Turkey: new era or fading false dawn?
By the turbulent standards of recent Turkish politics, 2003 was remarkably tranquil, writes Gareth Jenkins
Click to view caption |
The Neve Shalom Synagogue in Istanbul, one of two synagogues attacked simultaneously in November
|
Indeed, there were times when the government of the moderately Islamist Justice and Development Party (JDP) appeared Teflon-coated, shrugging off setbacks that would have plunged its predecessors into crisis and sent the financial markets tumbling. Yet, beneath the persistent optimism, nagging doubts remained. By late autumn there were already signs that reality would eventually take its toll.
Turkey's foreign policy in 2003 was dominated by the US-led war against Iraq and hopes of impending EU accession. While at home, the JDP and the staunchly secularist Turkish military shadow-boxed over the role of religion in the public arena against the background of a stubborn -- and often irrational -- confidence in the economy.
The JDP had swept to power in the November 2002 elections, winning one third of the national vote and two thirds of the seats in parliament, more because of what it was not than what it was. After a decade of corrupt and incompetent coalition governments the Turkish people had voted for an untried political party, a little over a year old and led by a charismatic leader, the current Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, whose only previous experience of public office was as mayor of Istanbul.
Almost as soon as it took office the government found itself facing a dilemma which would have tested even the most competent and experienced of administrations; namely whether to risk public wrath by supporting the US-led war against Iraq or jeopardise US financial support for an economy still struggling to shake off a devastating economic collapse less than two years earlier. In an attempt to reduce the potential public outcry the JDP government blatantly tried to sell Turkish support, including allowing US troops to use its territory as a platform for an attack on Iraq from the north, for as much money as it could get. This "horse-trading" as US President George Bush described it continued through January and February 2003 and even included a Turkish delegation led by Economy Minister Ali Babacan suddenly turning up at US Secretary of State Colin Powell's home in Washington to demand an aid package worth $96 billion. Then, on 1 March 2003, after the two sides had finally agreed on a much smaller aid package (worth around $30 billion, mostly in loan guarantees), the JDP members of parliament refused to endorse their own government's motion to allow US troops to transit Turkey on their way to Iraq.
The Turkish parliament's decision came as a shock both to Erdogan, who had assumed that his MPs would blindly endorse anything he put before them, and to the Turkish public; not least because a couple of weeks earlier the same MPs had approved another motion allowing US personnel into the country to upgrade Turkish military facilities ready for use by US forces in the war against Iraq -- a decision that made no sense unless the troops were actually going to arrive.
In Washington, the decision was greeted with a mixture of bewilderment and fury, particularly at the Pentagon, which calculated that the Turkish decision not to allow them to open a northern front could cost the US an additional 1,000 dead. Although such fears were unfulfilled, the damage to relations between the US and what had once been one of its closest allies in the region was clearly demonstrated in early July 2003 when US troops captured 11 members of a Turkish Special Forces unit in northern Iraq whom they accused of planning to assassinate local Iraqi Kurdish officials in order to try to destabilise the region and prevent the Iraqi Kurds from establishing their own independent state.
Relations with Washington warmed a little in September when Turkey offered to send peace-keeping troops to assist with the US-led occupation of Iraq following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. But the offer had to be withdrawn in October when it became clear that the Iraqis -- who, like most Arabs, do not share Turks' fond memories of the Ottoman Empire -- simply did not want Turkish troops on their soil. Yet, though welcomed, the offer failed to restore the US trust that had been shattered by the rebuff by the Turkish parliament in March. While it also fuelled doubts amongst opponents of the US war against Iraq, particularly in Europe and the Arab world, who had welcomed the Turkish decision not to allow Washington to open a second front against Saddam Hussein.
Relations with the EU were further strained by differing perceptions of Turkish progress in meeting the conditions for eventual accession. During the first half of 2003, the JDP government passed a series of reforms to reduce restrictions on freedom of speech and allow greater political plurality; prompting Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul to declare that Turkey should be admitted to the EU without delay. But the EU continued to argue that legislative changes meant nothing in themselves and had to be backed by implementation, particularly on issues such as allowing Turkey's substantial Kurdish minority to broadcast and attend courses in their own language.
But, most critically, there had still been no progress over the resolution of the 29 year-old Cyprus problem. Ankara still refused either to acknowledge that its military support for a breakaway Turkish Cypriot statelet in the north of the island violated international law or to pressure the Turkish Cypriot leadership to return to the negotiating table. But time is running out. The Greek Cypriot south of the island is due officially to enter the EU on 1 May and there is little doubt that, if it does so without a solution and while Turkish troops are still occupying what it regards as its own territory, it will simply veto any proposal to allow Turkey to join the EU.
Yet setbacks in the international arena appeared to have little impact on the government's domestic standing, where it continued to top opinion polls, much to the chagrin of the Turkish military, which believes that the JDP harbours secret, long-term plans to erode the often severe Turkish version of secularism. There was evidence during 2003 that the JDP will eventually try to dismantle some of the current restrictions on the expression of religious belief in the public arena -- such as the current ban on women wearing headscarves in state-owned institutions. There were several occasions when the JDP appeared to test the waters before withdrawing in the face of an angry reaction from the Turkish military. Privately, leading members of the JDP believe that they are likely to win at least one term in power and that it makes more sense to concentrate broadening their electoral base by improving the economy before finally deciding to challenge the military over secularism.
At first sight, the macro economic statistics would appear to indicate that the JDP is being successful. Since it came to power, inflation and interest rates have plummeted to their lowest levels in a generation, while exports are up and the economy seems well on track to achieve the government target of five per cent growth by year-end 2003. Yet the upturn appears more the result of increased market confidence than any structural or legislative changes. Indeed, some of improvements defy economic logic. For example, exports have continued to rise despite the Turkish Lira appreciating by 20 per cent in real terms over the last year.
This air of unreality was clearly demonstrated by the reaction to the series of suicide bombings in Istanbul in mid-November. On 15 November two truck-bombs exploded outside two Istanbul synagogues. Five days later on 20 November, two more truck-bombs exploded outside the UK Consulate General and the Istanbul headquarters of the London-based HSBC bank. A total of 61 people were killed, including the four suicide bombers, and over 750 injured. It soon became clear that, regardless of whether or not they had received technical or financial support from abroad, nearly all of those involved in planning and carrying out the bombings were Turkish nationals. Yet, after an initial fall in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the Turkish markets bounced back. Within days average prices on the stock market were well above pre-bombing levels, even though tens of thousands of tourist cancellations looked set to have a devastating impact on what is Turkey's main source of foreign currency.
It is likely to take years for Ankara's relations with the US to return to pre-March 2003 levels while Turkey's ties with the EU will come under increasing strain in the New Year as Cyprus moves towards accession. Yet there has been little attempt by Turkey to forge closer links with other countries in the region. Unless substantial measures are taken in either the economic or political sphere -- and with the very real possibility of future terrorist attacks -- the often blind optimism that has sustained Turkey through 2003 is unlikely to be long-lived.
