The year of the helping hand
The world and the Sudanese want peace in Sudan, but a lasting peace cannot be brokered by a self-interested, election-conscious American government, writes Curtis Doebbler*
The overwhelming majority of Sudanese both at home and abroad want peace in their country. That is not surprising given the torturous history of war that has claimed an estimated two million lives, displaced as many as five million people, and relegated one of Africa's naturally richest countries to an existence of abject poverty.
Even before it became an independent country in 1956, civil war had broken out and it has plagued the country with only slight respites ever since. Efforts to end the war by Sudan's neighbours, who joined together in the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), have been unsuccessful. That is, until the Bush administration threw its weight behind the ongoing negotiations.
Now, for the first time since the 12-year pause during the regime of Jaafar Nimeri (1972-1985) the end of the fighting between the government of Sudan and its numerous militias, and the Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Army and Movement (SPLA/M) appears possible. Odds are that within the next 60 days a peace agreement will be signed between the government of Sudan and the SPLA/M. This agreement may end the fighting and even incorporate some opposition figures into the government. But it will also bring its own problems, and may actually exacerbate the troubles of the Sudanese people.
The primary reason for this pessimistic prognosis is that the impending peace agreement is not the product of indigenous Sudanese efforts, but rather the arm-twisting of the United States. Although American pressure perhaps reflects a better use of its military strength than its unlawful attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan, it belongs to that family of actions. This is so because the American effort is based more on its own national interest of finding a quick fix to offset the fiascos it has created in these other two countries. Without a success that does not depend on the use of military force, American Secretary of State Colin Powell can just about throw in the towel of diplomacy and re-enlist as a foot soldier of America's aggressive department of defence. The urgency of peace in Sudan is, therefore, as motivated as much by American interests as it is by Sudanese concerns.
As a result of the American search for a quick fix, several aspects of the impending peace agreement are significantly problematic.
Foremost, there is the question of motivation. If the parties really seek peace why didn't they come to the table of their own volition? It looks very much as if the motivation is rather the hundred of million dollars and more of assistance that will be paid to the signing parties, backed by threats from America. Both motivations are problematic.
If it is the money, the problems arise because the funds will be going to a government and movement that have maintained their power bases through the use of force. When is the last time militarily dependent entities used the funds their received to improve the social and economic lives of their constituents? Nevertheless, the US and IGAD negotiator General Lazaro Sumbeiywo have encouraged SPLA leader John Garang and Sudanese Vice-President Osman Taha, who is negotiating on behalf of Sudanese President Brigadier-General Omar Al- Beshir, to negotiate the end to the civil war with little influence from civil society or the other fractions that make up or represent the majority of the Sudanese people.
Yes, you may have noticed, with former General Colin Powell rounding off the quartet of involved parties, there are military interests everywhere you look. In fact, from Powell and Garang to Omar Beshir and Lazaro Sumbeiywo, everyone involved has a history of using the bulk of the resources they get their hands on to purchase and use military equipment. What will make this payout any different? Even if there is a short peace, the fact that the parties will be better armed if a new armed conflict breaks out will increase the bloodshed.
Moreover, the less than voluntary nature of the negotiations cannot be ignored. Nor is it by the parties. The Sudanese government has not only left the talks at every chance it has gotten, but it has continued to carry out armed attacks, if not in southern Sudan, then in Darfur in western Sudan. The SPLA has not been much better, allegedly continuing its attacks against government forces in the south despite a cease-fire agreement. So why do they even bother to talk? If it is not the money, then might it be fear?
Sudanese government officials are cognizant of the fact that the US nearly invaded their country in 1992. Instead they choose ill-fated Somalia, allegedly because the US lacked adequate intelligence about how to get from Port Sudan to Khartoum. That was when the Clinton administration was in power in Washington. Today, however, as the military attacks on, and occupation of, Afghanistan and Iraq have proven, the current Bush administration doesn't seem overly concerned about proper intelligence. If they don't have it, they just make it up, relying on the fact that they have world's largest cache of weapons of mass destruction, and the world's most advanced ability to deliver them. Perhaps it scares Sudanese even more to remember that the more thoughtful President Clinton bombed a pharmaceutical company in Khartoum based on erroneous or fabricated intelligence.
