Syria: much ado, but nothing happened
The war on Iraq was used to put pressure on Syria in 2003 to amend foreign and domestic policies, writes Sami Moubayed
Click to view caption |
A truck removes rubble from the Palestinian Ein Al-Saheb refugee camp that was targeted by Israeli warplanes in October
|
Syria spent 2003 completely preoccupied with Iraq; too much was at stake for Damascus if neighbouring Iraq turned into a US satellite. First, despite political differences with Saddam Hussein, Iraq, like Syria, was a state ruled by the Ba'ath Party. Second, Iraq had always supported Syria in times of need due to a common commitment to Arab nationalism as dictated by Ba'athist doctrine. Third, Iraq's becoming a US satellite would mean two things: the weakening of Iran (a strategic ally of Syria) and the surrounding of Syria with pro-American regimes in Iraq, Jordan, Turkey and Israel. Syria's only ally would be Lebanon, but were Syrian troops to withdraw, Lebanon could also become a headache due to the anti-Syrian fervour of its Christians.
Syria's commercial interests with Iraq were also at stake. Syria resumed dealings with Baghdad in 1998, via the Syrian Chamber of Commerce and the UN Oil- for-Food Programme. In 2001, Syria's exchange with Iraq amounted to $1.5 billion. Syria's campaign for Iraq took many forms, ranging from solidarity visits to Baghdad -- conducted at the highest level by Prime Minister Mohamed Mustafa Miro -- to lobbying for its cause in the international community. Syria tried to make use of its temporary seat on the UN Security Council -- ultimately to no avail -- to block any pro-war resolution. It voted in favour of resolution 1441, giving the UN inspectors unrestricted rights to search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq. The vote, Syria claimed, was an attempt at saving Iraq and confining the conflict within the UN. When no weapons were found, Syria claimed that war was not justified, since Saddam Hussein was destroying his arsenal as requested by the UN and had issued a general amnesty releasing hundreds of prisoners. That argument, made repeatedly by President Bashar Al-Assad, Foreign Minister Farouk Al-Shara and Syria's Ambassador to the UN Mikhail Wehbe, also failed since Washington refused to listen.
The US invaded Iraq on 17 March to the horror of Syria. As the war dragged on, anti-American sentiment erupted throughout Syria, and many volunteers -- from Syria and elsewhere in the region -- crossed the border into Iraq to help in the confrontation against the US-led invasion. According to uncorroborated reports from US sources, the majority of the foreign fighters were Syrian. At the outset of the war, it seemed briefly that the US-led forces were not as prepared as they had initially claimed as the death toll of US troops began to rise. This initial victory for the Iraqis increased nationalist sentiment in Syria, and many -- officials and citizens alike -- counted on a long war that America would be unable to sustain.
When the war ended quickly with a US victory, Syria and the entire Arab world was stunned. The Syrian press was the only one in the region which failed to carry the story of the actual fall of Baghdad or the toppling of Saddam Hussein's statue, reporting only that "confusion and looting reign in Baghdad." As the world looked to the Iraqi capital, Syria turned the other way, insulted, embarrassed and shocked by the defeat of Iraq. It did not want to believe that the war had ended so swiftly and easily in favour of the US.
On the day Baghdad fell, the US administration began hurling accusations against Syria. Members of Saddam Hussein's regime, it was claimed, had taken refuge in Syria and senior US officials, including President Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, confirmed these reports. Syria was accused of "sponsoring terrorism" in Iraq. If some Iraqis had, indeed, managed to cross the border into the country, claimed Syria, this happened without knowledge or approval of the government.
