Post-withdrawal scenarios

Samir Ghattas outlines the likely results of Sharon's plans to withdraw from Gaza, and Egypt's possible roles in the process

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As Israeli troops withdrew from Rafah on Thursday a man peers through a hole in the wall of his damaged house. It at least escaped three weeks of Israeli bulldozing (photo: AP)

Israel has been occupying the West Bank and Gaza for 37 years now. No one would ever have thought that the reverse could happen -- that Gaza would "occupy" Israel, from top to bottom.

But this is no exaggeration. For at least a year Israel has been obsessed with Gaza. The Palestinian territory has a fixture of headlines in most of the Israeli press, unrivalled as a focus for the deliberations of the many political parties across the country's ideological spectrum.

It tops the agenda of discussions in the cabinet, the Knesset, the military and military intelligence. Even the notorious "Greek islands" scandal, in which Sharon and his son were implicated in financial irregularities and which for a brief period had monopolised the attention of the Israeli public, has receded into the background as the Gaza "earthquake" in to view, sending tremors through the Israeli politic, toppling party leaderships, shifting party alliances and upsetting the government coalition. Moreover, as Gaza assumed increasing priority it compelled Israel to finally turn again to Egypt and ask it to resume its crucial mediating role in Palestine, in general, and on the Gaza issue in particular.

Israelis have tended to view Gaza as an excessively heavy and costly burden, never, by any measure, as a strategic asset. The late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin famously said that he wished that all of Gaza would be swallowed up by the sea and the noted military commentator Zaif Shif gave an article of his the headline "Gaza, the plague". Sharon -- the godfather of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, including his cherished spawn of 17 settlements in Gaza, had pledged himself only three years ago never to dismantle a single settlement. Sharon went so far as to say that "the fate of Netzarim [settlement in Gaza] is the fate of Tel Aviv".

Sharon's relationship with Gaza dates as far back as the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948, when he was a young infantry officer fighting in that area. In 1969, as commander of the 101 commandos unit, he was charged with subduing Palestinian armed resistance in Gaza. He succeeded in his task, with the brutality and massacres for which he has become known.

However, he eventually stunned all, especially the ultra nationalist and religious conservatives in Israel when, in his speech to the Hertzliya conference on 18 December 2003, he outlined his unilateral disengagement initiative and announced that Israel should take immediate steps to evacuate all territories that would not be included within its borders under a potential peace settlement. It must, instead, consolidate and strengthen its control of the land that would be incorporated into Israel under a political settlement.

Until just over a year ago no one in Israel would have believed his ears had Sharon made such pledges and remarks. However, by the time of the Hertzliya conference much had changed to alter his position. He was now the head of government rather than the leader of the opposition or a political party, and as such he had to adopt an outlook that was broader and more responsive to international developments, especially after 9/11. It was Sharon who, on 21 May, said that the fate of the state was more important to him than the decision taken by the members of his party. In addition, the situation is such that Sharon can no longer sustain his position of leadership without offering a political initiative of his own. He had no alternative but to act to mend the growing rifts in Israeli opinion epitomised by Yusi Belin's initiative - the Geneva Document - and by Shinui Party leader Yosef Lapid's threat not to join in a government coalition that includes the conservative religious parties.

It appears, too, that Sharon has begun to fathom the demographic time-bomb -- the looming spectre of an Arab majority that would jeopardise the Jewish character of Israel. Indeed, some analysts in Israel believe that this was one of the main factors behind Sharon's disengagement plan. Gaza's 1,700,000 Palestinian population is expected to increase by 3.9 per cent annually.

Sharon also faces external pressures. In particular he is increasingly obliged to exercise some restraint in his policies in deference to his close relationship with Washington and the latter's demands that he respects the sensitivities of its network of relations in the Middle East. As the Israeli press quoted him as saying, "What we see from the US we cannot see from here."

Finally, Sharon's shift in position must be seen within the context of a broader strategy, which is to "sacrifice" Gaza in the hope of being able to annex half the West Bank and East Jerusalem and to forestall the creation of an independent, contiguous Palestinian state that would have the prospect of full sovereignty and natural growth and development.

