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Arabs have missed many opportunities to redress the shifting balance of international politics. All is not lost, writes Mustafa El-Feki*

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The Arabs are caught up in a vicious cycle, hemmed in by transformation and change abroad and the object of international scrutiny and, today, numerous foreign initiatives. Only when they adopt new attitudes and policies towards powers with which they have been dealing for centuries will they become able to open new horizons and prospects for healthier international relations. I have chosen two Asian and two African countries to illustrate the rethinking we must bring to Arab foreign relations: China and India, Ethiopia and South Africa.

China, the world's most populous country, is predicted by many to become a great power within a decade or two if it can keep its current growth rates up and inflation down. Although the plethora of small and light Chinese manufactures that have pervaded international markets testify to this possibility, the Chinese themselves strongly reject the notion that their country could become a superpower. That, they say, is a reflection of "imperialist thinking", and does not reflect the Chinese character. Although they may strive towards economic prowess, they have no global ambitions. Rather, they perceive economic might as a means to realise reasonable levels of prosperity for their billion and a half people and to remain an influential power within the Asian sphere.

One point that regularly crops up in the preparatory conferences for the Arab summit is the need to strengthen Arab-Chinese relations. Just as regularly, this supposedly marginal point is deferred from one year to the next. China under Mao Tse-Tung and Chou En-Lai was an unswerving supporter of the Palestinian cause and staunch opponent to the Zionist movement and international imperialism. The Arabs can no longer be confident of such support. The current Chinese prime minister recently spent more than five days in Israel, during which time he swam in the Dead Sea and otherwise courted Israeli affections in the hope of gaining access to American technology. Like many others, Chinese leaders have come to believe that the way to Washington's heart passes through Tel Aviv.

Yet, despite this shift in the Chinese stance, the Arabs have done little through diplomatic channels or the press to encourage Beijing back to its historic support for their cause. I am not suggesting that China has become pro- Israeli. But it is certainly no longer as pro-Palestinian. Clearly, the Arabs need to formulate a new policy towards this country that appears destined to have an increasingly powerful impact on the course of international politics.

Having served as an advisor to the Egyptian Embassy in New Delhi over a quarter of a century ago, I experienced first hand extensive Indian sympathy for the Palestinian people. Indeed, the late Faisal Aweida, Palestinian ambassador to India, and his predecessor, the celebrated intellectual Dr Clovis Maqsoud, had virtually immediate access to the Indian prime minister's office. Today, New Delhi stands on the other side on the Arab-Israeli conflict, having established strategic and military relations with Israel. To a large extent, we are to blame for this shift, handling the Indian-Pakistani conflict through Islamic blinkers thereby driving India into the embrace of Israel on the principle, "The enemy of my enemy is a friend." It would serve us well to recall today that India contains some 150 million Muslims who have yet to receive approval for admittance into the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.

Numerous indicators, as well as my own visit to the Indian capital in 2003, testify that India is poised to become a major power, not only in south and west Asia, but also in the much-touted Greater Middle East. Not only is New Delhi readying itself to play policeman in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf, its security apparatuses have proven themselves highly adept in the pursuit of Muslim extremist organisations.

The Arabs must act now to revise their policy towards India in the hope of reviving our previous stock of goodwill and mutual cooperation and curbing India's developing bonds with Israel. There is no reason why we should court the animosity of India, especially considering our historic friendship, as epitomised by the fact that India, along with Egypt and Yugoslavia, came together to form the kernel of the Non-Aligned Movement. Instead of leaving India to lay down a red carpet for Sharon, Arab leaders should also make their way to New Delhi in the interest of strengthening Arab-Indian ties of friendship and cooperation.

By Ethiopia, I refer not only to the country but the entire Horn of Africa. This area is of great strategic importance, located as it is at a highly critical crossroads between the Arab and African worlds. It is also fundamental to the security of the Red Sea, that strategic strait that links the Arabs, through successive waves of migration, to the eastern coast of Africa. Nor should we forget that Egypt and Sudan are dependent on the source of the Nile in the Ethiopian plateau or that Somalia and Djibouti -- two nations from the Horn of Africa -- are members of the Arab League, with Eritrea poised to become a third. Simultaneously, the Arabs must bear in mind that, since the 1960s, Israel has steadfastly sought to infiltrate this sensitive area making considerable inroads in this regard in the time of Emperor Haile Selassie. It is time that the Arabs took a hard look at the facts and adopt a more realistic and practical policy towards their southeastern gateway.

In terms of South Africa, despite of the fact that the country shares a continent with several Middle Eastern nations, it has been virtually absent from the international and continental political arena for nearly 20 years because of its policy of apartheid. Eventually, it sought to emerge from political isolation through the aggressive pursuit of a policy that capitalised on its economic and technological prowess. Soon, it emerged to the forefront of a belt of emerging economies of the South, with India to the east and Brazil to the west, as it fought rivalries in its own continent. Apartheid Africa was heavily dependent on Israel, its peer in institutionalised racism, to the extent that it was commonly believed, until South Africa abandoned its nuclear programme and Africa was declared a nuclear free zone in April 1996, they cooperated closely in the development of nuclear arms.

Despite the end of South African apartheid, Pretoria has not been entirely true in its relationship with the Arabs. Mandela may be a highly charismatic figure, but he has demonstrated little enthusiasm for Palestinian or other Arab causes. This consideration alone should compel the Arabs to become less standoffish towards South Africa. Perhaps, in striving towards a more cooperative relationship, Egypt and other North African countries might reduce the bill they are now paying in the course of heated competition over political seats and athletic honours.

The four examples cited above illustrate the need for Arabs to set their foreign relations on a more realistic and dynamic footing. In all instances we must bear in mind that for many reasons Arab causes do not have the same international appeal they had under the climate of the Cold War and that support for the Palestinian cause has noticeably declined. A fresh approach, on the other hand, may go a long way to reviving lost support. Whether that is true or not, the main point I want to stress is that a revision of our conduct of international relations is far more vital than many believe, not least because it will reveal how past shortcomings in our attitudes towards others contributed to our present predicament.

* The writer is chairman of Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee.