Sharon's bluff

Samir Ghattas* looks at the rickety prospects of Israel's coalition government and Sharon's threat to hold early elections

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No country can afford to overlook the fast-breaking events occurring all around it. Regional developments are of utmost importance, particularly when pertaining to political developments in Israel, for such developments will inevitably affect the Palestinian question as well as the fabric of the entire Middle East.

This is why it is crucial to follow up the recent developments that shook the stability of Israel's government coalition and threaten to have a lasting effect on the country's political landscape and the structure of the new government coalition. Although the crisis appears on the surface to be an internal Israeli affair, it is in essence a reflection of a deeper political crisis; one related to regional conditions not just the domestic Israeli scene.

The crisis began with Prime Minister Sharon's decision to implement his so-called unilateral disengagement plan. Sharon first referred to this plan during a speech at the Herzliya conference on 18 December 2003. When he officially launched the plan on 14 April 2004, the crisis worsened, with numerous parties squabbling over its implications. Within less than two months, Sharon's coalition began to show signs of disintegration, although up to 4 June the prime minister retained a comfortable majority in the Knesset (67 of the body's 120 members).

As conflict mounted over Sharon's plans, the crisis took an unexpected turn. Sharon, desperate to gain a majority vote within the cabinet, sacked two of his prominent supporters, ministers Avigdor Liberman and Benny Alon of the National Union Party (NUP). Although Sharon succeeded, on 7 July, in getting the cabinet to approve his plan, his success was costly.

Following the withdrawal of the NUP from the government, part of the Mafdal Party pulled out of the government, depriving Sharon's coalition of its parliamentary majority. As a result, the government became liable to a vote of no confidence throughout last month. A recent vote of confidence was a tie, with 55 members voting for the government and the same number against it. Sharon's crisis worsened with the emergence of strong opposition to his policies within the Likud, with fellow members threatening, in public, to replace him.

A seasoned politician, Sharon knew that the blood oozing from his political wounds would whet the appetite of rivals aiming to turn him into a vestige of Hebrew history. Armed with favourable opinion polls, both within the Likud and the Israeli public, Sharon was determined to stay ahead of the political game and lure others to join him in a new coalition; one that would give him a comfortable majority, a majority he needs in the grinding battle ahead -- the battle that will begin with skirmishes over the general budget at the Knesset and escalate with the withdrawal from Gaza, which Sharon promised to complete by the end of 2005.

Despite his eminence in today's Israeli politics, Sharon is not as strong as he was on the eve of his historic victory in the elections held on 28 January 2003, elections that led to the formation of the 16th Knesset in its current form. At the time, Sharon succeeded in raising Likud's share from 19 to 40 seats. This was at the expense of Labour, whose share dwindled to 19 seats, the lowest in its history. Now, as then, a majority among the Israeli public looked to Sharon to form a Likud-led coalition involving both Labour and the centrist Shinui.

The Likud's celebratory mood, combined with the serious differences between Sharon and former Labour leader Amram Mitzna, precluded the formation of such coalition at the time. Now, the Israeli public seems to favour such a coalition, believing that it could lead the country out of its current fix.

From the 13 parties represented in the 16th Knesset, Sharon used four in his coalition: Likud, Shinui, the right-wing NUP and Mafdal. Labour opted to stay in the opposition. Opinion polls held at the time showed that about 55 per cent of Israelis expected the government to last no more than a year or two. They were correct. Less than two years later, Sharon was negotiating with Labour to join the government.

On 9 July, Sharon announced the start of coalition talks with Shimon Peres-led Labour. It was clear to Sharon from the start that these talks will involve pressure, if not blackmail, on two sides. For its part, Labour would want tangible concessions before it agrees to join the coalition. Likud's own rebels would want guarantees that they will not lose their cabinet portfolios as a result of Labour's participation in the government. To fend off such pressures, Sharon is adopting new tactics to keep both Labour and Likud's own opposition at bay. Theoretically, he has to follow one of five options.