The SPLA/M also have reason to fear. Although under the wing of increasingly influential Christian enthusiasts in the US, their failure to go along with Powell's game plan could lead to their military and non-military support being cut off. Sources close to the SPLA/M leadership say this prospect has already been dangled before them. Never mind the irony of the US cutting off aid to a rebel movement it has maintained for alleged reasons of national security, while it continues to pump assistance into Israel so that it can maintain its oppressive occupation of Palestine for the same alleged reasons of national security. The SPLA/M has seen what has happened to America's former allies, Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. It knows that the same could happen to the SPLA/M if it fails to tow the American line.
If the coercive nature of the agreement were not enough, the fact that it might be an illusionary agreement altogether lends more oil to the fire that may be burning under Sudan. The reasons for this are many, but naming just a few suffices to illustrate the serious nature of this fear.
First, neither the government of Sudan nor the SPLA/M are the sole, or possibly the main, representatives of the Sudanese people. The government of Sudan came to power through a military in coup d'etat in mid-1989. It has held several elections to reiterate its grip on government, but there has been no real opposition as political parties are banned. The SPLA/M is no better. Most southern Sudanese, whom the SPLA/M claims to represent, do not even live in southern Sudan. They are scattered, from Uganda to the west, from Khartoum to Cairo. There have rarely been instances in history when a people have become so dispersed. It is no wonder that Sudan is home to the largest number of internally displaced persons in the world -- more than twice the number of the next closest country -- and that Sudanese refugees live in significant numbers in numerous other countries. Like the Sudanese government in the north, the SPLA/ M represents itself, more than anyone else. They are rebels who are fighting against the government in large part because of the way successive governments have treated southern Sudanese soldiers.
Perhaps more telling is the fact that civil society, both in the north and the south of Sudan, has been all but excluded from the current peace talks. When I confronted American and Sudanese government diplomats with this anomaly, they admitted they knew, but merely retorted that these groups would be considered later. When? After a peace agreement is reached that limits their ability to negotiate a representative form of government? After the money has been paid to the two negotiating parties forcing everyone else to become dependent on them? Or maybe they had in mind after a new rebel movement has been created to fight for the interests of the majority of Sudanese who have been excluded from the peace talks?
Have we forgotten so quickly the history of the creation of Sudan, whereby the southern Sudanese were marginalised at the time of independence because they were excluded? As the British Empire rushed to jettison its colonies, including Sudan, to avoid having to finance their development, the southern Sudanese pleaded for the British to remain in Sudan for some years as a sort of protectorate providing development assistance that would help to build universities in the south and train southern Sudanese to become administrators. For decades before independence the British had ensured that southerners were segregated from the north. Now confronted with their error, the British chose to walk away from the southerners, leaving them to the mercy of the north.
What has changed this time, not only in Sudan, but around the world, is that the oppressed are not as compartmentalised. They are not merely southern Sudanese, but Sudanese in both the north and the south who are not among the elites. This situation reflects the international community in general. As the World Social Forum (WSF) in Mumbai, India, just a few weeks ago brought home with a vengeance, the world is being divided into elites who have wealth and education, and those who do not. As Egyptian social thinker Samir Amin observed in his address to the WSF, more and more people everywhere are being oppressed and exploited. Moreover, those driving this exploitation often share the nationality of the oppressed, although the majority hails from rich, developed countries. Their common feature is, however, that selfish interests govern their actions.
This phenomenon is hovering over the impending peace agreement in Sudan. In the current framework of self- interests, lead by the US, the Sudanese people are likely to join the Afghan and Iraqi people as the newest victims of exploitation and oppression at the hands of those who allege they are helping them. It is not too late to correct this defect by broadening the participants and the scope of the peace talks, and by giving them the time and the space that is needed to come to real agreements. Such a move might not suit the election timetable of George W Bush, or the aspirations of Colin Powell, but it will do eminently more justice to the cause of peace in Sudan.
While it is not inappropriate for the US and the IGAD to encourage peace in Sudan, it must be a just peace, and it must be a peace that is really agreed upon by the people of Sudan. What is happening now meets neither of these criteria. Furthermore, it might be doubted whether the US, in light of its most recent and repeated degradations of the international consensus, can be the motor for a just and representative peace. Perhaps at this point this question has already been decided and we can only trust in the Sudanese people to build an imperfect peace into a lasting and just peace.
* The writer is an international human rights lawyer and currently visiting professor at Tashkent State Law Institute, Uzbekistan. He has been advisor on human rights to the Government of Sudan, legal advisor to UNICEF Sudan, and visiting professor at Khartoum University.
