Greek-Cypriot tragedy

Greek and Turkish Cypriots failed to agree on a UN-sponsored plan to reunite the island nation, reports Michael Jansen from Burgenstock, Switzerland

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The possible outcome of the 24 April communal referenda on the United Nations plan for the reunification of Cyprus in a Swiss-style federation remains uncertain. While 75 per cent of Greek Cypriots say they will vote against reunification, they could change their mind if either President Tassos Papadopoulos or the two largest political parties, the communist Akel and the right-wing Democratic Rally, recommend acceptance. Although veteran Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash flatly turned down the plan, his people, bolstered by tens of thousands of mainland Turkish settlers, could vote in favour because the Turkish government strongly supports it.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan had hoped that after nine days of intensive talks at the exclusive Swiss mountain resort overlooking Lake Lucerne, the two sides would agree to recommend his plan to their communities. But this did not happen. While the Turkish side was prepared to endorse the plan, Greek Cypriots were not.

This is because the negotiations involved the Greek Cypriots and Turkey, the occupying power in the northern 37 per cent of the island since 1974, rather than Turkish Cypriots. As a result, the huge disparity in power and international influence between the two sides has been a major issue. Greek- Cypriot concerns over this imbalance were exacerbated when Ankara was granted its demands while a number of important Greek-Cypriot requirements were not incorporated into the plan.

Turkish Premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan achieved his aims by telephoning UN President George Bush and other world leaders, asking them to press Annan to accept Turkey's suggested revisions to the fourth version of his plan. Bush contacted Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis and British Prime Minister Tony Blair wrote to Papadopoulos asking them to agree to the plan, making both men all the more reluctant to do so.

Although Annan attempted to portray the comprehensive 200 page "Foundation Document" and 9,000 pages of laws and treaties as a balanced "win-win" document for both sides, few observers agreed with his assessment. The Turkish camp cracked open the champagne when the revised text began circulating, though Erdogan warned the Turkish press to refrain from triumphalism when the text was leaked to journalists. Nevertheless, the Turkish side had good reason to be pleased.

The eleven suggestions on key issues submitted by Turkey were all accepted, most of them at the expense of Greek Cypriots. In a briefing after the close of the talks on 31 March, Erdogan listed the gains made by the Turkish side. The most important was international recognition that "two different nations and two separate democracies" exist in Cyprus -- an acknowledgement Ankara has sought for nearly half a century. Turkey was also given assurances that the principle of separation, or "bi-zonality", would not be infringed or diluted by granting political rights to Greek-Cypriot refugees permitted to return to homes in the Turkish component state; that minority Turkish Cypriots would enjoy political equality with the majority Greek Cypriots; that Turkey would continue as a guarantor power; and that 68,000 mainland settler families would be allowed to remain while new settlers would be able to take up residence on the island.

One member of the Greek-Cypriot delegation said that the plan not only "permits Turkey to remain in occupation of the north but also to become a partner in the [Greek-Cypriot majority] south". The Greek-Cypriot fear is that there could be a return to political deadlock in the federal government if Turkey, which has always used the Turkish Cypriots as a Trojan horse, opposes specific policies. This happened when Cyprus became independent in 1960. The Greek Cypriots do not want a repetition of this situation that precipitated violence, division and ultimately, de facto partition. When asked if Ankara was serious about reaching a workable solution this time, leading mainland Turkish commentator Mehmet Ali Birand told Al-Ahram Weekly it was.

However, a Turkish-Cypriot journalist quipped, "It depends on which Ankara you mean." The generals and political elite still cling to the notion that the Turkish-Cypriot state in northern Cyprus will continue to be recognised while the present Justice and Development Party (AKP) government of Turkey seeks a settlement based on reunification- cum-camouflaged partition, legitimised by the international community.

It is ironic that the two parties most keen on solving the 40 year-old Cyprus problem are the moderate Turkish AKP, which has the backing of a majority of Turks, and the old- fashioned Greek Cypriot communist party, Akel, which enjoys the support of 35 per cent of Greek Cypriots. In the past both parties have been considered anathema by the US and the European Union. However, they are acceptable partners in the realpolitik of today because firstly, the Islamists may be able to deliver Turkey from the generals who have dominated the political scene since the modern republic was founded 80 years ago, and secondly, the communists may be able to persuade deeply sceptical Greek Cypriots to opt for the Annan plan. If the communists adopt a positive line, the right-wing Democratic Rally would follow suit, transforming the current "No" to a "Yes".

Cypriots from both communities realise that the international push to resolve the Cyprus problem has little or nothing to do with what happens on the island. On one hand, the AKP is determined to compel the generals' return to their barracks, enabling Turkey to be eligible for membership in the democratic EU. On the other, Greek-Cypriot backing for the Annan plan will lead to EU entry for a united Cyprus on 1 May, smoothing Turkey's prospects of membership. Furthermore, a truly democratic Turkey -- where the generals are firmly under the command of civilians -- could become an example for the Bush administration to cite when pressing for the democratisation of other Middle Eastern countries.