Sharon's land grab

---

By threatening to liquidate Arafat, Sharon makes it clear that he wants to eliminate all resistance figures in the occupied territories, deprive the Palestinians from the one leadership they agree upon, and foment violence and instability. Sharon wants the international community to support his plans to keep Israeli settlements in the West Bank and deprive the refugees of their right to return. His are the actions of a man interested in land grabbing, not peace.

Had Sharon detained Sheikh Yassin and Abdul-Aziz Al-Rantisi, the hope for a negotiated peace would not have been so totally snuffed. But this is what he wanted. Abdul-Aziz Al-Rantisi was the 168th Palestinian leader to be assassinated, in the course of a bloodbath. The Palestinians are dying to keep their land, not because they want the violence to continue. This is what the US president failed to grasp when he absolved Sharon, with written guarantees, from commitments to the 1967 borders and the refugees.

Land is what the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is about, the violence an incidental by-product. Should Israel commit itself to removing all its settlements in the occupied territories unconditionally, the violence would fade away. But Sharon does not want that. So long as he remains in power, the Palestinians and Israelis would have no hope of settling their conflict. Sharon's policies, and his constant threats to Arafat, would take the violence to unthinkable dimensions and push the region to the brink of war.

The Palestinians should make it clear that they have no intention of giving up their land, and the Arabs should help them in every way they can. One thing the Palestinians could do is to declare a state of total civil disobedience on every inch of the land internationally recognised as theirs. Another thing the Palestinians could do is to disband their national authority and ask the UN to take charge, with the help of other international organisations. The Namibian model of civil disobedience can be repeated in Palestine.