War games

When Ethiopia and Italy went to war, Egypt was naturally concerned, given the close relationship she enjoyed with both sides. Professor Yunan Labib Rizk sees how such a remote conflict made such a local impact

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Benito Mussolini, left, and Haile Selassie, above, were the leaders of Italy and Ethiopia respectively when the two countries went to war

Al-Ahram: A Diwan of contemporary life (566)

Some of our senior citizens who can recall the 1930s and 1940s may remember a game they used to play called the "Italian- Ethiopian war". The game, based on a real war between the two sides, is alone indicative of the impact this conflict had on the Egyptian conscience at the time, to the extent that for children it became the byword for a game of good guys versus bad guys.

In fact, one case involving "Ethiopians and Italians" became news. Al-Ahram of 5 November 1935 relates that in Zifta, a boy by the name of Awad Abdel-Aziz El- Basyouni created an army of children, none older than 10, over which he took command. He called it the Ethiopian army. "This army pitted itself against another army of children of the same age, which was under the command of Sayed Ahmed Dandesh and which they called the Italians. In one of their skirmishes, the 'Italian' commander was struck by a stone hurled at him by the 'Ethiopian' commander. The child died a week later. The autopsy concluded that death resulted from the injury incurred from a broken skull. When police asked the young El-Basyouni why he had hit the victim, he responded with the innocent candour of his age that he was the Ethiopian and the other guy the Italian."

Given the effect the real Ethiopian- Italian war had on the Egyptian consciousness, it is not surprising that many studies have appeared on the subject. Perhaps the most important of these is Egyptian Public Opinion and the Ethiopian-Italian War, by the eminent political science professor Dr Abdel-Malak Ouda. Appearing in the January 1970 edition of Al-Siyasa Al-Dawliya (International Politics), Ouda treated this issue at three levels: the various grassroots reactions, the official reaction and government policy, and the response of the political parties.

At first glance it appears odd that Egyptian opinion should become so intensely involved in events transpiring in such a relatively remote country. However, in addition to the nature of the conflicting parties -- the Ethiopian forces led by Emperor Haile Selassie and the Italian forces dispatched by the fascist government of Benito Mussolini -- we must also bear in mind a number of other considerations.

Above all, Egypt and Ethiopia were bound by long historical ties. Indeed, until fairly recently the Ethiopian church was subsidiary to the Egyptian Coptic Church; the Egyptian patriarch appointed the Ethiopian archbishop and the Ethiopian clergy demonstrated their allegiance to the Egyptian patriarch through various forms of tribute presented to his residence in Clot Bek in Alexandria. Not that these relations have always been smooth. In the 1870s, during the reign of the Khedive Ismail, tensions arose in military engagements, known in Egypt as the Ethiopian wars. The khedive failed in his campaign to occupy the impenetrable mountainous kingdom and annex it to his possessions in East Africa.

Egypt is also bound to Ethiopia by vital strategic considerations. As we know, most of Egypt's Nile has its source in the floods emanating from the Ethiopian highlands. Egypt is naturally perpetually anxious over who controls those highlands and the prospect of water projects that might cut off the flow from these heights through Sawabit, Atbara, the Blue Nile and onwards to Egypt.

But Egypt also had long and diverse ties with Italy. One of the most obvious manifestations of these relations was the age-long Italian expatriate presence in Egypt. Even under the policy of isolation imposed under Ottoman rule in the 16th century, this presence remained uninterrupted. Italian merchants continued to be frequent visitors to Egyptian ports, supplying, among other things, many of the luxury goods sought by Egypt's Mameluke overlords.

With the emergence of the modern state in Egypt in the 19th century, and well before the unification of Italy in the early 1870s, Italians began to arrive in Egypt at first in trickles and then in droves. This influx reached its peak under the Khedive Ismail who relied heavily on foreigners in the development of the urban and military infrastructure of the modern state founded by his grandfather. Although the Italians were outstripped in number by the Greek expatriates who also arrived in large numbers during this period, they ultimately proved to have a more influential and lasting impact. It was the Italians who designed the royal Opera House, Ismail's palaces and the streets and buildings of the capitals -- new governmental and residential quarters. The Italians also had closer contact with the Egyptians than any other foreign community. Indeed, linguists have noted that for a long time Egyptian colloquial contained more loan words from Italian than from any other language.

