Iraqi army lite

Former Baathist army officers are to be incorporated into a new Iraqi army. Judith Neurink interviewed several who are not in Baghdad and Najaf

---

Click to view caption

In a makeshift refugee camp in Baghdad, an Iraqi refugee from Falluja kisses her baby doll, donated by the Iraqi Red Crescent. Fighting in Falluja broke out again on Monday

Officers of the former Iraqi army are being trained for a new national defence force. Many in Iraq, and beyond, believe that the officers should be banned because they were members of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party. Those who defected and worked with the Americans in last year's war, however, are now to be rewarded with a position in Iraq's new army.

The coalition authorities in Iraq this week appointed the leadership of Iraq's new army. A Kurdish general who organised the Kurdish fighters since 1973 will head them, with a Sunni Arab as the chief of staff and a Shia as his deputy. Each had already left Saddam Hussein's army before the last war, unlike dozens of officers who are now being trained to join the new army.

"They are my friends," says Saad Baryas Al- Waaly, 37, which is also why he will not furnish any details. But the former army doctor who is now working in a civil hospital in Najaf does acknowledge that quite a few of his former colleagues are now being trained in Jordan and Iraq. They will be the new officers in an army that is supposed to consist of around 40,000 men.

How many former officers are being trained is not clear, but the fact that they are involved in the building of Iraq's new army illustrates a change of policy. In June last year the American chief administrator in Iraq, L Paul Bremer, decided that members of Saddam's Baath Party would be excluded from any role in the building of a new Iraq. Army officers were most certainly members of the party: it was a condition of the job.

"Many just fought for their country. They thought the former government was trying to do the best for the country but have been bitterly disappointed," says Al-Waaly. He thinks their knowledge is of great importance to the new army: "They know the country, its geography, its neighbours," he adds. The officers who were chosen had decided not to fight the Americans last year, he noted. "Some already were in contact with the Americans before the war, and some during. I know them -- they are good men. Now some of them are training for the new army. Others joined the police or the civil defence force," he said.

In Baghdad, this opinion was echoed by a former colonel of the Republican Guard; a man who wished to be referred to as Abu Abdullah. In April 2003 he stayed until the very end at the head of the Fateh Al-Morim, a unit that led three brigades of the Republican Guard. Is it a coincidence he has been able to find a job neither in the new army nor the police? The brigades he commanded days before the fall of Baghdad dissolved. A year later he continues to deny that this was the result of extensive desertion. He mentions "communication problems" and "soldiers who had been on leave and could not return to their units because of the fighting".

Abu Abdullah has been told about officers training with the Americans, but "I live in a military complex with 200 officers, and none of us is involved in this." Yet his brother-in-law, who was also with the Republican Guard, has been recruited by the British in Basra for the Iraqi navy.

The fact that he has not been able to return to his former position strongly implies that those who did not work with the Americans during the war will not be picked out to work with them now. Even though Abu Abdullah, 37, had a "very positive" interview with an American army commission, he was rejected on the grounds of his age. An application for a position in the new police corps was -- after months of positive interviews and tests -- also rejected, again officially because he is over 35 years old.

Perhaps understandably, Abu Abdullah's bitterness is because of this treatment. Like most members of the former army, he has financial problems. Although the authorities have recently started paying the soldiers again -- after cancelling their wages for months -- Abu Abdullah has only been paid twice in the past year. Like many other former officers he is forced to earn money as a taxi driver.

Poverty in combination with the bitterness of defeat and occupation has driven a lot of his former colleagues towards the resistance, Abu Abdullah says. As an example he mentions Mohamed's army, of which he only says that he "has read their name on the walls". The resistance will not cease if the Americans leave, he predicts, but will strike at the Iraqi's who came with them, like Interim Governing Council member Ahmed Chalabi. "It is a circle. The resistance against Saddam is in power now and this calls for the resistance of the former power."

The new army cannot play a role in fighting this, he says. Both he and Al-Waaly are critical towards the new army: the number of 40,000 men, to their minds, is much too low, especially as this includes the border police and the civil defence forces. "This is no army, but a police force," says Al-Waaly angrily. In comparison, Abu Abdullah recalls the two million soldiers Saddam had in active service. "You cannot defend a country with such a small force -- no way. And they will be armed only with Kalashnikovs. We had two million men and rockets, and yet we lost our country! Iraq will be like Switzerland. Only beating us about a little will be enough for us to open the door."

Both men are convinced the Americans do not want a real army, but disagree on the reasons behind this. The former Republican Guard points to internal Iraqi politics: the militias of the Kurdish leaders Talabani and Barzani and of Ahmed Chalabi will make up an important portion of the small, new army. And these leaders are very close to the Americans. "They are afraid a real army will kick them out as soon as possible."

But Al-Waaly makes a link to Israel, which to him -- and a lot of Iraqis -- is the main reason for last year's US-directed attack. "We expect some action by the Israelis," Al-Waaly says. "They want revenge for the loss of the land of Ibrahim, the Land of Ur, from whence they were evicted centuries ago."

This is not quite the story as told in the Bible, but to many Iraqis this is the simple truth: "The Israeli plan is to extend their nation to the Euphrates. And to make this possible, the Americans will not allow us to have an army that can really defend our country."