A nation-state in waiting

A year into the occupation, Iraq's future seems still shrouded in uncertainty. Will Iraq emerge as a failed, fragmented or frail state? Will it be a sectarian and fundamentalist, or a federal, secular and democratic polity? Such questions are as painful and upsetting to Iraqis as they are to their American patrons, writes Faleh A Jabar

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Iraqis gather under a looming mural of Saddam Hussein to watch British troops north of Basra

The invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003 signaled a major shift in US global strategy in the post- Cold War era. Following the tragic events of 11 September 2001, the US administration developed the "Bush Doctrine", which envisaged the concept of "unilateral pre-emption". Unilateralism means the US will act single-handedly -- pre-emption is the right to strike first -- but against whom? The target is to combat both global terrorism and pariah (or "rogue") states, and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), by force if necessary.

The Bush Doctrine, however, linked combating global terror with the need to reform the countries in question by enhancing the market- economy and building infrastructure for democracy and prosperity. These reforms, according to US strategists, will ensure more transparency, enhance prosperity, and consolidate accountability, leading thereby to the elimination of the root causes of terror and drying up the money that funds it.

This strategic framework had overt implication for Iraq, and covert implications for the Gulf countries. Most of those involved in the September 2001 episode came from that region, and Iraq was seen, rightly or wrongly, as combining possession of WMDs with links with clandestine fundamentalism. Iraq was also the weakest link; if it was reformed, Washington assumed, it

could act as a beacon for reform in the Middle East and become a counterbalance to fundamentalist-infested Saudi Arabia.

The successful removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2002 gave a boost to such far- fetched strategic thinking. As a result, US strategy towards Iraq shifted radically from containment to regime change. Most Arab observers did not correctly assess the effects of September 2001 on US thinking and policy-making vis-ˆ-vis the Arab region in general, and Iraq and the Gulf in particular. Instead, they stuck to old-fashioned conspiracy theories of sorts, propagated mostly by half-informed TV networks and indoctrinated social activists.

PLANNING AND NON-PLANNING: During the 2003 US-led invasion, by most accounts the Iraqi army did not put up much of a fight. The invasion force reached Baghdad barely three weeks into the war. The quick collapse may suggest a lack of nationalist feelings, or, in the usual Arabic jargon, treason. The truth is that the passive attitude of the military signaled a final divorce between Iraqi patriotism ( wataniya ) and official nationalistic ideology, a cleavage that alienated the bulk of the armed forces, and the nation, from the single-family, single-party system.

US political options for post-conflict Iraq had four versions: one: direct military rule; two: a coalition civil administration, three: an Iraqi civil administration, and, lastly, Iraqi interim government. Shortly prior to the invasion, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) was formed under General Jay Garner to provide humanitarian assistance and civil administration for Iraq. Jay Garner confided to his aides that the political options were not clearly defined. But General Garner was in fact negotiating his way from de facto option one to option four.

The formation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under ambassador Paul Bremer, in line with UN Security Council resolution 1483 (22 May), reversed Garner's thinking from hypothetical option four to de facto option one/two. On 1 June, the CPA emerged as the final, but interim, arbiter of power, much to the dismay of the Iraqis, who felt total disempowerment in the face of the UN resolution and the US move.

Again, barely a month later, Bremer moved one step forwards by the creation of the Iraqi Governing Council, the IGC (13 July), as a junior partner of the CPA. With the tide of violence on the upsurge and chaos on the loose, the CPA changed course yet again, signing this time an agreement to transfer sovereignty by 30 June 2004. These criss-crosses were a clear sign of a lack of political planning on part of the US, as well as a failure to objectively assess the reality of Iraqi nationalism or rationally anticipate post- war complexities.

Indeed, the CPA was too focused on stabilisation to indulge in laying out the institutional framework for liberalisation. One of the problems was, and still to some extent is, the host of unpredictable and uncontrollable social and economic forces that have emerged on the scene after half a century of single-party or military authoritarianism.

NEW POLARISATION: After 9 April, the focus of political polarisation has gradually shifted from opposing or supporting the Ba'ath regime into engaging or opposing the occupation authority in order to shape, influence, distort or hinder the transitional process. Several forces, hitherto cloaked in secrecy, soon emerged. More than 170 newspapers of all sorts, and more than 140 groups, associations and civil-society forces of every colour emerged, benefiting from the demise of the old monolithic hegemony.

