Pushing at the margins
By Amina Elbendary
Al-Muhammashun fi Al-tarikh Al-Islami (The Marginalised in Islamic History), Mahmud Ismail, Cairo: Ru'iyya, 2004. pp208
A new generation of historians has been involved in a large-scale project to revise and rewrite Egyptian history. Fundamental to this project is an interest in hitherto neglected topics, as well as an attempt to empower less powerful historical subjects who have more often than not been ignored by traditional historiography.
This has resulted in a number of works based on new historical sources, in particular archival documents, as well as a rereading of traditional sources. The process is inspired by new methodologies such as an interest in social, cultural and economic history -- history from below. In recent years, seminars, conferences and publications on themes of marginalisation and the marginalised in history have undoubtedly been inspired by this basic tenet, which figures in the work of many contemporary Egyptians.
The Ottoman History Seminar, organised by the younger scholars of the Egyptian Society for Historical Studies, for example, recently dedicated a whole season to the theme, while the Department of Arabic Studies at the American University in Cairo hosted a seminar on "The Marginalised in History and Society" in 2003. Among the recent publications on the topic is Sayyid Ashmawi's Al-Jama'at Al-Hamishiyya wa Al-Munharifa fi Tarikh Misr Al-Ijtimaei Al- Hadith (Marginal and Deviant Groups in the Modern Social History of Egypt, published by the Faculty of Arts, Cairo University, 2003).
The present book, too, is in the same vein.
Unlike Ashmawi's, however, Mahmud Ismail's book is intended for that elusive creature, "the general reader". As the reputed Egyptian sociologist explains in his introduction, the book is geared towards lay readers who are non-specialists in history. This makes it part of a genre of writing that has all but disappeared in the last couple of decades: popular history. Ismail's book is concise, easy to read, and uncluttered by clusters of footnotes -- the tell-tale sign of academic writing and its various pretensions. The book would have benefited from a list of suggestions for further reading to make up for the absolute absence of citations or sources. Another reason Ismail's book stands out is that, despite its overly ambitious title, it has a very narrow focus, the author's interest being specifically political marginalisation. Indeed, though intentionally generalised since it is aimed at the general reader (ironically enough that reader tends to be even more demanding than his academic counterpart), the introduction would have benefited from a clearer definition of the subject. Though the introduction fails to state this clearly, Ismail is more focussed on movements of political protest against autocratic and corrupt authorities that occupy the margins of historiography. He includes in his analysis many groups, such as the harafish of Egypt, the ahdath of Syria and ayyarun of Iraq, who in traditional historiography are often presented as criminals and deviants -- members of the urban underworld. However, the difference in his perception and definition of such groups is arguably what warrants the writing of a new book.
Ismail's choice of subject matter is in itself innovative since a common theme in Arab, and to a certain extent Islamic historiography has been the passivity of populations under oppression. While the author tries to refute this entrenched view, focussing mainly on marginalised political protesters, his tone remains bafflingly defensive. A persistent question remains unanswered: why did most of these popular resistance movements fail?
The author highlights a number of political and popular protest movements that span Islamic history, covering a broad geographic stretch; most of them are little known. He does not claim to be offering an exhaustive list of all such movements, yet the absence of some, like the Bashmuric revolt in Egypt, is significant. Ismail does not deal with the Abbasid revolution either, perhaps since it is not, strictly speaking, a movement by the marginalised. He starts with the first Zanj revolt of the Umayyad period which, unlike its Abbasid successor, traditionally receives even less mention in history books. This, Ismail argues, is due to the racist tendencies of historians of the classical period, who looked down on black slaves and therefore ignored their protest movements in their writings. The blacks, he recounts, espoused rebellious Shi'i ideologies and were joined by Persians.
Ismail follows with a discussion of the Khashshabiyya (wood artisans) revolt, also in Umayyad Iraq, and the Haddaddin (ironsmiths) revolt in Andalusia. Among the few successful exceptions he deals with is the revolt of the Qaramita, who set up a state in Bahrain and southern Mesopotamia. In fact a number of the revolts analysed in this book took place on the peripheries of the Islamic domains: North Africa, Spain, and Sajistan, for example. Of particular interest is the chapter dealing with the culture of the marginalised, in which the author refers to surviving examples of popular culture, whether in the form of proverbs, rhymes, epics, shadow plays or Shi'i lamentation plays, which reveal their opposition to the ruling authorities.
Ismail uses traditional Marxist historiography in approaching his subject matter. Protest movements arose in response to political unrest and economic crises; periods of stability and prosperity witnessed fewer protests. His main argument is that the main reason behind the failure of historical protest movements is their lack of class- consciousness. The Muslim bourgeoisie, according to the author, has betrayed its historical role by failing to espouse and lead protest movements, and siding instead with ruling authorities. This made most protest movements and revolts unorganised and undisciplined, and therefore easier to suppress. The failure of such revolts often meant that class conflict remained unresolved, and while some of the direct and limited demands of the rebels were often met, and the oppression of the ruling authorities checked, the overriding outcome of such movements usually reaffirmed existing modes of production and curtailed "the natural progress of societies." This led to a freezing of social development, perpetuating the status quo.
Ismail obviously has an axe to grind; his history is also a call for activism. His denunciation of the historical bourgeoisie can be read as an incitement of the modern bourgeoisie for siding with the powers that be and not living up to what he considers its historical role. Historically speaking, however, this begs the question of why the Arab (and Muslim?) bourgeoisie has consistently failed to make that choice. Instead of asking why they didn't do what Ismail expected them to do, one might ask why they did what they did.
But that would be the subject of another book.