 May, his administration has failed to restore security and stability or install a viable and legitimate Iraqi government to replace that of the deposed regime. The country is still in a state of insecure chaos and earnest steps to start re-building Iraq from the wreckage of war have not yet begun.
A major turning point occurred when Saddam was captured on 14 December. The image of Saddam bedraggled, bearded and humbled was probably meant to undermine or even end the insurgency. Yet many commentators fear Saddam's capture will lead to an increase in violence and disorder, particularly since the passions which inflamed the anti-American insurgency do not seem to be abating. Furthermore, those who refrained from joining the insurgents' attacks on the US forces, for fear this would be aiding Saddam, may now feel no such restraint.
Nevertheless, US military officials said there have been fewer attacks on the US forces since Saddam's capture, while attacks on Iraqi security and Iraqis working with the US-led occupation authorities are continuing. Nearly 30 Iraqi civilians were killed in suicide attacks in the 24 hours after Saddam's capture was announced.
Senior US officials have predicted that resistance will continue, although at a slower pace. As a result, Washington is sending marines to Iraq this spring to replace the army units. The marines, who have a reputation for toughness, are expected to be sent to restive towns in the Sunni triangle, like Falluja and Samara where insurgents have been operating.
On the political front, there seems to be little progress on reconstructing the country, let alone building a democratic and prosperous Iraq. Iraqis are not expected to have an interim government before next June, after a new provisional legislative assembly is chosen and votes on a provisional government. National elections might not be held for years, under a plan approved by the American-led occupation authority.
One brutal fact that post-Saddam Iraq has revealed is that Iraqis -- Shi'ites, Sunnis and Kurds -- are sharply divided. Iraq's Shi'ites, long the underclass in a nation where they are the majority, stand on the verge of their first real chance at political power. The Shi'ites, who are believed to make up as much as 70 per cent of Iraq's population of 25 million, were side-lined for centuries by successive Sunni and foreign rulers. Now, their political and religious leaders have become the dominant players in the American-led process of shaping a new, more representative government for Iraq.
Shi'ite leaders have avoided openly antagonising the American occupiers, the Sunnis or the Iraqi Kurds. But they made it clear that that should not be mistaken for weakness. Indeed, they seemed to be thinking ahead and their main objective is to ensure a share in the country's wealth and power which they believe should be proportional to their population. The Shi'ite leaders are emerging as pivotal to the deliberations of the Iraqi Governing Council in Baghdad. Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, the most influential of the Iraqi Shi'ite clerics, ultimately forced both the council and the Bush administration to change course on Iraqi sovereignty last month.
The fate of Sunni Arabs, who account for about a quarter of the 25 million Iraqis, still remains unclear, and resistance to the American occupation stems from their areas. They appear likely to balk at the current political formula which they fear will diminish the power they enjoyed under Saddam. If they refuse to engage in the new process they could undermine the US plan or stall the political transition all together.
Also, Kurds, Iraq's second-largest ethnic community have insisted on a new formula that would include an autonomous Kurdish enclave within a new federal system. Such a system, they argue would guarantee national harmony and prevent the recurrence of atrocities committed by the former regime, like the gassing of Kurds. Their leaders have threatened that they would not accept a new arrangement short of federalism, a formula which seems to lack consensus.
Iraq's neighbours remain concerned about the far- reaching regional consequences to the US presence close to their borders. Some of them, like Syria and Iran, feel threatened by the US military presence while Washington continues its pressure on both countries.
Turkey feels its strategic role is diminishing while Kurds, its long-time foes, are playing an increasing role in shaping Iraq's future. Saudi Arabia which lost its strategic importance to the US by the redeployment of the US forces out of Saudi Arabia into Qatar has been under sever criticism by Washington for its alleged role in promoting Islamic radicalism. Even Jordan and Kuwait are unsure for how long the honeymoon will continue with Washington over Iraq, should Iraq become the centrepiece of America's new Middle East strategy.
While politics remains on hold, the biggest problem in post-Saddam Iraq remains the rebuilding of the economy and showing people the benefits of the new situation. The majority of Iraqis are jobless, penniless and dependent on the UN food handouts. Protests against delays in salary payments are common.
One of the major challenges facing the rebuilding of the Iraqi economy is the huge foreign debt. Last week Bush's special envoy on the Iraqi debts, James Baker III, met with five European leaders and secured a substantial write-off of the $40 billion in old loans and accrued interest that Baghdad owes major developed countries. Iraq's overall debt amounts to $120 billion. Although only a start, its a significant step.
If the situation has not improved by the end of June 2004, when the coalition hands power back to an Iraqi government, further trouble is almost guaranteed.
