A better Middle East
America and its allies may have plans to redraft the political, social, cultural and economic composition of the Middle East, but true reform comes from within -- as it must, writes Hala Mustafa*
US policy towards the Middle East in the past had never caused the confusion and bewilderment it does today. For decades, it was very simple and straightforward, governed as it was by America's traditional pragmatic, utilitarian approach to foreign policy. In the Middle East the US was concerned with two things: ensuring the flow of cheap oil and safeguarding the security of Israel. Everything else pertaining to the peoples and societies of this region were "details".
11 September and its aftermath changed all that dramatically, even frighteningly so. Matters that were once peripheral now moved to the centre of attention; concerns that were once secondary at best have been elevated to top priority, and the erstwhile short-term pragmatism has been eclipsed by a full- fledged, long range strategy that goes under the heading of "change". This is "change" writ large, with the full force of ideological vision, missionary zeal, and great and lofty aims, some of which can be accomplished through diplomatic channels, others of which might require forms of economic, political or military coercion. And, when asked why this radical shift in approach, Americans will point quite simply to the connection between the rise in armed extremism (and its extension beyond a relatively narrow geographical margin to strike at the very heart of America) and the prevalent conditions in the region (such as economic decline, poor standards of living, poor educational systems and access to knowledge, the inferior status of women, the lack of civil and individual freedoms and liberties; in short an entire complex gamut of political, social, cultural and economic causes that give rise to an ideological mindset that is alien to peace and freedom).
It is because of this inference that Washington declared its "fight against terrorism and extremism", and that this campaign has ranged from the use of military force in Afghanistan and Iraq and the use of the nuclear arms inspection card against Iraq and other countries, to the Powell initiative for democracy and the declaration of the initiative for a "Greater Middle East". If the US pursued the first phases of this strategy almost single- handedly, the latest initiative, which is expected to be approved in its final form in the forthcoming G8 summit, will bring onboard Washington's foremost European partners and allies and, for the first time, will render NATO, with all its rapid- intervention capacities, as its executive and monitoring agency. The concept of the "Greater Middle East" initiative is founded upon two central premises: the need to promote reform and democratisation in the region, and the need to resolve once and for all the Arab-Israeli conflict, which, over more than half a century, has been a primary source of constant tension, violence and instability.
The US, thus, has set the agenda for its new strategy towards the Middle East. Nor is this the type of strategy that is contingent upon a particular set of political figures; it will most likely continue regardless of the next occupant of the Oval Office. Like America's Cold War footing that persisted uninterruptedly through a range of Republican and Democratic administrations until the collapse of the Soviet Union, this one, too, appears to aspire to a similarly institutionalised nature. It is, therefore, little wonder that the "Greater Middle East" initiative is being forwarded in the manner of the Helsinki Accords of 1975, which were signed by 25 nations, including most of the countries of Europe, the US and the Soviet Union. Although, the purpose of the accords was to secure the mutual recognition of secure borders and establish arbitrating mechanisms and other peace-keeping measures, considerable emphasis was given to an associated mandate in which signatories pledged to respect, and furnish the legal frameworks to guarantee, a range of fundamental human rights and liberties ranging from the freedoms of belief, religion, opinion and expression, to the freedom of movement and access to information. The underlying US-European suppositions behind the Helsinki Accords may well have inspired the "Greater Middle East" idea, which Washington has designated as a framework for the future of the Middle East; in accordance with which, issues of liberalisation and democratisation may increasingly determine the tenor of the US's relationships with its "friends and allies" in the region.
Because of its very magnitude, the shift in US policy has triggered all the manifestations of "shock"; from stunned disbelief and denial to suspicion and outrage. An element of this is only natural in the face of sudden change, but today such sentiments and sensitivities have encompassed an entire region.
Perhaps the most compelling question we should ask ourselves at this juncture is whether US-Arab relations are henceforth only to be characterised by tension and confrontation. Is it to be solely "dictates", "coercion" and "intervention" from one side and "refusal", "opposition" and "hatred" from the other? Is there no possible meeting-ground that will enable the two sides to avert what some claim to be inevitable?