The Egyptian royal family, especially since Khedive Ismail, had a special relationship with Italy. Italy was this khedive's choice of exile after Britain and France conspired to depose him in 1869. Much later, King Fouad, who was on the throne at the time of the Italian-Ethiopian war, had grown up in Italy where he developed close relations with that ruling family.

Egyptians were, thus, far from oblivious to what was going on in Rome. Indeed, many, particularly the young, admired the Italian fascist movement led by Mussolini, to the degree that some emulated his quasi-military Black Shirt organisations. One of these was Misr Al-Fatah (the Young Egypt Movement), led by Ahmed Hussein and Fathi Radwan, whose members wore green shirts and ran their own military training exercises.

In spite of Egypt's generally friendly relations with Italy, there was another side characterised by suspicion and alarm at Rome's colonialist policies. After unification, Italy joined other European powers in the scramble for a piece of the African cake. Not all that much was still up for grabs and its choice happened to fall on an area that was very sensitive to Egypt. Rome first moved in on Eritrea and Somalia, which had been part of the Egyptian empire founded by Ismail, but from which Egypt had withdrawn following the outbreak of the Mahdist uprising in Sudan. Soon afterwards Italy struck an agreement with Britain in accordance with which it obtained portions of eastern Sudan extending up to Kasala . At the same time, it attempted to extend its control over Ethiopia, which led to the decisive battle on 1 March 1896. The battle was perhaps unique in the history of the colonisation of Africa. King Menelik II's defeat of the Italian forces in that engagement marked the first and what looked like the last African defeat of a European army during the partitioning of Africa. The victory was cheered by Egyptians, if it received scant mention in Italian history books.

After the Horn of Africa, Italy set its sights on Libya. Egyptians were understandably hostile to the Italian occupation of that country on its western border, which took place between 1911 and 1913. Egyptians were incensed at this latest European encroachment on the Ottoman Empire, of which Egypt was still nominally a part and the capital of which was still the seat of the Islamic caliphate. Of more immediate importance, however, was the threat of possible invasion, a threat made all the more likely by the fact that the Senusi-led Libyan resistance had bases in the oases in Egypt's Western Desert. Egyptian apprehensions of the Italian presence in Libya were proved well-founded. A decade after their occupation of Libya, the Italians succeeded in obtaining Jaboub Oasis. Although this acquisition came by virtue of an agreement between the Egyptian and Italian governments, Egypt only agreed after having had its arm twisted by the British, which compounded the outrage of the Egyptian people over this territorial compromise.

Egyptians thus had good cause to keep their eyes trained on Italy's actions in Africa, which is why they would not have been surprised at the Al-Ahram headline: "The diverse phases of the Ethiopian problem". Appearing on 31 August 1935, the article states that this problem reared its head in the wake of an event that took place on 5 December 1934 on the borders between Italian Somalia, Ethiopia and British Somalia. "In late November, a joint British-Ethiopian committee went to Walwal with the purpose of laying out the British-Ethiopian boundary in that area. Suddenly, at the Walwal wells, located 400 kilometres from the Indian Ocean, they came across an Italian force that prevented them from completing their mission in this area on the grounds that they had crossed into Italian territory."

The article goes on to relate that, although the committee members returned to Addis Ababa, they had left behind the force that had been guarding them. As a result of Italian provocation, there erupted a brief skirmish resulting in a number of dead and wounded on both sides.

The "Walwal incident", as it came to be known, was triggered by Italy, in part perhaps because of its desire to avenge itself for its defeat at the hands of the Ethiopian army 40 years earlier, but largely because of the renewed expansionist drive fired by Mussolini. As though to emphasise its aim, Rome rejected all proposals for a peaceful resolution to the dispute, including recourse to an independent arbitration committee. Rome was adamant that it should receive appropriate compensation and that Addis Ababa present an official apology.

