On Monday, US Civil Administrator Paul Bremer handed over "sovereignty" to the Interim Government of Iraq in a furtive ceremony, two days ahead of schedule. Not the stuff that independence days are made of. How sovereign is Iraq; what kind of future does the ongoing process offer for that shattered nation; and most significantly, how can a genuinely free, democratic and prosperous Iraq be created? Al-Ahram Weekly, in these special pages, invited Iraqi journalists and intellectuals to provide some answers
Hard days ahead
Saif Abu Gulal* writes on the challenges facing Iraq's interim government in the months ahead
Even though the new Iraqi interim government contains a combination of enthusiastic politicians, it is virtually impossible for this government to take the new Iraq in seven months towards a competitive representative election as the UN resolution 1546 stipulated. Under the highly constraining circumstances and daily violence, a competitive, free and inclusive elected democracy is no doubt the work of a decade. Essentially, the "temporary" interim Iraqi government that will assume power from the start of next month can be considered a necessary path for producing a complete transition to a democratic regime. However, there are still many daunting tasks that need to be accomplished and steps required to overcome the severe political and economic crises in Iraq.
Unfortunately, the new Iraqi government will have to live with a series of problems brought about by over a year of ill- planned and ill-executed Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) policies. At this critical juncture in Iraq's history, the new Iraqi government, which is considered by many Iraqis to be more representative than the Interim Governing Council (IGC), will first have to deal with the increasing anti-democratic behaviour represented by hard- liners and radical forces. The indiscriminate violence is having an erosive effect on the transitional process and is curtailing the reconstruction of the country. To quell the terrorists, bandits and criminals, the interim government will need to display force by putting additional police and armed forces in the street and perhaps impose martial law, which by itself places the new Iraq under a non- democratic period that may take years. On the issue of restoring security to Iraqi towns and cities there is a consensus shared by the vast majority of Iraqis. Thus, the proper role of the new government is to provide law and order to its citizens; although this might entail using repressive measures that might weaken the democratic process and the newly found spirit of freedom.
The privileging of security over democratisation will extract a heavy price from the new freedom, which would be fundamentally at odds with UN resolution 1546, and an impediment to the pre- liberation promises for a free democratic and prosperous Iraq. The security situation that is plaguing Iraq will in turn transfer the powers of the interim government into a more permanent task legitimised by a series of emergency rules and measures. Thus, the coming period will make no positive impact on the pace and quality of the transition towards a full democracy unless the security dimension is quickly resolved.
But the darker and more difficult problem that the interim government will have to address in the coming period will be the disagreement among Iraqis over vital issues such as a unitary state versus a federal state. Kurdish nationalism and its separatist tendencies eschewed anti-unitary anti- nation state behaviour attempting to secure an independent state in northern Iraqi provinces away from Baghdad control. The issue of holding together all the 18 provinces of Iraq under a single democratic system will present the interim government with a sharp split within its ranks pitting the vast majority of Arab Iraqis including the large Shia community, against their Kurdish countrymen. The coming period of transition will witness some Iraqi Kurds employing a skilful combination of threats and lobbying that will curtail the rebuilding of a united Iraqi state, in turn leading to more centrally controlled government and the declaration of a Kurdish separate state in the north. Such a scenario will lead to the partition of Iraq and the immediate Turkish military intervention in northern Iraq.
The political economy of the transition will prove equally crucial for achieving a true legitimacy for any Iraqi politician and government. The economic role of the new government will characterise the next period of transition. Rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure, educating its citizens, and injecting fresh investment in all Iraqi towns and cities especially in the south, which have for decades suffered constant economic and financial discrimination, will be an important source for the interim government's legitimacy. Taking Iraq from the ashes of Saddam's tyrannical legacy will stumble on a largely forgotten potential minefield, which is the rising unemployment in a country that possess the second largest oil reserves in the world.
Saddam's wars and damaging economic policies coupled with 13 years of unprecedented comprehensive economic sanctions led this once upper middle-income country into a bankrupt country crushed under a financial load and $150 billion of foreign debts in addition to other considerable amounts of war reparations and heavy cumulative interests on loans. Saddam borrowed heavily to finance his wars against Iran, Kuwait, and his own people in the north and the south as well as to maintain his grip on power by buying loyalties from the military and tribes. The lenders, aware of the human wrongs committed by Saddam on his people, helped Saddam pill more debts and thus maintained and prolonged his dictatorship.
The debt burden will influence the political economy of transitional Iraq and might hinder the new government's ability to create jobs, provide social services, increase development spending, or even expand the police and armed forces to control the daily violence and terrorism. It is thus unfortunate that the UN resolution 1546 sidestepped this vital issue leaving Iraqi's agriculture, industrial and construction efforts stagnant. A positive boost to the new government came from the European Union, which sketched a medium term strategy for Iraq based on improving political, cultural and economic conditions in addition to assisting the coming elections, civil society, and market economy initiatives with 200 million euros. At the same time the United States is lobbying for lending nations to forgive Iraq's debt and has promised the new government $18 billion in aid. If all this is fulfilled, it will help Iraq's economy and interim government to stand on their feet.
Thus the new government needs to begin the long road of transition to democracy with the pursuit of an independent foreign policy that reflects its socio-economic and political interests, embody peaceful and democratic visions and express moral values. Iraq's foreign policy must experience an enlightenment period that can produce visionary designs that place greater emphasis on negotiation, patience, diplomacy, commercial ties, international law and political engagement. The coming period will witness the importance of trade, debt relief, and economic recovery, which will determine Iraqi policymakers' definition of its national and security interests.
* The writer is a Netherlands-based Iraqi political analyst.
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