On Monday, US Civil Administrator Paul Bremer handed over "sovereignty" to the Interim Government of Iraq in a furtive ceremony, two days ahead of schedule. Not the stuff that independence days are made of. How sovereign is Iraq; what kind of future does the ongoing process offer for that shattered nation; and most significantly, how can a genuinely free, democratic and prosperous Iraq be created? Al-Ahram Weekly, in these special pages, invited Iraqi journalists and intellectuals to provide some answers

The future of Iraqi resistance

The post-Saddam Hussein era has been one of triumphs and defeats on all sides, writes Abdul-Hussein Shaaban*

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One of the reasons the Iraqi scene is so paradoxical is that the Iraqi state -- created first in 1921 -- was dismantled, with hundreds of thousands of state employees, especially those of the armed forces, the security services and the media, suddenly laid off. The state that had stamped everything with its own mark, that had dominated every aspect of political, social, professional and even personal life in the country, disappeared almost overnight.

The fall of the regime and the dismantling of the state meant that national independence was lost, for Iraq came practically under US-UK occupation. National sovereignty was suspended as the occupation took charge. There was a time when no one could speak on behalf of Iraq, represent it in the UN and before the international community.

This was not an aberration-- Afghanistan being a case in point. Following the 11 September events, US President Bush said, "After [this] chaos and carnage ... it is not enough to serve our enemies with legal papers. The terrorists and their supporters declared war on the United States, and war is what they got." This was the first sign that the United States was not interested in "international legitimacy", international law or even domestic law. Harsh diplomacy and a belligerent attitude marked US policy after 11 September, as Washington sought to change the Middle Eastern map by force. So long as the Middle East remained a hotbed for despotism, despair and anger, it would continue to threaten the safety of the US and its friends, President Bush claimed.

The occupation and the absence of the state left a constitutional vacuum in Iraq. The transitional constitution, which came into force on 16 July 1970, was annulled along with a substantial number of laws and regulations, without being replaced with an alternative legal framework. Meanwhile, occupation forces exercised actual "sovereignty" on the ground, asking civilians to obey their orders and instructions. The international community had given them the right to do so, through resolution 1483 of 22 May 2003.

The absence of the state and the loss of sovereignty led to a state of lawlessness in which assaults on individual and state property became widespread with the country descending into 15 months of violence. No wonder that President Bush, who was once so sure of his mission to liberate Iraq, wanted out.

One has to distinguish between resistance acts that targeted the US military and the forces of occupation and those mounted against unarmed civilians. The latter are simply acts of indiscriminate terror. One should note also that there are several international and regional players who want to see Iraq descend into chaos. One can safely assume that there are five main parties backing resistance operations: first, former regime adherents, who are not fighting to liberate the country, but to avenge their loss of privileges. Some of these have been won over by the occupation and begun defending it. Second, religious extremists who have been shocked to see foreign forces in their midst. Many come from tribes that treat as "alien" anyone from another tribe or area, so understandably they are hostile to foreign troops.

Third, various sections of Iraqis who want to preserve the previous ethnic composition of the state. This may explain why Shia have generally been less critical of the occupation than Sunnis. Fourth, Iraqis who are opposed to the occupation as a matter of principle and are horrified to see the occupation forces blow up homes, fire at will and wreak havoc on entire towns, as happened in Fallujah, Ramadi and Karbala. Finally, regional parties with security interests in Iraq and its doctrinal and ethnic composition. These include even non-Arab countries, such as Turkey and Iran.

In addition, Al-Qaeda and similar organisations are obviously tempted to use Iraq as an arena in which to battle US troops. Why go to Washington or New York if the Americans have landed close to home? And one cannot rule out that the occupation forces and even Israel's Mossad may want to sow sedition among various Iraqi factions in order to achieve their own goals. This opinion was expressed by UN and Arab League envoys to Iraq.

The battles in Falluja and Najaf lasted for weeks and were eye-openers in more than one way. First of all, these two battles made it clear that the Sunnis and Shia have a common disdain for occupation. Secondly, occupation proved incapable, for all its might, of achieving the kind of victory it sought. It is true that the Iraqi groups did not win but were at a definite disadvantage in terms of men and material. The two battles prove that it is possible to dissipate some factional tension through the formulation of general and common objectives. This happened before in the 1920 revolt, when western and northern towns, including Kurdish ones, united with Najaf, which was the driving force behind the revolt.

The battles were half-victory, half-defeat for the Americans. Half-victory because the Americans were able to march into Iraqi cities and even shell mosques (on the pretext that militants hid inside them), without noticeable reaction from powerful religious leaders such as Ali Al-Sistani or from the Shia in the Interim Governing Council, aside from some warnings and calls for restraint. The battles trespassed over all the red lines. After killing several hundreds of people in the two battles, the occupation forces managed to reach an agreement under which militants were to lay down their arms and towns were to be patrolled jointly with the Iraqi police. In exchange, the occupation forces offered rhetoric rather than hard-and-fast guarantees.

Half-defeat was because the US could not get a lead on who killed and dismembered the four US citizens in Falluja. Nor could it arrest Moqtada Al-Sadr and bring him to trial for alleged involvement in the killing of Abdul-Majid Al- Khouei. President Bush recently said that Moqtada Al-Sadr could join the political process in the country.

Obviously, the Americans have backed down, hoping to gain time or wagering on divisions that may emerge between Sunni and Shia groups opposed to the occupation. After the Abu Ghraib scandal, the occupation forces seemed more inclined to let Iraqis handle their own affairs. With the recent handover of power, Iraq has its own security services but the occupation forces are staying put under another "friendly" format; one governed by indefinite military, security and political agreements. Does this mean that the violence is to abate? The next few weeks will proffer an answer.

* The writer is a London-based Iraqi intellectual.