On 18 December, Addis Ababa submitted a report to the League of Nations containing proof that the Walwal wells area fell within the Ethiopian borders. Italy responded that the boundaries between Somalia and Ethiopia had never been delineated. It was then reported that Italian forces had advanced further into Ethiopian territories to the village of Garlogbi . Rome did not deny the report, but it did state that its planes had circled over the area to monitor Ethiopian troop movements, which, it claimed, were preparing an assault against Italian forces. The Italians then went on the offensive, using every weapon in their arsenal including internationally banned poison gas, while ignoring all League of Nations attempts to halt the hostilities and the international condemnations of its actions.

Egypt was particularly disturbed by this crisis into which Mussolini had dragged the world. The Italians were already poised to the west and it hardly wanted an additional threat from the south. In fact, there was considerable concern that if the confrontation in the Horn of Africa escalated, then British and Italian forces might clash, with Egypt as a possible battle arena and with Egyptian forces serving as gun fodder. Such apprehensions surfaced in the Egyptian press, one example of which is an Al-Ahram report of 16 October 1935. Citing an informed source, the newspaper writes, "Those who claim that the Egyptian army is not large enough or well equipped to defend the country are fooling themselves. Our defences will concentrate in the air force and navy, supported by a large number of rapid armoured artillery vehicles." The newspaper also reported that the eighth infantry regiment had been dispatched to Marsa Matrouh where it would link up with another infantry regiment and an artillery regiment that had already been redeployed there. "We have learned that these regiments have taken up stations at the front and have begun to dig trenches, set up special artillery bases and construct arms and ammunitions bunkers." A third item would have stirred even greater alarm. It reported that the government had taken measures to safeguard citizens from poison gas attacks.

In addition, several reports focussed on the preparations under way among the British forces stationed in Egypt. At the coast at Al-Maks, they had appropriated a piece of land which they surrounded by barbed wire and upon which they had begun to build installations that would serve as a military base. A second item relates that there were now some 60 British warships in the port at Alexandria. "There is intensive activity in the area of the port and ships are constantly heading out to sea for surveillance and manoeuvres." In addition a British carrier had arrived with 75 fighter planes, some of which it dispatched to the airport at Abu Qir, and this was followed by the arrival of another carrier which brought another 70 military aircraft and other military equipment.

British and Egyptian forces then established their front-line defence fortifications, which ran from Marsa Matrouh down to Siwa. It was decided that Egyptians would undertake the defence of the northern segment of this line down to kilometre 32, and the British the southern segment from this point down to Siwa. Work then began on building water and other supply lines. Authorities were also concerned about the morale of conscripts at the front, as we can understand from the official statement, reported in Al-Ahram, that in view of the great efforts being exerted by the troops, their rations would be increased. "Instead of the three loaves of bread per day that they have been receiving they will get four, and their ration of 110 grammes of meat will be doubled to 220. In addition, orders have been issued to give them a daily quantity of sugar and tea... This is a well deserved reward for those soldiers who have been working with such great determination and superhuman energy in the desert," commented Al-Ahram.

Meanwhile, to the south there lurked the danger of Italy gaining control over the sources of the Nile and putting Egypt in the worst imaginable stranglehold. Al-Ahram took the occasion to furnish a brief account of Egypt's quest to secure that major source of its Nile. If that was one of the primary motives behind Khedive Ismail's military campaign in Ethiopia, this was only one chapter in this quest. Even the British, following their occupation of Egypt, readily admitted that the greatest threat to their existence in Egypt came from the south. It is little wonder, therefore, that in 1891, even before the reconquest of Sudan, Britain and Italy reached an agreement over the partition of Ethiopia. The agreement contained a secret protocol in accordance with which Italy pledged not to undertake any construction on the Atbara River that might affect its flow or alter its course. Just over 10 years later, on 15 May 1902, Britain signed another agreement with Ethiopia, in the second article of which the latter pledged not to construct or permit the construction of any work at the sources of the Blue Nile, Lake Tana or on Subat that would diminish or alter their flow into the Nile.

