The Bibliotheca Alexandrina symposium
Mohamed Sid-Ahmed discusses the significance of the symposium held this week at the Bibliotheca Alexandrina on the need for reform in Egypt and the Arab world
An extraordinary thing happened at the Bibliotheca Alexandrina last week, where Egyptian and Arab writers, thinkers and civil society personalities came together to discuss the pressing need for reform in the region. For three days, participants held brainstorming sessions characterised by an unprecedented degree of candour, their discussions driven by a sense of urgency and the hope that the symposium could be the first step towards a new reality. The mood was upbeat, the determination to bring about change so strong that it was described by Al-Hayat newspaper as an unstoppable wave.
This view was not shared by our local media, which depicted the Alexandria symposium on "Problems of Arab Reform, Vision and Implementation" as just another run-of-the-mill talking fest, when in fact what happened on 13 and 14 March is indicative of a profound change in the making, and should be seen as a movement emerging out of the ranks of angry people adamant on the need for democracy. It remains to be seen whether the proposals of the symposium will be translated into reality, but there are grounds for cautious optimism. In his opening address, the director of the Bibliotheca Alexandrina, Ismail Serageldin, said that complete freedom of speech was guaranteed for all participants with no reservations. The four committees, political, economic, social and cultural, would sit in closed sessions, but the discussions would be absolutely free. It was probably this aspect of the symposium which set it apart from similar endeavours. The openness, transparency and audacity of the interventions were without precedent. That was the symposium's most remarkable accomplishment.
The participants proceeded from similar basic premises. Every one agreed on the pressing need for reform and all agreed that it had to be based on a vision. But the unanimity over generalities did not extend to specifics.
That is not the case at the global level, where agreement over specific issues of vital concern to the region is now being worked out. Bush has come forward with his Greater Middle East project and is inviting the European Union to be Washington's partner in the project. Both the United States and the European Union see themselves as subjects of history, while the Arab countries lying within the Greater Middle East are regarded as objects of history, members of a region of the world where terrorism thrives and weapons of mass destruction are illegally produced, stored and, eventually, used. The Arab world cannot remain silent in the face of what is nothing less than a restructuring of the world order. That is true of Egypt in particular, which, as the largest Arab country, bears the greatest share of responsibility for the fate of the region.
Moreover, Egypt has to act swiftly, before the convocation of the Arab summit in Tunis, before the G8 summit, and before the NATO summit; in short, before the international community imposes the formula for reform proposed by the US. Speed was of the essence, even if there was not enough time to complete all the procedural steps. It was necessary not to allow what is being planned for the region at the international level to become a factor of destabilisation at the regional level, and to initiate reforms in accordance with the vision of the local actors, not according to a vision imposed from outside.
Ismail Serageldin pointed out that President Mubarak inaugurated the symposium not in his capacity as president of Egypt, but as a member of civil society. Accordingly, he was not escorted to the Bibliotheca Alexandrina by a cortege of ministers and official personalities. Participation was limited to representatives of different schools of civil society, which implicitly meant that reform should not be limited to political practice as it has developed under the state of emergency. The symposium was a first tentative step towards a new political culture in which freedom of expression is not curtailed by special, exceptional, legislation. This was the implicit -- and symbolic -- significance of the recent decision not to impose prison sentences on journalists and other citizens charged with press offences.
The trend that held the forefront of the symposium was the liberal trend. The trend that was most poorly represented was the religious Islamic trend, despite its strong presence in the Egyptian street. At a recent press conference held in the Press Syndicate without government permission, the new leader of the Muslim Brothers presented his party's programme. Is this the reason the party was not invited to take part in the symposium? Surely it does not justify sidelining such a potent force on the political stage. If the demands of the Alexandria symposium, which include a call for an end to the state of emergency, are to be accepted, then all trends in Egyptian society must be afforded equal opportunities to express their political views.
Although the symposium purported to address the issue of Arab reform in general, it focussed essentially on the need for reform in Egypt. As a result, some basic issues were not sufficiently addressed. The Greater Middle East project is not directed at Egypt in isolation from the rest of the Arab world, but addresses the Egyptians at a time the Palestinian crisis has reached unprecedented heights and the Iraqi crisis remains as explosive as ever. Stability and freedom in Egypt cannot be realised as long as the Palestinian problem is being liquidated and while Iraq is being decimated, divided and threatened by civil war. The discussions at the symposium did not take this wider pan-Arab dimension sufficiently into account.
While condemning attempts to impose reforms from abroad on Egypt, the organisers of the symposium were careful to underline that it was a purely Egyptian initiative motivated by internal considerations, irrespective of recipes for democracy concocted abroad. Actually, foreign initiatives in this matter should not be underestimated and facing them as a challenge is no less critical than shortcomings emanating from Egypt's internal setup.
In the final analysis, democracy is facing two equally formidable challenges, one from our own internal setup and another from the attempt by external forces to impose their formula for democracy. The US formula for democracy disregards our pan-Arab affiliations, notably the Palestinian issue which is at the heart of the longest-standing conflict in the Middle East, even in the Greater Middle East, while democracy tailored to suit our requirements would fall short of what is necessary and abort the whole process. The model of democracy we need to adopt should fall into neither of these two pitfalls. It should draw its specific character from going beyond these particular defects. There is nothing automatic in overcoming them. Exercising democracy requires training and time. Democracy is a climate, the very opposite of the one that develops under fear, emergency laws and widespread restrictions. It is a sort of social contract where the force of law replaces the law of force.