Transatlantic rifts

Europe has stood firm on the side of reason in world politics. In the wake of American mistakes, old Europe may have the upper hand over US neo-cons, writes Hassan Nafaa*

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This week, President Bush was working overtime to mend the rift that appeared in European-US ties in connection with the war on Iraq. Bush attended the summit in Ireland with the leaders of the EU, then flying to Istanbul for a NATO summit. During both events, the US president carefully projected an image of someone pleased with how things are with Europe. A few weeks ago, Bush was participating in the 60th D-Day anniversary and took the occasion to remind Europe of the role the US played in liberating it from the Nazis. Has Bush finally succeeded in mending fences with the Europeans? More to the point, is he sincere about it? Or is the president just putting on an act for election purposes?

Europe's discomfort with the US right wing began right after the Cold War, when the US secretary of defense issued a "defense planning guidance" directive noting that the strategic goal of the US was to maintain its status as a sole world power and prevent the emergence of a rival power at any cost. The document was symptomatic of how the ruling US right wing saw the role of the US in the post-Cold War era.

The US vision, as writings of US neo-conservatives ahead of the September 2001 events show, is based on a number of assumptions: first, that the threat to US interests and to international peace and security still persists despite the disappearance of the Soviet and communist peril; second, that China and the Islamic world represent the major sources of threat -- China is experiencing tremendous economic growth but is not growing politically and democratically in a commensurate manner and the Islamic world has turned into a hotbed for extremist movements; and third, that the US should embrace interventionism and increase its military spending.

The US right wing is particularly critical of the policies of the Clinton era. Under Clinton, military spending was reduced and foreign policy became isolationist and passive, neo- conservatives claim. The victory achieved in the Cold War was squandered, the US right wing felt. Once in power, neo- conservatives set about reshaping the post-Cold War world in a manner that, in their opinion, suited US interests. Meanwhile, the Europeans felt that the US was determined to take sole control of the international system and had a tendency to rely on military intervention over diplomatic means.

Although many in the US and Europe expected post-Cold War changes in the international order to encourage isolationism on the part of the US, the opposite occurred. Since the socialist bloc showed its first signs of disintegration, the US intervened militarily across the world more often than it did throughout the Cold War. Between the invasion of Panama in 1989 and of Iraq in 2003, the US sent troops to Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan among several other parts of the world. With George W Bush in power, and with September 2001 providing a convenient pretext, US interventionist tendencies became unmistakable. The US right wing became more belligerent following each war conducted with minimal losses. This alienated the Europeans.

The EU wanted to see a multi-polar international order develop; not one controlled by a sole power, even if that power is a country with which Europe has much in common. A multi-polar system alone would allow major powers, including the EU, to take part in international decision-making. Such a system would allow each power a say in international affairs in a manner commensurate with its capabilities, not just its military prowess. But the US, mindful of its military advantage, was determined to monopolise international decision-making and reduce other contenders to secondary status.

It was inconceivable that the entire EU would submit to such an arrogant view. And it was natural that some powers within the EU would resist the US's wish to dictate things. On the whole, EU foreign policy objectives diverged from those of the US. Europe generally preferred diplomacy to military action and collective decision making to unilateralism. Germany and France, in particular, were vocal in their rejection of the US war on Iraq.

The schism between Europe and the US right wing was not confined to transient interests. Divisions developed over essential matters; over how the two sides assessed threats to international peace and security, over how they saw the priorities of the international order. For example, the EU -- despite the presence of an extreme right wing in its midst -- does not seem paranoid about China and the Muslim world. EU foreign policy is also less susceptible to Zionist pressure than that of the US. The EU, generally speaking, is more willing and capable to differentiate between Islam and fundamentalism, between Islam and terror. The EU views international terror as a threat but is willing to look into the causes of that threat, not just its symptoms. It is willing to act within a collective framework and in accordance with international legitimacy, rather than through unilateral and extra-legal measures. This attitude proved exasperating for the US ruling right wing.

The neo-conservative writer Robert Kagan speaks on behalf of the US right wing in his recent book, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. Kagan notes that the current international division of labour is one in which the US cooks and Europe washes the dishes. The peaceful tendencies of Europe and its propensity to act within the UN framework, he says, betray a "psychology of weakness". Europe, Kagan concludes, has to adapt to the US view of the world and assume its share of the cost, if it wants to share the benefits.

The French-German alliance that took shape in the UN Security Council during the crisis of the war on Iraq was more than an expression of displeasure. The two countries practically challenged the US, despite the uneven balance of power, and they haven't changed their position since. This is why the US president failed to convince NATO to send troops to Iraq. All President Bush was able to accomplish was a NATO agreement to let member states, if they wish, train Iraqi police forces, but not under a NATO flag.

I don't think that Bush had any illusions about Europe changing its views. He went to Istanbul to appear in photos, smile and look at ease with other world leaders -- all for election purposes. The US president wants to give voters back home the impression that all is well and the US is not isolated or reviled internationally as some say. Has anyone noticed that Bush and Rumsfeld speak now in a tone different from the one they used before, during and right after the war on Iraq? I have.

* The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.