Why was the summit postponed?

The Arab summit crisis has placed new pressures on an already fragile Arab system. Mohamed Sid-Ahmed comments

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Are the Arab parties following the pattern set by the Europeans in the period preceding the Iraq war? At the time, the European capitals split into two camps, one led by Britain, which sided with the United States and followed it on the path to war, and one led by France and Germany, which opposed the war and refused to join the coalition.

Following Tunisia's shock announcement that the Arab summit would be "indefinitely postponed", a similar pattern seems to be emerging at the Arab level, with one grthon diplomacy is focussed on convocation of a summit and another questioning whether, given the deep anger in the Arab street following the murder of Sheikh Yassin, the time is right for a summit. The first group is led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria; the second is best represented by Tunisia.

The countries making up the first group enjoy the same sort of status in the Arab world as do France and Germany in Europe. They have sufficient political, demographic, economic clout to build a leading axis that could come forward with initiatives, propose policies and adopt independent stands. The countries in the second group, on the other hand, wield little influence at the pan- Arab level and are not prepared to take any action that would place them in Washington's bad books. We thus have some Arab countries behaving towards America much as Britain did in the run up to the Iraq war and others standing up to what they see as unwarranted meddling in the region's internal affairs. This dichotomy is particularly evident in the diverse reactions of various Arab countries to Washington's Greater Middle East Initiative, with some openly critical of the initiative and others arguing that it should not be rejected out of hand and that it might even be a welcome development.

In any conflict situation, states in today's world have little freedom of manoeuvre. Whether they like it or not, they have only one of two options: either to toe the American line or to stand up to it. There can be no middle ground, for, as far as the Bush administration is concerned, "whoever is not with us is against us." Moreover, standing up to the most powerful state on earth is a risky option that can be resorted to only up to a point and within given limits, as France and Germany found out.

After launching a major war in the region, the Bush administration has set itself the task of establishing a regional system to replace the one that was held prior to the war. The proposed system has been dubbed the Greater Middle East Initiative. Although the war succeeded in removing Saddam Hussein, it did not succeed in its stated objective of finding and dismantling his alleged arsenal of banned weapons, making it difficult for the Bush administration to claim a clear-cut victory. With his case for going to war effectively demolished and with memories of the deep rift his unilateral decision to go to war caused in the trans-Atlantic alliance, Bush was keen to bring his European allies on board his initiative from the start. To that end, he invited the EU to join America as a partner in its Greater Middle East Initiative so that together they could face up to the region Bush holds responsible for the spread of terrorism and the propagation of weapons of mass destruction.

Thus, the Middle East has become -- or is desired to become -- a platform for a confrontation between two huge entities; in the North, the Greater Middle East Initiative in conjunction with the European Union; and, in the South, a region where outstanding efforts are being furnished to bring together an Arab summit which is being resisted and undermined by a number of Arab countries, mainly the smaller ones, and particularly those with ties which relate them directly (that is, without passing through the Arab League) to the two parties of the North (especially America). This is the confrontation the region will have to contend with in the coming weeks and months.

In the light of these givens, we can guess at the reasons behind Tunisian President Zien Al- Abidine Bin Ali's decision to postpone the Arab summit indefinitely. No easy task, given that very little solid information on what actually transpired at the foreign ministers' preparatory meeting has filtered out. We have heard conflicting statements but no credible, coherent explanation for what is obviously an extremely serious development.

All the Arab parties have expressed astonishment and dismay at Tunisia's 11th hour decision to call off the summit, but all refrained from condemning it outright. The only question they raised was why the decision had been taken without former consultations and why Tunisia did not take any measures to ensure an exchange of views on the postponement, albeit afterhand. The parties were keen not to challenge Tunisia's right to host the summit if it wished to do so, in conformity with the provision introduced to the charter of the Arab League at a previous summit which allows the country chairing the summit to convene it on its territory.

It was against the backdrop of growing disarray in Arab ranks that Sharon took the decision to assassinate the Hamas spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. The timing was no accident. Sharon believed the assassination would fuel the anger of the Arab street, not only in Palestine, but throughout the entire Islamic world. By further radicalising the Arab street, the assassination would play a key role in deepening inter-Arab contradictions at a time the Arab states are required to adopt a common stand against the US plan for a Greater Middle East.

In the coming weeks and months, a series of extremely important global summit meetings will be held to discuss, among other things, how to re-organise the Greater Middle East, including a European summit, a G8 summit and a NATO summit. The Arab parties cannot afford to adopt a passive attitude towards such high level meetings which are expected to determine their fate for a long time to come.

Nor can they stand passively by as Sharon proceeds apace with his plans for the region, notably his planned unilateral pullout from most of Gaza's settlements on the grounds that the continued occupation of what is arguably the most densely populated spot on the face of the earth has become more of a liability than an asset. Whatever his motives, the pullout is a welcome step that all the concerned parties should try to build on. Even if for Sharon it represents the final territorial concession he is ready to make, for the Palestinians it is only a first step towards a settlement of the conflict.

Then there is the situation in Iraq, which is expected to become even more critical as we move closer to the legislative elections scheduled to be held next June as a first step towards Iraq restoring its national sovereignty. However, everybody agrees that meeting the deadline is impossible, not least because Iraq lacks the basic requirements to hold general elections. That means a possible partial US withdrawal from Iraq while the prerequisites for sovereignty are not fulfilled, a situation that could expose Iraq to fragmentation, internal turmoil and even civil war.

In conclusion, the prompt convocation of the Arab summit is a must, so that the Arab parties can participate in the critical negotiations that will decide the fate of the Middle East in the period to come. this will remain impossible as long as the Arab countries are divided into two camps: a minority determined to convene the summit at once and a majority which seem to believe that postponing it is less of a threat than caving in to the demands of radical forces.