No one can pretend that the answer is easy, particularly given that the precise contours of the picture are still indistinct. However, it is possible to assert that the picture may not be as grim as we imagine. There are many reasons for this, foremost among which is that the issues of reform and democratisation are already on our national agenda, at the public, state government and regional levels. True, there is considerable discrepancy in opinions and intensity of conviction, but the spirit of change is there, and powerfully so.
Secondly, the US, or so-called "international" strategy -- as it was couched at least -- does not appear to be necessarily confrontational in nature. Just as it speaks of encouraging the development of civil society and the promotion of human rights, civil liberties and freedoms, it also emphasises cooperation with the governments and societies of this region in order to achieve these ends. In a sense, therefore, it espouses a certain realism in its recognition of the need to strike a balance between the two sides involved in this process, as well as in its acknowledgement that liberalisation and democratisation, by their very nature, can not be realised unless there exists the commensurate conviction and drive towards these ends in the countries undergoing the reform process.
Finally, regardless of what the US does or does not want, we must contend with a socio-political reality that is brimming with issues that need to be addressed with a resolve and vision that emanate from within. The question of political reform, which has urged itself upon national discourse, is far too important and complex an issue to leave to what might appear as a one-sided dialogue. Political reform is not merely a question of holding general or municipal elections, for the electoral process alone cannot guarantee reform. Rather, elections, quite simply, crown the reform policies at various levels. However, as "elections" is a catchword with greater "appeal", it is given greater play, generally in order to avoid delving into many inextricable, but central, issues.
Take for example, the question of political parties. Although the Arab world began its foray into the realm of multiparty plurality three decades ago, most of these experiments are still tender and frail, as they lack the necessary modern institutionalised frameworks and they have yet to crystallise into distinct entities in the manner of political parties in most other democratic systems with their own political and ideological identities and platforms. As a result, the political parties that do exist here are reminiscent of the "rallies" of an earlier epoch, in that they comprise all shades of the political spectrum, from the ultra left to ultra right. The logic, undoubtedly, is a legacy of the epoch of the monolithic state party system, which by its very nature is adverse to the spirit of diversity and competitive plurality.
By the same token, the questions of the advancement of human rights and civil freedoms are similarly encumbered by inherited conditions. Arab culture, in general, still emphasises kinship and similar group affiliations over the individual, which inherently hampers the implementation of individual rights and freedoms and is, thus, the essential source of the chronic gap between the provisions of the constitution and law, and day-to-day reality in practice.
The same applies to the role of women in the public sphere, an issue which is central to the reform process. There is no doubt that Arab countries have made important inroads on such developmental issues as women's right to education, to work, to equal wages and the like. Rather, my focus here, in the context of political reform, is women's representation in the public sphere and their participation in political life, areas from which women have been excluded for decades as a consequence of an authoritarian culture, the perpetuation of which would render it difficult to conceive of a free and enlightened climate conducive to political development. Indeed, a simple comparison is sufficient to illustrate the current decline in the status of Arab women. In the early part of the 20th century, Arab women took up the banners of the fight against poverty, ignorance, injustice and other causes and manifestations of underdevelopment, and of the struggle for freedom and equality. Beneath these banners they were integral to the success of the most important popular uprisings in modern Arab history, notably Egypt's 1919 Revolution. The banners women sport today convey the very antithesis of that vital spirit.
The foregoing are only a few of the many issues that could be placed on the discussion table in the context of reform and democratisation. Certainly, such discussions will be far more beneficial than dwelling on those knee-jerk reactions against the "hegemony of the superpowers" and the inevitable obsession with "America". We need to formulate a homegrown vision for political development that emanates from an honest and close assessment of our realities. Then we will find that our horizons are broader than those perceived through those narrow "stereotypical" blinkers.
* The writer is editor-in-chief of the quarterly journal, Al- Dimocratia (Democracy), published by Al-Ahram.