First, get both Labour and the fundamentalists into the new coalition. This option means that the coalition would be expanded to the most possible extent. It would include Likud (40 seats), Labour (21 seats, counting those of Israel's One Nation Party), Shinui (15), Mafdal (six) and Yahadut Hatorah (five). Sharon has already begun talks with leaders of the religious parties, such as Shas (11 seats) and Yahadut Hatorah. Shinui, which used to be opposed in principle to joining a government including religious parties has, in a surprise move, announced that it is only opposed to the participation of Shas. Tommy Lapid, Shinui's leader has said that his party is not opposed to Yahadut Hatorah joining the government, so long as Labour is part of the coalition. If Sharon goes for this option, he will first have to convince the opposition within Likud that this is the right move. To do that, he may have to promise that the foreign affairs portfolio is going to stay with Silvan Shalon and not go to Shimon Peres. This would be a difficult promise to maintain, for Labour is likely to insist on Peres becoming foreign minister.

Second, let Shinui leave the coalition. This may happen if Sharon insists on rejecting the idea of forming a secular government along with Labour and Shinui and on inviting religious parties to join. If Shinui pulls out, the coalition may be formed from Likud, Labour, Shas, Mafdal and Yahadot Hatorah. The problem of this option is its costliness, for the religious parties are likely to blackmail Sharon and seek huge expenditure on religious schools and on a network of projects serving fundamentalists who refuse to serve in the army or the government.

Third, form a secular coalition. Despite his own dislike for the idea, Sharon may have to form a secular coalition of the country's three major parties: Likud, Labour and Shinui. Although this option faces strong opposition within the Likud, a public poll held on 14 July indicates that 54 per cent of Israelis support the idea. Sharon remains strongly opposed to this option for fear that such coalition may widen the sectarian schism in Israel. Sharon wants to pose as a leader of all Israelis, not of one political current.

Fourth, form a right-wing coalition of the Likud, Shas, the National Union, Mafdal and Yahadot Hatorah. This option would limit Sharon's political manoeuvrability and subject his policies to right-wing priorities concerning the continued occupation of Palestinian land and the expansion of settlement activities. It would also place Sharon on a collision course with the international community, particularly the United States, something that the Israeli prime minister has adeptly avoided.

Fifth, call early elections. This would give the Israeli prime minister a breathing space, send a few ripples through the political scene, and perhaps create a more favourable climate for Sharon to arbitrate the country's political destiny.

It is a known fact in Israel that the majority of Knesset members, within the Likud as well as other political parties, are reluctant to face early elections. This is why Sharon brings up the matter whenever under pressure from his rivals. Israel's Supreme Court decided on 7 July that the general elections for the 17th Knesset is to be held on 17 November 2006, not on 30 October 2007 as was previously agreed. This new date gives Sharon's rivals (Netanyahu, Barak, Peres) less time to prepare themselves for the election campaign. If the elections are held earlier, these rivals will have virtually no time to prepare themselves. Most opinion polls indicate that general elections, if held soon, will make hardly any change in the country's political scene. What elections would do is force political parties to wait, once again, for Sharon to negotiate their fate.

Most likely, Sharon will not have to resort to early elections, which many in Israel refer to as a "doomsday weapon", because Labour has little choice but to join the new elections. Peres recently told his party that Labour cannot afford to be seen as the party that undermined the withdrawal from Gaza. Likud is not in a position to carry out the disengagement initiative without Labour support, and Labour alone cannot carry out this crucial and unprecedented initiative in Israel's history.

The coming few weeks are likely to witness more bickering and stalemates, but by the time the Knesset comes back from its summer recess the situation may have changed. I have to caution, however, people who entertain any illusions about Sharon's fate. Irrespective of the change in Israel's political map, Sharon and no other leader would be at the helm of the government, steering the country's policy. Sharon is the one who decides the agenda for others, not because he has supernatural powers, but -- perhaps -- because we made him appear so.

* The writer is director of the Maqdis Centre for Political Studies.