After all, Syria's border with Iraq is long and difficult to monitor, especially in times of war. Then began the rounding up and arresting of former Iraqi officials in Iraq, including former Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Aziz, who confessed to having been in Syria. Former Foreign Minister Naji Sabri had also been to Syria during the war and from where he made an exodus into exile, reportedly to Austria. US officials, backed by neo-conservatives who wanted an all-out war on Syria as well, claimed that Syria must change course because the world had changed. A massive smear campaign was launched in the US media, which depicted Syria as a rogue state, similar to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The US issued a list of demands to Syria; no aid was to be given to former Iraqi officials, Palestinian resistance groups were to be expelled from Syria and the government was to clamp down on Hizbullah in southern Lebanon. According to the US, Hamas and Islamic Jihad -- which had offices in Damascus -- and Hizbullah -- which was backed by Damascus -- were no different from the Taliban regime, Al-Qa'eda or Saddam Hussein.
Secretary of State Powell came to Syria in April 2003 to ensure that Damascus understood the new tone in Washington, and Assad promised to shut down some offices of the Palestinian resistance. Syria said it had closed down the offices of some resistance groups, and that Khalid Meshal, the head of Hamas, had moved to Qatar. Not true, retorted both the US and Israel, both claiming these organisations still operated from inside Syria and that their offices were more than just media bureaus, as Assad and his foreign minister had often insisted.
To make their intentions more clear to Damascus, Washington passed the Syrian Accountability and Lebanon Sovereignty Restoration Act, clearly stating Washington's requirements of Syria, and asking Damascus to withdraw from Lebanon, to stop "supporting terrorism" and to put an end to the development of WMDs. One of the pro-act lobbyists was Michel Aoun, the former prime minister and army commander of Lebanon who headed the opposition to the Lebanese government. Syria did not take the Act seriously at first, claiming it would not be passed. The Act, however, was passed by Congress with an almost unanimous vote, and was signed into law by President Bush. Observers warned that the US might try to force Syria to withdraw from Lebanon, claiming that it was "occupying" a neighbouring country. If Syria does not comply with US demands, the Act stated, then the US can impose a series of economic and political sanctions.
When a suicide bomber from the Damascus-based Islamic Jihad carried out an attack in Haifa, killing 19 Israelis on 4 October, Ariel Sharon decided to retaliate with force. Israel launched an air strike deep inside Syria on 5 October, hitting the Ayn Al-Saheb refugee camp it claimed was a training camp for Islamic Jihad. The strike was made as Syria was celebrating the 30th anniversary of the October War of 1973. It was the first Israeli attack on Syrian territory since that war. Syria seemed reluctant to respond violently in order to avoid confrontation. Instead, Assad took the matter to the UN, filing an official complaint against Israel. When Syrian Ambassador to Spain Munzer Bilal claimed that Syria was ready to go to war against Israel, the foreign minister responded by stating he had expressed his personal opinion and not the official Syrian line. Seemingly under pressure from its own people to respond, Damascus issued a statement -- through Bushra Kanafani of the Foreign Ministry at first, then through Chief of Staff Hasan Turkmani -- to the effect that any repeated attacks would result in Syrian retaliation.
The conflict with Israel was seen as part of the greater Syrian crisis with the US. Had Syria's relations with America been cordial, it would have been impossible for Israel to carry out such an attack on a site only 21 kilometres from Damascus. Syria began a massive campaign to appease the US. Articles were written by Buthaina Shaaban in the US media -- including the International Herald Tribune -- to explain Syria's viewpoint to Americans, and Assad himself gave an interview to The New York Times. The US was reminded that Syria had offered assistance in the war on terror after the 11 September attacks, and had provided the FBI and CIA with thousands of documents on Al- Qa'eda members. In a clear message of goodwill towards America, Assad met with members of the Iraqi Interim Governing Council while attending the Islamic Summit in Malaysia and invited them to visit Syria. One-time members of the Iraqi opposition, such as Sharif Ali, who were once frowned upon as allies of the US, were welcomed in Syria as the new rulers in Baghdad. Syria awarded contracts for the extraction of oil to US companies, and expressed, again and again, that it had no problem with the US and wanted the White House to pressurise Sharon into resuming peace talks with Damascus. Damascus did, however, express reservations concerning the US-backed roadmap for peace between the Palestinians and Israel, but did not lobby against it, believing that the proposal would fail anyway, just like the Oslo Agreement. Syria also passed a symbolic law, which claimed to define the future role of the Ba'ath Party as supervisor of the general state affairs and not as a body interested in interfering in day-to- day business. From then on, appointments to government offices would be made according to suitability, and would no longer be based on Ba'ath Party membership.