Almost all ideological trends that characterised political life in Iraq from the twenties of the last century emerged in full force: liberals, monarchists, Qasimites (loyalists to General Abdul Karim Qassim), old pan-Arabists, Islamists, and the like. Newcomers, however, are also abundant. In addition to the former, ethnically-based politics (like those of the Assyrians and Turkomens), pan-Iraqi tribal associations and leagues (14 have emerged), faith-based movements and institutions, prominent among which was the institution of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, or the movement of the young and fiery cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, also made their appearance.

Issue-oriented new civil-society movements, such as those based on gender issues, the missing, the environment, the unemployed and the like, became active. Needless to say, remnants of the old Ba'ath party, above all those loyal to the person of the deposed president Saddam Hussein, also regrouped. The landscape looks like so much mumbo-jumbo. However, closer scrutiny reveals that a new polarisation has set the majority of social, institutional and economic forces into a mainstream current that engages the CPA to retrieve Iraqi sovereignty by means of peaceful institutional politics: negotiations, pressure, and, if need be, street politics.

This peaceful camp, while opposed to the continued occupation, distinguishes itself from two fringe but violent currents: the loyalists and the fundamentalists. Support for violence has been thin. It is only natural that a nation that has emerged from almost three major wars is distasteful about the prospect of yet another civil war, and is thirsty to have peace with itself and with the world.

Yet, this mainstream current is attacked on both flanks by the loyalists and the fundamentalists. But neither the return of the Ba'ath regime, nor the inception of a Taliban-like fundamentalist order, has any meaningful support. Both thrive on hardships, on the near absence of security, on a lack of an Iraqi sense of "ownership" and on some CPA blunders.

The mainstream is a plethora of forces with sundry interests. All compete for a share in the new, emerging political order to make up for past grievances. Now this main current is again polarising along new dividing lines of secularism versus Islamism, Iraqism versus communalism, and integrative federalism versus assimilative centralism. The situation is fraught with uncertainties, but one thing is clear: Ba'ath totalitarianism is over.

TOP-DOWN RESTRUCTURING: As the old power structures melted away, chaos, looting and violence, more or less rained down. After the fall of Baghdad, lawlessness was the norm. When the dust of battle had settled, the CPA initiated three levels of restructuring. The first focused on creating power structures on the municipal and provincial levels. Local councils had existed before, but they were controlled by the ruling party in terms of nominations, elections and operations. Now, communities were approached directly for their participation. The process of selection that followed was contested by the public, which took an interest in the process, vetoing many CPA- appointed governors of the provinces ( muhafaza ). In many instances, mass demonstrations unseated appointees and installed more representative figures. Grass-roots politics was thus spontaneously inaugurated.

The second process targeted the administration. One aspect was dismantling the major agencies of "legitimate" violence, the ministries of defense and of the interior (police and security), the presidential guard and special security corps, in addition to the ministry of information, the symbol of state hegemony over the very language of communication.

This was part of a plan to dismantle the old regime, dubbed de-Ba'thification, a term borrowed from US post-WWII experience in Germany. The approach was ideological rather than pragmatic, and it backfired and aggravated the sense of Iraqi disempowerment. Of course, it also inflated the ranks of the unemployed and worsened the security gap. The present increase in anti-Coalition violence stems, in part, from these drastic measures. However, on the other hand, new ministries were created, such as those for human rights and women's affairs. The ministry of justice was radically reorganised, and the education ministry quickly rehabilitated.

The third level was engaging the Iraqi Diaspora and native groups in the creation of the top-level of the Governing Council. This interim Council was the product of hard negotiations between Iraqis, the UN and the CPA, in which veto powers were used by most of the parties engaged.

These three levels, the municipal councils at the bottom, the governing council at the top, and the ministries in between, were as disconnected from the real reins of power as they were from each other in terms of processes, the social forces involved and jurisdiction. Re-aggregating them into one integrated working system may prove problematic.

