Inside out

"Spin it how you like, but reform," is the message Gamil Mattar* hears the West give the Arabs

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The Western reform offensive has delivered a volley of messages that may have flown over our heads, but were snatched out of the air by Arab officials. One of these messages tells Arab governments, "You have the right not to accept our recipe for reform in its entirety, but you do not have the right to refuse it in its entirety. If you do refuse the whole, we hope that you will take to heart the substance of those proposals you reject and abide by those proposals you accept." This message came with the codicil: "With regard to those reform projects the Arabs do accept, they will be answerable to third parties."

The first of these third parties is Europe, wringing its hands over the Middle Eastern conundrum so fraught with tension and conflict in all their Islamic, nationalist and terrorist dimensions. Seizing upon this anxiety, Washington invited the most important European nations to consult over its initiative, urging them to broach Arab officials over this initiative, as well as similar EU initiatives. It was only natural for the Americans, after having leaked the general outline of their initiative, to expect Arab leaders to go running to Europe. After all, the Arabs have long been infatuated with the game of playing both ends of the international balance of powers against the middle, a habit acquired from the Ottomans or perhaps that the Ottomans acquired from them. Thus, even before the Arabs got in touch with them, the Europeans were all set with an initiative of their own, but one that did not stray too far from the US initiative. In their contacts with Arab officials, the Europeans told them that they were no less concerned over reform in the Middle East than the Americans, but that they were eager to hear Arab reactions to both the US and EU initiatives. At the same time, some European parties wanted to hear more. They wanted to hear an Arab commitment to certain specific points before they would volunteer their services to help reach a compromise. I suspect that the Europeans had already obtained such a commitment from several Arab governments.

Perhaps, too, there was a codicil to the codicil, stating that Arab governments had to be answerable to one another. Fulfilment of this provision would come in the form of a reform programme, devised and promoted by a group of Arab governments. Not only would such a programme have to meet a certain set of minimal standards, it would also have to be more than a mere bi-, tri- or quadrilateral agreement in accordance with which the founding or signatory parties would commit themselves to considering the possibility of gradually phasing in some of its provisions at the appropriate times their specific security, social and economic circumstances permit. Rumour in official circles in Europe and among European diplomatic circles in Arab capitals has it that some European countries, and perhaps the US as well, have hinted at the need for no less than a clear and comprehensive declaration issued by Arab leaders. It has not escaped Western governments, or for that matter leaders of public opinion in the Arab world, that certain Arab governments will attempt to camouflage their resistance to reform by campaigning for the promulgation of an impassioned declaration condemning foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of Arab nations, or by simply ignoring the reform initiatives in their entirety. It has also been rumoured that certain parties have already begun to push for a vague, loosely worded, noncommittal statement, open to diverse interpretations, in the manner of most of the statements issued by the Arab League. This is not what the West wants. The West wants an unequivocal commitment to reform, although Arab governments may couch this in whatever face-saving formulas they wish -- such as how this commitment developed autonomously, inspired by a sincere dedication to national welfare, rather than by foreign or even domestic pressures.

Evidently, contacts between the West and various Arab governments focussed on a third item of concern: the Arab people and their civilian organisations. I imagine that it was put to Arab officials in no uncertain terms that they would be able to alleviate Western pressures and modify American conditions if they met Western reform demands half way. It was only natural, and expected, that the Western reform offensive meet a vehement outcry from Arab capitals, with the exception of those that have received the official certificate of approval stamped by Bush personally. However, it was simultaneously understood that this initial reaction would be followed by urgent measures to bring the Arab people into play in the dynamics of Western action and Arab reaction. The Western perception, conveyed to Arab officials, was that these governments should make clear pledges to their peoples and their organs of civil society to institute a number of political reforms. But, just in case these officials feared that their public would take such pledges to mean that their governments had caved into Western pledges, it would be perfectly understandable if they set the appropriate scene for some NGOs to convene, issue statements and resolutions, and otherwise mobilise public opinion behind a reform drive that would thus appear to emanate from Arab civil society and to respond to the will of the Arab people rather than to foreign arm-twisting.

European and American capitals were not overly irritated by the criticisms and objections levelled by Arab governments against their reform initiatives. They would have found the Arab governments' adamancy upon a gradual process -- a principle that would be underscored even in a re- convened Arab summit -- logical and reasonable. The liberal tradition in the West is inherently averse to sudden change and upheaval as it, itself, owes its development to the gradual transition from one phase to the next. In addition, the US experience in Iraq, which was to become the model for democracy in the Arab world, has confirmed that the ideas which the occupation authorities brought with them to Baghdad have failed to produce the desired result because they did not take into account the need to effect the more profound transition from an authoritarian to a liberal culture. I do not believe it an exaggeration to say that the developments that have occurred since the US leaked its outlines for a "Greater Middle East" suggest that Western powers are assured that their initiatives have delivered the necessary shock and have, therefore, achieved their first objectives.

It has been no secret over recent months that Washington hopes to "break" the bonds that bind people to governments that refuse to change or have not succeeded in changing. Some form of shock tactic was needed to produce this rupture, even if it triggered another bout of hatred against US policy, and I must confess that if I were one of the architects of Washington's reform offensive, I would feel quite smug at the effect I produced. Arab governments have scurried into action, some even making outright commitments and mobilising a segment of their civil society, as well as their security forces and media apparatuses, to exonerate themselves. They have taken a stance for change, even if their intent is to keep change as limited as possible or merely to gain time until the Western offensive peters out and the US presidential elections are over. At the same time, the peoples of the region are aware that their governments have made a commitment to others to implement reforms and that this commitment will be subject to a scrutiny that the peoples themselves have long been unable to exercise.

As for the implementation of the reforms themselves, according to one of the US officials responsible for formulating and leaking information on the initiative, this can be worked out through a process of negotiation over compromise solutions, priorities and timeframes. Moreover, he stated, it would be in the interests of the reform project that Arab governments have the right to claim that the reforms are domestically motivated and that the project is the continuation of a reform process that has been in effect ever since this or that government came into power. There is, however, a new factor that could exert considerable pressure on the parties seeking to take some of the force out of the reform offensive. In the wake of the recent massacre in Madrid the US has a powerful card to play in convincing its European allies to take a tougher stance against terrorism and on reform in the Arab and Islamic world. At the same time, I believe that the US will continue to resist any European efforts aimed at helping to reform the Arab League before individual Arab governments make solid inroads into putting their own houses in order, and before they have clarified their intentions with regard to full normalisation with Israel. In addition, Washington will want to see some progress in the transition from an Arab regional to a broader Middle Eastern order, preparatory to the transition to the Greater Middle East, each expanding phase of which will require its own appropriate regional organisation. As the region has already begun to move beyond its narrower Arab circumference, Washington undoubtedly believes that the existing regional institution -- the Arab League -- no longer serves any purpose but to obstruct the process of regional re- organisation.

The Bush administration can now tell the US electorate that it has won an Arab pledge to democratise. Bush can say that after the inroads that democracy has made in a number of Arab countries, which he had commended before, other countries in the region have been inspired by this success. At the same time, Bush will keep the American public's eyes trained on Syrian accountability, the spectre of Iran, the establishment of new institutions of government in Iraq and his administration's great record of service to Israel through its efforts to eliminate the Palestinian cause.

* The author The writer is director of Arab Centre for Development and Futurestic Research.