The new law raised speculations that a de-Ba'athification of Syria would coincide with the one taking place in Iraq, but nothing of the sort happened. These fears proved unfounded when Assad appointed Mohamed Naji Al-Otari, a Ba'ath Party member, as prime minister in September. Al-Shara, Syria's prime minister, gave a press conference stating that the new Ba'ath Party policies were being misunderstood. The party, he said, would not step down from its leadership role in Syria; all major cabinet postings, in fact, were filled by Ba'ath Party members except that of the minister for the economy, which remained with the World Bank economist Ghassan Rifa'i, and the Ministry of Higher Education, which went to Dr Hani Mourtada. In all, 17 posts out of 30 went to the Ba'ath Party, while the remaining 13 went to the party's socialist allies in the National Progressive Front (NPF) and a few independents. The message was clear: Ba'ath Party influence was not going to be reduced just because the US wanted it to happen. In March, a similar message was made in parliament, when the Ba'ath Party and its socialist allies received 167 seats while only 83 went to independents, in the first chamber elected to office under Bashar Al-Assad. Mourtada was the first non-Ba'athist to be given the higher education brief since the party came to power in 1963, signalling that Syria wanted to de-Ba'athify education. Weeks before Mourtada's appointment, the military uniform worn by all students in Ba'athist Syria since 1963 was replaced, on Assad's orders, with plain school clothes. In addition, private universities have already opened in Syria, including the Higher Institute of Business Administration, the Syrian Virtual University and Kalamoun University in the town of Dayr Atiyya. All of these institutions are independent of the Ba'ath Party. The portfolios of justice, finance, information, interior, defence, foreign affairs, culture, and industry all went to the Ba'ath Party.
On the domestic front, Assad replaced several of his ministers, including Minister of Information Adnan Omran, Minister of Finance Mohamed Al-Atrash and Minister of Justice Nabil Al-Khatib. All of them had come to power under the late President Hafez Al-Assad in March 2000. The Minister of Industry Issam Al-Za'im was replaced by Mohamed Safi Abu Dan, also a Ba'athist. It was rumoured in the Israeli press that the US wanted to veto the re-appointment of General Mustapha Tlas, a veteran Ba'athist, as minister of defence, and Farouk Al-Shara, Syria's long-time minister of foreign affairs. The Israeli press claimed that Tlas embodied unacceptable Syrian policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Shara embodied similarly unwelcome ideas regarding the war on Iraq. Shara had been very outspoken against the war. Ha'aretz even published a false report saying that Firas Tlas, the son of the defence minister, had smuggled Saddam Hussein's WMDs from Iraq to Lebanon. Defiant in the face of accusations against two of his most trusted officials, Assad re-appointed General Tlas and Shara to the Otari cabinet.
The long awaited private banks, ratified by Assad in December 2000, finally became a reality and are due to open in January 2004. On the political side of things, Syria showed reluctance to introduce change and nothing monumental took place in 2003. The outspoken weekly Al- Domari, which was hailed in 2001 as the first private political newspaper since 1963 and which had been created under Assad's direct orders, was shut down this year because its publisher Ali Farzat had quarreled with Prime Minister Miro and Information Minister Omran. Farzat had fallen from grace with regime officials since the fall of Iraq because a Kuwaiti newspaper had published some of his cartoons, which mock Saddam Hussein. The cartoonist claimed he had created the drawings during the Gulf War of 1991, when Syria was fighting with the US against Iraq; not now, he stressed, where Syria opposed the war. The cartoons infuriated Syrian officials and state newspapers wrote long editorials criticising Farzat for siding with the US. The closure of Al-Domari was criticised by opposition members and Farzat, who promised to defy the state and publish his work online. Nothing of the sort, however, happened.