Against this background, the contours of the initiative Sharon unveiled in Hertzliya grow clearer. On 14 April 2004, in Washington, the Israeli prime minister obtained the support of President Bush for his plan and subsequently the EU announced that it, too, supported the plan to disengage from Gaza. Then, in an unprecedented development in Israeli politics Sharon put his plan to a referendum of the nearly 200,000 members of his party. The referendum returned a stinging slap in the face.

Sharon refused to give in and, instead, decided to put all his weight behind the plan, regardless of the consequences, even if that meant risking putting his head on the block. The "battle of Gaza" has proved not only to be vicious but also critical to Sharon's remaining in power. He has thus found himself compelled to rally every weapon at his disposal, including reviving the Egyptian role, which he had long opposed and the importance of which he adamantly refused to recognise.

Sharon was the first Israeli prime minister since the signing of the Oslo accords in 1992 to refuse, at least till now, to visit Egypt, even if he remained willing to receive Egyptian envoys to Tel Aviv or at his farm in Hashkamim in the Negev. It was also under Sharon that the occasional criticisms of Egypt by Israelis escalated to a vituperative pitch, the onslaught driven by official quarters, by prominent individuals in the Sharon government and in the Israeli armed and security forces.

There were the flagrantly racist proclamations of cabinet ministers Avigdor Lieberman and Etian Ben Eliahu, Minister of Defence Shaul Mofaz who, on 21 July 2003, declared that Egyptians were smuggling arms into Palestine to aid the Palestinian Intifada, and Chief of Staff Moshe Yaloun who, on 11 August 2003, claimed that the tunnels into Gaza originated inside Egyptian military bases on the other side of the border. More recently, on 1 June 2004, Yossi Koperwasser, head of Israeli intelligence's research department, told the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Security Committee that Egyptian-made Cobra anti-artillery missiles were being smuggled into Gaza and that it was this weapon that had blown up Israeli armoured vehicles during the recent fighting in the Zeitoun neighbourhood of Rafah. The committee chairman, Yoval Steinitz, said that Cairo permitted terrorist organisations to cross eastern Sinai to its logistic front, adding that there was no difference between Egypt and Syria, which allowed Hizbullah to receive arms from Iran via Damascus.

In a more curious development Israeli Chief of National Security Giora Eland suggested before important international forums that Egypt should donate 600 square kilometres of its land in the Sinai -- an area equivalent to the size of Gaza -- to the Palestinians. Then the two areas combined could serve for the creation of a Palestinian political and economic entity. In exchange, he said, Israel would give Egypt a chunk of the Negev.

However, even as the attacks against Egypt intensify another camp inside Israel is gaining momentum. This is the camp that is advocating the need to bring Egypt back into the loop in the settlement process and on the Gaza issue in particular. What role Egypt could play depends on developments following the crucial cabinet decision of 7 June approving Sharon's plan. In this regard, it is possible to envision six possible scenarios for the immediate future of Gaza following the Israeli withdrawal.

One possibility is for the PA, with indirect or direct Egyptian assistance, to extend its control over Gaza's five governorates, from Rafah in the south to Beit Hanoun in the north. For this to happen the Palestinians must reach a form of collective concord, especially the PA and the Islamic opposition factions. In spite of the considerable scepticism over the likelihood of achieving this in a safe and democratic way, many Palestinian parties favour this option, at least over the other possible scenarios.

A second option is to arrive at a new power-sharing formula for the administration of Gaza. Here, too, Egypt could play a central role in the process of reaching the necessary understandings between the various concerned factions or in the negotiations over a possible electoral system for creating a representative coalition government on the basis of a popular ballot.

A third scenario is that Hamas, on its own, succeeds in taking control over PA positions in Gaza. Were popular elections to be held today one can envision a sweeping Hamas victory, giving the Islamic resistance organisation a mandate to form and head a new administration. In spite of the many restraints and obstacles that would stand in the way of this possibility one cannot discard it entirely, especially if Hamas reached understandings with Tel Aviv and Washington. This is not as far fetched as it may appear, given that even under Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Abdul-Aziz Al-Rantisi there were numerous back- door communications between Hamas and Washington, the most important of these being the meetings between Hamas leaders and Steve Cohen in Gaza. In addition, the Qatari foreign minister is known to host Hamas leaders in Doha while simultaneously retaining close contacts with both Tel Aviv and Washington.

