Sharon's security fence
Mohamed Sid-Ahmed asks: Which of the two logics is more likely to prevail: building barriers or removing them?
The security fence Ariel Sharon has been building around Palestine over the last few months cannot be described as a temporary measure, if only because of the astronomical costs of the project, which are expected to run to as high as a quarter of a billion dollars, that is, to an average of two million dollars for each mile. Nor can it be described simply as a security measure without any political implications, if only because its construction entails dismantling Israeli settlements in Gaza and the West Bank and angering the ultra- nationalists who are Sharon's core constituency. Sharon, who has reportedly already given orders to plan for the evacuation of 17 settlements in Gaza and 3 in the West Bank, threatens to push ahead with his "disengagement programme" from the Palestinians with or without the approval of the extreme right- wing members of his ruling coalition. If need be, he said, he would replace the far-right National Union and the National Religious Party, both strong supporters of the settlement movement, with the Labour Party, which is now headed by Shimon Peres.
According to senior Likud officials, Sharon is seeking to obtain the approval of the government and the Knesset for his plan, even if this entails the formation of a national unity government or the holding of early elections. The Israeli press reports that Sharon will ask his cabinet to vote on these proposals within the next two months, and he is quoted by Yehadot Ahronot as saying that while he is in no hurry to put together a new coalition government, he does not want to remain "at the mercy of the right-wing parties".
Although some Labour Party officials have hinted that their party would be ready to join a government of national unity, Peres himself has not made any such commitment. He has said, however, that his party would totally endorse the dismantling of the Gaza settlements.
Sharon's decision to dismantle the Jewish settlements in Gaza is being portrayed as one of the "painful concessions" he has had to make for Israel's long-term interests. But some see the decision as a diversionary tactic aimed at deflecting attention from the corruption probes currently underway against Sharon and his sons in connection with bribery charges and illegal property deals. Moreover, the Israeli prime minister needs to restore his credibility if he wants to be seen as a useful ally by the US president at a critical moment for the latter who is facing accusations that he launched the war in Iraq under false pretences.
However, if he is forced to distance himself from the extreme right and join hands with the more moderate elements in the Israeli political spectrum, Sharon will be shooting himself in the foot. He would in this way be giving as much needed boost to the Israeli left at a time he needs to prevent it from restoring its credibility as a viable player on the international stage so as to undermine the Yossi Beilin/Yasser Abed-Rabbo initiative, known as the Geneva Accord, which has been well received in a wide variety of circles.
For a while Sharon and his opponents engaged themselves in procedural forms of manoeuvring. Sharon announced that he was studying the possibility of holding a referendum on the removal of the Gaza settlements after several members of his own party voiced their opposition to the move. On the Palestinian side, Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei said he would seek a decision from the International Court of Justice ruling the fence illegal. This prompted Israel to move for the refusal of Egyptian judge Dr Nabil El-Arabi from the panel deliberating the issue. Israel's request was rejected by a majority of 12 to 1 votes, with only the American judge voting in favour.
Meanwhile, both Sharon and Qurei have expressed their willingness to hold what would be their first meeting since Qurei took office last October. Can this long-awaited summit take place before Sharon's visit to Washington in a few days' time? Qurei has announced that he will not engage in any peace talks with his Israeli counterpart while construction of the fence continues. Can work on the fence be halted, even temporarily? Can Washington help alleviate tensions between the two parties? Can Cairo play a role?
Sharon has said he will pursue his disengagement policy unilaterally, that is, evacuate the Gaza settlements, if he judges that the roadmap has failed. But his plan was met with widespread scepticism by both Israelis and Palestinians. Even some members of the Likud believe he is not seriously considering such a move and that it is nothing more than a publicity stunt. On hearing the news, Arafat was scornful: "Seventeen settlements? What, so they can replace them with another 170?" His fears may be well founded. In an interview published in Ha'aretz, Sharon said "It is my intention to carry out an evacuation -- sorry, a relocation -- of settlements that cause us problems." According to close aides, he describes the Gaza settlements privately as a "security burden and a source of constant friction". For Sharon, ensuring the safety of 7500 settlers living in isolated enclaves amidst a hostile Palestinian population of 1.2 million is a security nightmare. The largest concentration of settlers is in the West Bank, where some 230 thousand settlers live in 125 settlements. In the same Ha'aretz interview, Sharon said "we must be ready to move of places we will not hold on to anyway in a final settlement, like Gaza."
Although Sharon has long supported the settler movement, he does so from a different perspective than the settlers themselves. While they base their claims to the land of Palestine on biblical texts, he sees the issue in terms of Israel's modern security needs, not its ancient claims. From this perspective, he sees the settlements in the Gaza strip as a liability rather than an asset. If he does indeed dismantle the settlements, it will not be the first time he acts at cross purposes with the settlers, who regard him with a great deal of mistrust ever since he oversaw the evacuation of settlements in Sinai under the terms of the Egyptian/Israeli Peace Treaty. Sharon has made it clear that he will impose, if necessary, restrictions and take unilateral measures vis-à-vis the Palestinians if progress towards a settlement -- at his conditions -- is not reached this summer. On the other hand, he has informed the Jewish settlers that he will not dismantle settlements without reaching an agreement with them first. But, as many believe, Sharon's decision to abandon territories is prompted by the increasing weight of the Palestinian resistance.
What is the fate of the Geneva Accord in the light of these developments? What is certain is that it will remain a non-starter if the ambiguities surrounding the primordial issue of the Palestinian right of return are not cleared up. It is an issue on which the parties continue to hold antipodal stands. Experience proves that when contentious issues are deferred to future negotiations there is no guarantee that positions will soften with time.
The European Union has supported the Geneva Accord. Spokesmen for the EU maintain that it can go hand in hand with the roadmap and should not be seen as an alternative process. Sharon is violently opposed to the Geneva Accord and Washington has remained cool towards it while top EU dignitaries like Chris Patten and Xavier Solana have noted that on the issues of Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees, it has gone further than the roadmap but not enough to dissipate all misunderstandings. On the other hand, some EU members do not believe that seeking a ruling from the International Court of Justice would be a wise step at this very delicate moment, especially that the court's judgements are not binding.
In a way, the logic behind Sharon's security fence is the very opposite of the logic behind the Geneva Accord. It is also out of tune with recent initiatives in the region where we have seen reconciliatory moves undertaken by a variety of parties to put their difference behind them. Thanks to these initiatives, there has been a softening of tensions between Syria and Turkey, between Egypt and Iran, between Libya and Western capitals, and, further afield, between India and Pakistan. While there is no guarantee that these initiatives will not be exposed to setbacks, they are at least a step in the right direction. The key question now is which of the two logics will impact more strongly on the future course of events in the region: the logic of building barriers or the logic of removing them.
