The Shia dimension

Until now the US has played one Iraqi community off against the other, but in the longer term this policy is unsustainable. Civil war won't help anyone, not even Washington, writes Abdallah El-Ashaal*

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As residents look on, US Marines conduct house searches for weapons in Falluja, on Monday 12 April 2004.

A year after the invasion, things are taking a turn for the worst in Iraq. At one side of the stage stands the US, determined to stay, to implement a democratic model of governance and export it to the rest of the region. At the other side stands the Iraqi resistance, defiant, enigmatic. Other domestic and international forces mill around in between, variable, making up their minds as they go.

The US is adamant that Iraqi resistance is a form of terror that must be quashed; that it has to rid the country of this terror just as it rid it of Saddam's horrors. On the first anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, President Bush told the American people that the conflict in Iraq is one between the supporters of freedom and the supporters of violence and chaos. He went on to link Iraqi resistance with the Palestinian struggle -- with other forms of hostility to Israel and the United States. For the US president, all these are parts of one and the same jigsaw puzzle: terror is a whole, indivisible phenomenon.

As the US tries to quash Iraqi resistance, it has to handover the country's administrative affairs, under the watchful eyes of L Paul Bremer, to Iraqis. It is also trying to get the UN involved in administrative, security, construction and political matters. The US is also prodding its allies to help out with military and security tasks in Iraq.

Iraqi resistance deserves a closer look. Arab policy on Iraqi resistance is particularly incoherent. Arab governments do not recognise Iraqi resistance. Arab political discourse omits any reference to that resistance, out of concern for US sensitivities. Even the mere mention of such resistance would bring into question the legalities of resistance and occupation -- would remind the world that resistance is legitimate whereas occupation isn't.

Remarkably, Arab nations, without exception, are glad to see Iraqis resist US occupation. The Arab public does not accept the US contention that occupation is legal and that it alone is the legitimate authority in the country. The US still finds it odd that Arabs have reservations about the Interim Governing Council (IGC). The US view, which is shared by many Arab politicians and writers, is that occupation is better than dictatorship. Occupation, we are told, is the safeguard against chaos and civil war, and it has to go on until Iraq stands on its own feet.

So far, the Iraqi resistance has been ambiguous in form, dubious in identity. There is no consensus that resistance is what it claims to be. Some believe that the continued frictions are leftovers of the conflict between the US and the deposed regime. Even the Iraqis are divided over the matter. The Shia and Kurds see themselves as victims of Saddam's regime and are hopeful that the occupation will ultimately rehabilitate them and give them a fair share of power. This point is one the Americans use to break up Iraqi unity, setting the scene for civil war.

The Kurds have been of help to the Americans against the Iraqi army and proved useful in intelligence gathering. The Shia assumed a stance of neutrality, on the grounds that it is religiously and morally unacceptable to support a foreign invader in one's own homeland. Additionally, the Shia remain suspicious of US intentions towards Iran, their staunch ally. Yet the Shia were happy to see Saddam go, and pleased also to have the largest number of representatives in the IGC, a tribute to their numerical superiority.

For all its ambitious schemes for Iraq, the US has mismanaged the power transfer. It began by naming members of the IGC on behalf of the Iraqi people. It then forced the Council to approve the interim constitution, a document containing a myriad of concepts detrimental to Iraqi interests, including the assertion that only Iraqi Arabs are part of the Arab nation. This latter point did not seem to bother the Shia. What made the Shia reject the interim constitution was the special status given to the Kurds; a status the US claims is a fair compensation for the massacres the Kurds suffered under Saddam.

The Shia suspects that Washington wants the Kurds to be Iraq's most powerful faction, a fear reinforced by the fact that the Council's foreign minister is of Kurdish origins. The Shia is also apprehensive that Washington may use them as a pawn in the Iranian question. This is why the Shia, soon after the constitutional crisis, called for elections, not a referendum on the interim constitution. The US initially demurred, then allowed the UN to intervene, finally acquiescing to the demands of Ayatollah Al-Sistani, so as to appease the Shia.

Instead of rewarding the Shia for their stance during the invasion, Washington proceeded to break their ranks. Since early April, Washington has been impatient with the Shia followers of Muqtada Al-Sadr, a young cleric that the US sees as a possible rival to Al-Sistani. If Al- Sadr is neutralised, the Shia may rally around the more moderate Al-Sistani; or so the US thinks. The Americans started by confiscating Al-Sadr's newspaper Al-Hawza, then used force against peaceful demonstrations by Al- Sadr's allies and arrested his top aides. Finally, US forces surrounded Najaf and Karbala in the hope of eliminating Al-Sadr's own militia. President Bush said these actions were a sign of his government's resolve, immediately ordering more US troops be dispatched; a move as likely to succeed in any normal election year as to backfire. But this one?

In contrast to the Palestinian resistance, which has the unanimous support of all Arab governments and nations, the Iraqi resistance is controversial. The Shia as a whole may prefer to pursue a less violent line, one of political pressure rather than confrontation with the occupation. Washington, meanwhile, is wagering on a split within Shia ranks. Should the Shia, however, join the resistance en masse, the scope of resistance would grow to a point at which other countries and the UN would have to rethink their policy on Iraq. In which case, the likelihood of sectarian clashes in Iraq would rise. If elections are held, the Shia and Sunnis will come out on top, being the majority. Can they live with one another?

Would Iraq turn into a new Vietnam? There are differences between the two cases. One is that the Vietnamese were all united against the Americans. The Iraqis aren't. Another is that the Soviets and the Chinese helped Vietnam. In Iraq, the Americans are virtually unchallenged, and can even call on the Israelis for help. Still, the future will be decided by the course the resistance is going to take. If reinforced by the power of the Shia community, the resistance is going to pose a serious challenge to the US. Washington's dogged determination to crush the resistance at any cost -- conduct that conflicts with international norms and violates the commitments of the US as an occupying force -- may reinforce sympathy for the Iraqi resistance, turn all of Iraq into a battle scene, and embarrass, if not alarm, US allies.

Acts of willful mass murder against the Iraqis must be stopped, even if Washington says it's only trying to pacify the country. The current situation calls for an active diplomatic effort, with the involvement of both the UN and the Arab League. Iraq has suffered enough. Score-settling between Americans and select Iraqi combatants is not going to improve life for Iraqis, nor speed up the country's return to normalcy.

* The writer is a veteran diplomat and former assistant to the Egyptian foreign minister.