Sharon's predicament

The Arab protagonists are not the only ones facing intractable problems, writes Mohamed Sid-Ahmed

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Sharon hoped the Likud referendum on his disengagement plan would consolidate his power base and that he could use his party's approval of the plan to bring Israel's extreme right- wing factions into line without having to make concessions to forces on the left of his coalition government. But his gamble did not pay off: he suffered a resounding defeat in the poll, with 59.5 per cent of party members voting against the plan versus only 38.5 per cent in favour. Far from weakening the Israeli right, the outcome of the referendum has strengthened its political clout. The rejection of Sharon's disengagement plan by an overwhelming majority of his right-wing constituency also proves that his policy of appeasement towards the far right and the concessions he has consistently made to the settler movement is counterproductive. It would be no exaggeration to say that Sharon is now facing the worst political crisis of his career.

The Israeli prime minister believed that limiting the referendum to Likud Party members would assert the ruling party's control of the decision-making process and the exclusion from the process of forces standing on its left. He also believed it would give him greater leverage over the far right factions who are opposed in principle to any Israeli withdrawal from any of the occupied Palestinian territories. Instead, the referendum has revealed that the deepest contradiction in Israeli society today is between Sharon, long regarded as the most prominent spokesman of the Israeli right, and the settler movement and its supporters, who are even more extremist in their right-wing views than the prime minister. Sharon's overriding concern now is how to heal the breach in the ranks of the Israeli right.

Though badly shaken by the results of the referendum, Sharon announced that he would not step down. His immediate reaction was to try and exact the price for his failure from the Palestinians by coming forward with a pared down plan for a "minidisengagement". Instead of pulling out of 21 settlements in Gaza, he proposed limiting the pullout to only three, and instead of four West Bank settlements, he proposed pulling out of only two. But the amended plan pleased no one, neither the right-wing extremists opposed to any pullout, who warned Sharon against trying to "bypass the outcome of the ballot," nor the opposition Labour Party, which, according to its chairman, Shimon Peres, will "support only a full-scale disengagement and not a limited version in a future Knesset vote", and certainly not the Palestinians. The Americans could not have been happy either with the truncated disengagement plan. Bush had supported Sharon's referendum before it was actually held on the grounds that it would be a first step towards a still wider pullout. The drastically reduced scope of the disengagement can hardly be associated with the idea of a withdrawal.

Likud's rejection of Sharon's disengagement prompted Peres to call for a general election, on the grounds that if the partisans of a pullout from Gaza constitute a minority within the Likud, they constitute a substantial majority (estimated by some as 80 per cent of the electorate) in Israeli society as a whole. However, Sharon has too much riding on his disengagement plan to let his defeat in the Likud poll stand in the way of its implementation. Even before the results were out, he had his deputy Ehud Olmert announce that the prime minister would seek a nationwide referendum if the Likud vote failed. Proponents of this course of action argue that the Likud referendum is an internal party matter that is not binding on the government. As to Peres's call for a general election, Sharon would only consider this as a last resort. Although it could well result in his reelection, the idea of using the opposition in order to push a plan rejected by his own party through goes against the grain. The irony is that Sharon, who came up with the idea of a party referendum in the first place to liberate himself from any political commitment towards forces expected to oppose him in the difficult negotiations ahead, now finds himself more dependent on these forces than ever before.

Peres, for his part, is not averse to reaching some sort of compromise with Sharon. He has collaborated with the Likud on more than one occasion and has even served in a Likud-led coalition government under Sharon. If he can reach a power-sharing agreement with the prime minister, there will be no need to call for an early election. The two men are equally interested in reaching agreement.

Both are keen to participate in the decision- making process. Both are keen to withdraw from many of the Gaza settlements. Both are keen, for different reasons, to prevent an extreme right- wing leadership, such as Netanyahu, from taking over the reins of power. Finally, both realise that Israel's withdrawal from Gaza will allow it to consolidate its continued occupation of the West Bank and enable it to gobble up greater chunks of Palestinian territory.

For the beleaguered Israeli prime minister, a power-sharing agreement with Labour to form a national unity government under his leadership is certainly a lesser evil than the limited partial disengagement he would have to settle for without Labour's support. Indeed, it seems to be the only option open to him. He is being pulled in two opposite directions by his coalition partners, with the religious parties insisting that he honour the results of the referendum and the secular right-wing party Shinui insisting that he push ahead with the disengagement plan. Its chairman, Justice Minister Yosef Lapid, said that Likud members will not decide the fate of the country and warned that the rejection of the plan will harm Israel's credibility with the US. He also warned that if Sharon gives up on the plan in the light of the dismal results of the Likud referendum, Shinui would have to reconsider its future in the coalition government.

Thus, whether he complies with the demands of the pro- or the anti-disengagement plan camp, Sharon knows he risks the disintegration of his coalition government. As he tries to wriggle his way out of the fix in which his ill- fated decision to hold a party referendum placed him, Sharon is keeping his cards close to his chest, announcing only that he will come forward with an alternative plan by the end of the month.

Meanwhile, the International Quartet held a meeting in New York on 3 May, at which the parties were represented at their highest level, the US by Colin Powell, the EU by Xavier Solana, the UN by Kofi Annan and Russia by its new Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. The meeting was described beforehand as very important and as providing a rare moment of opportunity that should not be wasted. Earlier, about 50 retired US diplomats addressed a letter to Bush criticising his administration's policy towards the Middle East and warning that his "unabashed support" of Sharon is costing America its credibility, prestige and friends. The Quartet meeting produced little. It reaffirmed the four parties' support for Sharon's proposal to evacuate most of the Gaza settlements and a few in the West Bank, but added that the Sharon initiative should lead to a complete evacuation from Gaza and be a step towards the implementation of the two-state vision along the lines defined by the roadmap.

But what the Israeli leadership apprehends most in the present context of failure is the meeting scheduled to be held on 17 May between Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei and US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, the highest ranking American official to meet the Palestinian Authority's leadership since Bush came to power. Some Israeli officials have expressed concern that this meeting could be the result of a growing US awareness that attempts to isolate Arafat have proved to be counterproductive and have made the resumption of negotiations all the more difficult. Instead of containing terrorism, this policy has contributed to its propagation and intensification. Bush has often spoken of Sharon's "courage" in coming forward with his Gaza disengagement plan. Would he be ready to exhibit courage in removing the ban on dealing with Arafat and thus release negotiations from their present impasse?