That the PA and Hamas and Jihad fail to reach an understanding and, instead, come to a stand-off that polarises the other Palestinian organisations and factions and escalates into open combat is, of course, the most unpalatable possibility. A significant body of opinion predicts that this "combat scenario" is likely in view of the sharp divisions of opinion in Palestinian society, the tendency of certain leaders on each side to fuel animosities and the Israeli authorities' attempts to provoke and intensify divisions.

Israel is adamantly opposed to the fifth possibility, the internationalisation of Gaza. Nevertheless, this scenario is not to be ruled out either, since it might arise naturally out of the mechanics of the withdrawal process and its consequences or have to be imposed through a form of international mandate over Palestine. Martin Endike, former US ambassador to Israel, has proposed this option and put it to the Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry. Although the idea still needs considerable study and clarification, at least theoretically it remains a viable option.

The sixth and final scenario is a variation of the preceding as it would entail bringing Egypt and Jordan on board a combined international-Arab administration of Gaza for a set interim period, after which authority would be transferred to Palestinians through a democratic process. Britain, in particular, is an enthusiastic proponent of this idea and just last week, on 6 June, former head of Mossad, Ha-Levy, wrote an article suggesting that developments in Gaza were heading strongly in this direction.

It is regrettable that the Palestinians, who have most at stake, may have the least to say over which of the scenarios prevails. The PA, or more specifically, Yasser Arafat, has yet to make up his mind and has issued conflicting statements with regard to the Egyptian proposal handed to him by Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman. The Palestinian factions, especially Hamas, have also yet to adopt a clear position on the Egyptian proposal, although it appears that, if they are not inclined to reject it outright, they will voice strong reservations.

Such ambiguity suggests that Egypt will be required to be even more forceful with regard to which of the six scenarios outlined above prevails. The Egyptian position might clash strongly with that of Israel, particularly in light of the fundamental differences in principle between the two sides and in view of Egypt's perspective on the tasks it should fulfil in Gaza in the forthcoming phase.

Although Egypt would be instrumental to security in Gaza -- it would, for example, have responsibility over the Philadelphia crossing and some 200 Egyptian security experts would assist in training and equipping the Palestinian security forces in Gaza -- it is important to subject this task to closer and more extensive political security. Such an analysis should proceed on two levels: the conflict between Egyptian and Israeli political premises and their potential political consequences.

While Egypt is determined to ensure that its security tasks in Gaza are comprised within the framework of a more comprehensive peace initiative, the Israeli media has focussed almost exclusively on the security role Egypt could play within the context of Sharon's unilateral disengagement plan from Gaza. The Israeli perspective was reflected in Sharon's presentation to the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Security Committee on 3 June. He informed the committee members that intensive communications with Egypt over this matter had focussed on three tasks: tightening security along the borders to prevent arms smuggling, providing security forces to train, guide and monitor the performance of Palestinian security services, and encouraging the reform processes in the PA. It is difficult to conceive that Egypt would lend itself to such a confined role. As Haaretz pointed out on 6 June, "Egypt's reading of the political map differs to that of Israel." Naturally, the sharper such differences the harder it will be for Egypt to press ahead with the security and political tasks it believes it should undertake in Gaza.

On the other hand, Egypt's participation in Gaza could be highly productive. Egypt could play a central role in the process of re-building and restructuring the PA.

Egypt could act as a buffer between the PA and the opposition factions, helping to avert escalating tensions and the possible outbreak of the civil war Israeli authorities hope will erupt following the evacuation from Gaza.

Egypt could assist in creating a more representative governing authority and help in the process of peaceful reform and democratisation in general. This would counter Israeli or US attempts to appoint or impose leaderships and processes tailored to their own interests.

Through an effective contribution to the rehabilitation of Gaza, Egypt will have made considerable inroads towards restoring confidence in its regional role. Clearly, the more progress Egypt makes in this direction the harder it will be for Israel to press ahead with its objectives and the greater the prospects of reducing Israel, in the eyes of its citizens and the international community, to its real political size.

Another positive outcome of a successful Egyptian intervention in Gaza would be to strengthen the resolve of relevant international powers and organisations to internationalise the Palestinian question, the only practical solution to the crisis of the derailed peace processes.

It goes without saying that Egypt's success in producing such results is contingent upon several conditions. The most important is the existence of a political framework that conforms to the choices made freely by the Palestinian people and that helps them progress, if only a step or two ahead, towards their final emancipation from occupation, national independence and full sovereignty.