At the time of the Italian-Ethiopian campaign, the British were keen to allay Egyptian fears that an Italian occupation of Ethiopia would wreak disaster on the sources of the Nile. The Daily Telegraph solicited a contribution from a noted expert on the Nile, General Timberly, who rather sternly reproached Egyptians for the hypersensitivity over their major source of water. Egypt had nothing to be afraid of, he asserted. Even if a dam were built at the outlet of Lake Tana Egyptians should bear in mind that that lake contributed only a relatively small amount of the waters that reached the Blue Nile.

More important, perhaps, was the statement by the former technical adviser to the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works, Murdoch MacDonald, to the Al-Ahram special correspondent in London. "Whether control over Lake Tana remains under Ethiopian rule or is transferred to the hands of another power, Egypt should not have a moment's alarm over the effect this would have on the water that reaches it. About 170,000 square miles of land are watered by the Blue Nile in Ethiopia. This is the area that should concern Egypt. So even supposing that Italy extended its influence over Ethiopia, Egypt has nothing to fear over its water. No human power exists that could prevent the winter floods from passing through their course from the Blue Nile in Ethiopia to Sudan and from there to Egypt."

Italian colonialist aggression and its potential threat to Egypt, whether or not this included the threat to the Nile, raised another problem. Should Italian commercial and military ships still be allowed to pass through the Suez Canal on there way to and from East Africa? The canal was universally recognised as a neutral international waterway, in accordance with the Constantinople Convention of 29 October 1888. Fearful that Britain would not heed this convention, Rome quickly reminded it of the provisions of its fourth article. This stated that the canal must remain open even in times of war, even to military ships of warring nations, without risk or any hostile activity or any action that might obstruct their freedom of navigation in the canal, at its three ports and in the open seas up to three miles from the ports at either end. The article stated that the ships of warring nations must pass through the canal as rapidly as possible and should not remain anchored at Port Said or Suez for more than 24 hours. In the event that two or more ships of hostile nations had to pass through the canal, there had to be a 24-hour interval between the time one party's ship left a port and the time its adversary's ship left the same port.

In spite of this treaty, there was a call in the League of Nations to close the Suez to Italian warships. Officials in Cairo and in London were opposed. The last thing the British wanted was to internationalise the canal issue and risk diminishing its political and military control over it.

However, the Suez Canal issue, in turn, raised another, quite unexpected, subject: the privileges accorded to the Suez Canal Company. On one hand, there was considerable resentment over the company's staffing policies. As Al-Ahram put it, it engaged only Frenchmen as administrators, "relegating Egyptians to waiters and janitors". On the other hand, the company enjoyed customs exemptions on all its imports, including the fireworks used for the 14 July anniversary displays, granite for commemorative plaques and luxury cars for its senior officials. The Al-Ahram article on this issue inspired many of its readers to join the campaign against the Suez company's privileges, which was one way to air the nationalist desire to assume control over the operations of this strategic waterway and its ports.

The Ethiopian-Italian war was one of the few subjects over which Egyptians and the British saw eye to eye. Nationalists feared that the British would interpret this as a form of acquiescence, which prompted them to make their position crystal clear. "The British must not exploit Egyptian pro- Ethiopian sympathies," cautioned an Al-Ahram headline on 4 August 1935. Egypt's position on the war was founded upon different considerations than those that dictated the position of the British government, it explained. It then commented, "Were it not for the fact that Italy is competing with them today, just as France did yesterday, the British would be the ones contemplating the occupation of Ethiopia and its annexation to their colonies. We have only to look at how quickly the British seized the German colonies in Africa to realise their wish to make all of Africa part of the British Empire."

Al-Ahram proclaimed the nationalist position on 19 October under the headline, "Once again, Egypt fights to defend itself, not the British Empire." In this article, the newspaper cautioned Egyptian Prime Minister Tawfiq Nasim against taking part in any war unless dictated by Egyptian national interests. It further warned, "The government must not keep the people ignorant of the affairs that affect their fate. Nor should it attempt to carry the burden alone, for this is beyond its powers."

Nothing could more clearly demonstrate how a remote war could not only affect Egypt but virtually become a domestic policy issue. The "Ethiopian-Italian war" was much more than a child's game.