After the hurricane
Arab states must understand the broader dynamics of regional history if they are to respond to the pressures of the present, writes Ahmed Abdel-Halim*
At the end of the Gulf War in 1991 President George Bush Sr announced that a "new world order" was at hand. Henceforth the world's problems would be resolved peacefully. The time had come, he added, to reach a settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Indeed, the US began to push towards the realisation of that end. Under America's wing, Israelis and Palestinians signed the Oslo Accords in 1993. Jordan and Israel concluded a peace treaty in 1994. Syria and Israel entered into negotiations, though regrettably these stalled following the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.
Despite auspicious beginnings, a change of tide was already discernible in international and regional politics. The US was now alone at the peak of world power -- a new precedent in modern history. Sweeping across corporate, governmental and martial America was a new concern to remain in that position for as long as possible. In the Middle East, the by-product of this was the greater than ever freedom of manouevre afforded to Israel. The rules of the game changed. Israeli and American practice took a new turn.
In addition to an end to the Palestinian problem, Israel made clear its desire to eliminate what it perceived to be a threat to its security emanating from Iraq and, above all, from Iran. Simultaneously, the US wished to eliminate what it regarded as obstacles to its policy in the Middle East; namely the political climates of Iraq and Iran. On the basis of this convergence in purpose, Washington and Tel Aviv began to work collectively towards the implementation of a shared political and military objective. Israel's eagerness to bring an end to negotiations with the Palestinians alongside Washington's rush to reshape the region in accordance with US- Israeli strategic interests reveals the common front on which Israel and the US were fighting.
Contrary to widely held belief, the events of 11 September 2001 did not alter US foreign policy objectives. They did change the means employed in achieving them. From recourse to political and diplomatic channels, Washington almost overnight adopted its current preference for military intervention. But was this shift the product of a fundamental change in US political and strategic thinking?
The end of the war on Iraq has led to geopolitical and geostrategic realignments across the Middle East, particularly in the Gulf. Geopolitically, from the American perspective, the relative political weight of the nations of the region has shifted. Geostrategically, American military forces are once again heavily numbered in the Gulf. Israel's role has been enhanced. In addition, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is to be remodelled. If this goes ahead, it will be extremely significant; it will represent the de facto creation of a new Middle Eastern organisation to replace the Arab League.
Taken together, events of the last decade have redrawn Middle Eastern history significantly. The US seems the primary author of this transformation. Nevertheless, the successful execution of its plan is contingent on several factors. There will be political obstacles, both from the American public and from friends and allies alike. Regular American losses -- both material and human -- will evoke the experience of Vietnam, which will inevitably have an impact on American resolve. Moreover, the financial cost of control through conflict and occupation is weakening an already debilitated US domestic economy.
While it might seem that the regional balance of power has already been altered, the future of the region remains quite fluid. This is particularly true with respect to stability in the Gulf and the role played by neighbouring non-Arab states. American policy in the Middle East is markedly inconsistent with the immediate needs of the people of the region and the world at large. It is common now, even within the mainstream, to characterise American policy as a dangerous adventure that risks perpetuating current conflicts in the region and beyond for years to come.
Two countries deserve special attention during coming months: Iran and Syria. Iran now finds itself in an extremely difficult situation. It senses that it is the next target of American intervention in the Gulf. Some Iranian officials have stated freely that Iran has not only been put on the defensive, but has its back to the wall. As a result, it is attempting to mobilise resistance to US hegemony and to establish a new framework for security that will help it endure when the moment of confrontation arrives. The question is: Why is the US threatening Iran? Again, the reasons are closely associated with Israel and the regional balance of powers. Were Iran to produce nuclear weapons (which it has the technology to do), Israel would no longer have a monopoly on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the region. The Iranian deterrent, in this case, would neutralise Israel's stronghand tactics. The US is not about to let that happen.
Meanwhile, Syria is still in the spotlight, as the US openly pressures it to align with American and Israeli objectives. The US administration, supported by the American Congress, has prepared the charge sheet well in advance. Syria, it argues, has become a storehouse and transit point for WMD, provides refuge to terrorist organisations, and militarily occupies large swathes of Lebanon. Washington's sudden interest in disarming countries suspected of developing WMD, of course, does not extend to Israel. Indeed, while somewhere along the way the issue of "terrorism" came to be identified with the issue of WMD, the paradox is revealed when Israel, with the full knowledge and support, not to say connivance, of the US, has been allowed to arm itself to the teeth. In a region already ripe with social, political and economic problems, this is not only a factor inducing instability; it is incentive for other countries to follow suite.
It could be argued that Washington's drive to eradicate WMDs from the region should receive the unqualified support of all clear- thinking people. Nevertheless, the credibility of Washington's position is comprised by double standards when it comes to applying its policy. There is one rule for Israel, which allows it to maintain a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons, threatening countries in the region and beyond. There is another rule for others. Everyone but Israel is required to dismantle whatever systems of deterrence they possess, and to desist from developing nuclear capabilities -- even if for civilian purposes.
How will the changing regional balance affect Egypt? The ongoing transformations have already had an impact on the situation in Europe. The most significant ramifications have been economic. This will affect Egypt too. But future ramifications are likely to be political and cultural. Will the region -- including Egypt -- comply with US designs for political and social and economic change? On what terms will they do so, if so? Phase two of the new world order is fully under way via the presidency of George W Bush. While the outcome remains unclear, states of the region will have to work hard to understand the broader context of regional change if they are to act effectively to maintain integrity, security and regional unity.
* The writer is a strategic studies expert and member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