IRAQI NATIONALISM: The selection of the Governing Council also ushered Iraq into a new, precarious era. For the first time, the composition of the highest body of governance, still symbolic though it was, was representative of Iraqi diversity. Sixteen parties were included, including Shias, Sunnis, Kurds, of liberal, Islamist, nationalist and leftist leanings. The method of selection had the aura of communalism and ethnicity, a quota-like system of power-sharing endangering the national fabric of Iraqi nationalism. Many social and ideological forces were also left out of the IGC, despite their willingness and readiness to be included. Iraqis also resented signs of the "communalisation" of politics on the Lebanese model. One way of avoiding this would be to build representation on a provincial basis, creating a sense of an all-inclusive Iraqi process, for Iraqi nationalism is a strong and vibrant force, as well as a benign one that unites the nation and gears segmented demands to inclusion while refining participatory mechanisms.

Under the Iraqi monarchy (1921-1958), such inclusion of all ethnic, communal and religious groups was observed under an archaic representative system that served the traditional classes, but disenfranchised the modern middle and working classes. The republican regimes (1958-1963) that followed improved the representation of the modern middle classes, but disturbed nation- building mechanisms that were inclusive of ethnic and religious groups. The Ba'ath regime (1968- 2003 ) destroyed both. Now it is necessary to reconstruct the system of representation and the order of inclusion anew. Thinking of nation-building in terms of quotas, that is, in terms of holistic religious, ethnic and communal segments, is insufficient and may prove counter-productive.

LIBERALISING THE ECONOMY: The CPA envisages a liberal polity embedded in a market economy, the rule of law, empowered civil society, and the free flow of information. But Iraq was not, or is not, only a totalitarian system anchored in a command economy; it is also a multi- ethnic, multi-communal, multi-religious society. Liberalising such a system involves several, overlapping aspects.

While the government-owned sector, failed and inefficient as it was, was left intact, a host of new initiatives have been taken to open up the market for investment and unfetter the central bank from central abuse and control. The former government issued paper money at will without reference to the central bank, sending the Iraqi Dinar into a downward spiral. The Dinar, valued US$3.1 in the 1980s, now stands at 1600 Dinar per dollar. The savings of the middle classes have thus been almost wiped out, and impoverishment has been massive.

Plans to distribute part of the country's oil revenues and tax these dividends are being considered. Yet, the CPA seems focused on the institutional infrastructure of liberalisation rather than on full-fledged measures to deconstruct the command economy in its entirety. Iraq's huge indebtedness is also a handicap. The former US secretary of state, James Baker, successfully negotiated the writing off of almost half of Iraq's US$130 billion in debts: a donors' conference held in Paris last year also came out with some $36 billion or so for reconstruction projects, $19 billion of which came from the US.

The security environment, however, has thus far impeded speedy reconstruction, and the unemployed, some 60% of the population, have also been active in making their case: we need jobs. Radical liberalisation without proper safety nets may transform these angry blocks into angry mobs tilting towards radical, mostly Shia, Islamism. Another problem is the centrally provided essential services that need to be kept running.

These and other structural changes have been overshadowed by the media's obsession with violence.

VIOLENCE: From its inception on July 13, to the signing of the agreement in mid November 2003, the IGC remained a junior partner under the veto powers of the CPA, acting on the basis of UN resolution 1483. However, as a result of mounting domestic pressures, the IGC demanded, and got the right, to form a cabinet and a constitutional committee in preparation for the transfer of sovereignty. Yet, both the cabinet and the constitutional committee were mere replicas of the IGC, and no real expansion was considered.

The power vacuum in the Arab part of Iraq was also glaring. While criminal violence waned, political violence surged, coming from various sources. The two major starting places were the loyalists and the fundamentalists, a mixture of domestic and foreign Salafi groups. Violence grew from a few attacks a day in June to 59 attacks a day in mid November. Thereafter, a drastic decline occurred to less than nine incidents per day, involving the use of firearms with or without casualties or material damage.

Public opinion came out gradually but forcefully against the violence. Local police and military units grew in numbers, and the random targeting of vital installations (water, electricity and oil), or the targeting of Iraqis, turned segments of the public in most hotbeds of violence against the attackers. A silent majority developed in those areas. While there is no shortage of hostility towards the occupation, there is a real shortage of support for the old regime or for the fundamentalists. Many underground networks, financed by the old regime, have also been uncovered and destroyed.

