Russia remote

Does Moscow -- barely a shadow of its former self -- have a coherent foreign policy, asks Hussein Ahmed Amin*

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Does Russia, today, have anything resembling the foreign policy doctrine it had before the collapse of the Soviet Union and disintegration of the Eastern bloc? Can we detect remnants of Soviet foreign policy in Russia's actions today?

Many in the Arab world mourn the loss of Russia on the international political stage. It was the superpower that acted as an effective counterweight to the United States and the Western bloc, one that Arabs could count on to support their causes and alleviate the impact of Washington's absolute support for Israel. Today, in the absence of that powerful check, the arrogance and belligerence of the US's bosom buddy, Israel, has escalated beyond bounds, the US and Israel busy venting their venom against one Arab state and Arab people after another. How does Russia stand with respect to this?

True, following the US-British invasion of Iraq, Moscow recalled its ambassadors from Washington and London for consultation, a palpable sign of its anger at that military action which was taken without notifying it in advance. Russian officials simultaneously voiced their apprehension over the consequences of America's unilateral heavy-handedness outside the framework of the UN. However, Russia's protest essentially stopped there. It soon sent its ambassadors back to London and Washington and President Putin, in spite of the sympathy some of his ministers aired on behalf of the Arab point of view, declared that he was not prepared to let any temporary disturbance disrupt the excellent relations between his country and the US.

Are there any principles or guidelines that orient Russian foreign policy today? Are there specific interests that policy planners in Moscow have pinpointed, prioritised and are working towards protecting, as is clearly the case with, for example, Japan, Italy, Sweden and Denmark? At times it appears that the contours of the foreign policies of Nepal and Comoros are easier to detect that those of Moscow's foreign policy today.

The leaders of the Soviet Communist Party held, rightly, that foreign policy was complementary to domestic policy. Both aimed to promote the same interests and objectives, if their respective means towards that end varied. After rising to become the second most powerful nation in the world after WWII, Marxism was Russia's ideological engine for its foreign policy. Whether they availed themselves of channels of diplomacy, war or intrigue, Russian leaders regarded it as their right to influence the affairs of other nations, through instructions to the communist parties in those nations, engineering coups d'état, backing national liberation movements, or merely through the provision of financial, technological or military aid. Nor would they pass up any opportunity to aggravate tensions between other countries and the US-led Western bloc and NATO.

Today, Moscow -- barely a shadow of its former self as the core of an empire -- is compelled to eke out a role in international events commensurate with its diminished powers, its feeble economy and deteriorating social conditions. Although it has yet to identify this role, it has frequently found itself obliged by the turns of international events to adopt what can only be loosely termed a "foreign policy" and may more accurately be described as ad hoc stances. In addition, in the eras of Gorbachev and Yeltsin in particular, Russian foreign policy such as existed seemed more often than not a product of the rivalries and power struggles within ruling circles rather than a reflection of identifiable interests.

Count Sergey Witte, who played a leading political and economic role under the last two Russian Czars, Alexander III and Nicolas II, famously said, "There is no Russia without its empire." If that is correct, what can fill the void created by the dissolution of the Soviet Union? What kind of foreign policy can it adopt now that it has recoiled into its old borders?

Gorbachev delineated the essential outlines. Henceforward, Russian foreign policy would abandon all the principles upon which it had rested until then. Moscow's positions would no longer be based on Marxist ideology or its antagonism towards other ideologies. It would relinquish its support for the workers' struggle in other nations, give up those allies in Eastern Europe and those Soviet republics in Central Asia that had become such an economic burden, abandon its feverish attempt to catch up with the West in the arms race. Gorbachev's foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, stunned the world when he unveiled Russia's new thinking on foreign policy. The exercise of military might was a thing of the past; economic might was now the main criterion for assessing the power of the state and close cooperation with international financial institutions and the major industrialised nations was now the way to confront the various serious dangers facing the world, such as terrorism, religious extremism, nationalist fanaticism, the arms race and threats to the environment. To continue to insist on labelling one camp as socialist and pacifist and another as imperialist and bellicose is both false and counterproductive. And to continue to extend aid and support to poor and underprivileged nations, as had been the Soviet Union's policy in the past, only added another encumbrance to Russia's heavily strained economy and worked counter to the requirements of globalisation.

On the basis of this platform, Gorbachev abandoned Russia's commitment to superiority in mid-range nuclear weaponry, withdrew Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, began withdrawing Soviet air and ground forces from the countries of Central Europe and abandoned all resistance to the re-unification of Germany. In 1991, Gorbachev approved the imposition of economic sanctions against its former ally, Iraq, because of the latter's invasion of Kuwait and, subsequently, supported foreign military actions inside Iraqi territory.

As Yeltsin succeeded Gorbachev and Putin succeeded Yeltsin, Russia continued its search for a new image commensurate with its new status and circumstances. However, as long as that image remained indistinct and conditions remained unstable, it was evident that foreign policy would remain improvised and ad hoc, rather than grounded upon an edifice of conceptual foundations delineating the aims and aspirations of the state. Both Yeltsin and Putin encountered enormous difficulties in identifying a set of national objectives. Perhaps, all they were able to perceive clearly was Russia's desperate need for material assistance from the West in order to avert total economic collapse. Hence the priority they accorded to courting partnership with the West by striving to win its friendship and confidence, cooperating with the Warsaw Pact's erstwhile enemy NATO, and joining the IMF and the G7.

The US and other Western nations heartily welcomed Moscow's overtures and signalled their readiness to open the floodgates for aid on the condition that Russia deregulate its economy, float its currency, follow the prescriptions of the IMF and adopt democratic systems of government. It was also to be implicitly understood that Moscow was not to act contrary to American policies towards one area of the world or another, such as Iraq, Sudan and Libya, and as a gesture of good will in this regard, Yeltsin re-established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1991.

Such obsequiousness would inevitably arouse the repugnance of a large sector of Russian public opinion, which is making it increasingly clear that it mourns those days when the will of the Russian people was free to express its condemnation of American policy, to support other peoples threatened by US imperialism and to rally together nations into a united front against US designs. In addition to the manifestations of such nostalgic wistfulness, some opposition parties are advocating certain practical steps towards enabling Russia to regain its weight in world affairs. Russia, they maintain, should strengthen its ties with China and the countries of the East and the South, in general, revive its ties with the Arab world, give priority to cooperation with the EU over cooperation with Washington and put the breaks on headlong economic deregulation at the expense of national and social security. Nonetheless, Arabs should not give into the futile hope that Russia will support them effectively in the short run, for that is beyond its means as long as conditions in Russia have not settled sufficiently to give rise to a clear perspective on the nation's true interests, which is indispensable to a cohesive foreign policy.

In the long run, however, although Russia may seem like an America puppet-state today, it is not beyond imagining that it become a superpower again.

* The writer is a senior Egyptian diplomat (rtrd.) and political analyst.