A general feeling has evolved in Iraq that institutional and peaceful politics is the better course to retrieve Iraqi sovereignty. Yet, hostile to the US invasion, Arab public opinion has shown unambiguous signs of sympathy for this destabilising violence, unwittingly creating a gulf between the mainstream sentiments of the Iraqis and the Arabs. The latter seem unwilling to see any means of conducting politics other than violence, and they seem disinclined to consider the ordeal of the Iraqis, who have been in a state of war since 1980.

RELIGION AND CONSTITUTION: Throughout the post-conflict period, religion has been the most active and mobilising force in the country, overshadowing liberal, centrist and other forces. On both sides of the communal divide, Islamist groups have been at the forefront. This rise of religion has, in fact, been a feature of Iraqi society since 1991. As the Ba'ath party lost much of its appeal, religious passions grew sharper. Mosque-goers trebled in number, and the government encouraged what it called "faith campaigns". Hundreds of new mosques were built at a time when the nation was starving under the UN sanctions regime.

The Saddam regime did its best to use and abuse religion, and a favourable cultural environment was waiting for the Islamist parties in the new circumstances. With continued financing from Iran, and possibly also from Saudi Arabia, Islamist groups are the best financed and best organised in Iraq. In addition, the institution of the highest religious authority, organised around Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has proved to be influential. Gradually, Sistani has emerged as a power broker. In the early days he issued fatwas calling on his followers to keep law and order, and prohibiting clerics from assuming administrative and government posts. Renowned for being apolitical, these gestures from Sistani were welcomed by the lay political class. However, Sistani changed direction when another of his fatwa s challenged the constitutional process initiated by the Governing Council in September. And in early January, he adamantly opposed US plans to form an interim constituent assembly through provincial caucuses, and called for direct elections.

Shia Islamist parties, above all the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) led by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, have also been putting pressure on Sistani to serve their plans for early elections in which, they think, they may well score a sweeping victory and be able to dominate the transitional process and "Islamise" the political system. Thus far, however, the Grand Ayatollah has been cautious and shown little confrontational spirit, and he accepted UN mediation in defusing the 2004 January crisis.

This crisis, over the new interim "basic law" drafted by the Governing Council, was opposed by five Shia members of the IGC, with Sistani taking a similar position. The interim constitution endorses Kurdish national rights, and empowers two thirds of voters in any three provinces (Kurdish, Sunni or otherwise) to veto any change in the constitution. This article is designed to safeguard the rights of minorities and oblige the majority to engage other groups in compromise. However, the Shia Islamist groups conceive of this article as a device to undermine "their" majority rule, understood in the mathematical sense of 50+1.

PROSPECTS: In the coming months, the IGC may commence negotiations over the "status" of the occupying forces. Shia Islamist groups, who have lost the constitutional battle, may respond in kind.

Centrist, moderate and secular forces are not wanting in Iraq, but they are fragmented. However, much of Iraq's future political development will depend on their vitality and unity; otherwise, Iraq will further polarise along federal-central, liberal-authoritarian and secular-Islamist lines. The US administration, on the other hand, is in a sensitive election year, and the June 30 deadline for the transfer of sovereignty has become politically vital for both the IGC and the US.

However, sovereignty is a complex thing, and for the IGC to enjoy it it will have to expand its ranks and take charge of the administration. Yet, there is still hardly any Iraqi army or intelligence and security apparatus to run the country with, and these are the agencies of power. In their absence, the IGC will be a government without instruments of national defense and domestic security.

Neighbouring countries are also concerned by the developing situation in Iraq. Turkey fears the rising star of the Kurds, and Iran is pushing hard to outflank the US through its Iraqi protégés. The Arab world, rulers and ruled, is very ambivalent: the rulers fear that a democratic Iraq will make them look like aberrations, intensifying pressures on them to reform, while the ruled, on the other hand, are too consumed by anti-US passions to show any sympathy with the Iraqis at large.

All in all, Iraq will emerge as a weak state but an empowered society, and it will be one focused on accelerating the return to normalcy. The war and sanctions generation in Iraq are thirsty for a civilian, prosperous life, and they want it here and now.